People v. Ardella
| Decision Date | 24 November 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 43023,43023 |
| Citation | 49 Ill.2d 517,276 N.E.2d 302 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Joseph ARDELLA, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
William R. Jacobs, Chicago, appointed by the court, for appellant.
William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, Edward V. Hanrahan, State's Atty., and James B. Zagel and E. James Gildea, Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago (Robert A. Novelle and George Elsener, Asst. State's Attys. of counsel), for the People.
The defendant was found guilty following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County of the offense of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and of the offense of failing to yield the right-of-way to an approaching vehicle when making a left turn. He has appealed from these convictions.
Following the investigation of an accident in which defendant was involved he was taken to a Cook County sheriff's-police station where breathalizer tests were performed on him which revealed a high percent of alcohol in his blood. Defendant was then taken into another room where an audio-video camera and equipment were located. The camera was operated by one officer who was stationed near it and another officer stood near the defendant and held a microphone in his hand for the purpose of recording the defendant's voice. At the beginning of the recording the officer is shown reading to defendant the full warnings prescribed by the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. The officers administered certain coordination-performance tests and the same with responses thereto were recorded on the audio-video tape. Prior to trial the court denied defendant's motion to suppress the tape which was introduced as evidence and shown to the court at the trial.
Defendant contends that it was error to admit the audio-video tape into evidence since he had not consented to being filmed nor was he warned that the tape would be used against him. The defendant further complains that the use of the tape violated the Illinois eavesdropping statute. Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, ch. 38, par. 14--1 et seq.
Defendant's constitutional objections are based on the fourth and fifth amendments to the Federal constitution. He contends that since he was not aware of the fact that his actions were being recorded and had not consented thereto, the recording of his actions and his voice on audio-video tape violated his right under the fourth amendment to the Federal constitution. We see here no such violation. The defendant relies on Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, wherein the Supreme Court held that defendant's fourth amendment rights had been violated when government agents attached a device to the exterior of the phone booth and recorded the defendant's conversation. Although the court stated that the fourth amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional right to privacy, the court held that the government's activities had violated the privacy upon which the defendant justifiably relied while using the telephone and thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the fourth amendment. In the recent case of United States v. White (1971), 401 U.S. 745, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 28 L.Ed.2d 453, the court pointed out that Katz involved no revelation to the government by a party to the conversations with the defendant. The court reaffirmed the holding in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374, to the effect that the fourth amendment affords no protection to 'a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.' The court also reaffirmed its holding in Lopez v. United States, 374 U.S. 427, 83 S.Ct. 1381, 10 L.Ed.2d 462, to the effect that the fourth amendment rights are not violated when an agent unknown to the defendant carries electronic equipment to record the defendant's words. In White the informant, while talking to defendant, was equipped with a transmitter and the government agents testified as to the defendant's conversation which they heard while monitoring the transmission. The court held that the defendant's fourth amendment rights had not been violated. In White the court concluded that since a police agent may make notes of his conversation with defendant and later testify concerning them as in Hoffa, for constitutional purposes, no different result is required if the agent records the conversation with electronic equipment which he is carrying as in Lopez, or if he carries radio equipment which transmits the conversation to other agents who are monitoring the frequency as in White. The court held that in such situations the defendant's constitutionally justifiable expectation of privacy is not invaded.
In the case now under consideration not only is our conclusion fortified by the holding in Hoffa, Lopez and White, but also in our case unlike the three cases referred to, the defendant before he spoke had been warned that anything he said could be used against him. Under these circumstances there was no violation of the rights secured to the defendant by the fourth amendment to the Federal constitution.
As to the defendant's rights under the fifth amendment to the Federal constitution he admits that prior to the...
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...v. Mines, 132 Ill.App.2d 628, 270 N.E.2d 265 (Ill.1971).11 State v. Thurman, 84 N.M. 5, 498 P.2d 697 (N.M.1972).12 People v. Ardella, 49 Ill.2d 517, 276 N.E.2d 302 (Ill.1971).13 Mercer v. State, 6 Md.App. 370, 251 A.2d 387 (1969), cert. den. 255 Md. 743 (1969); English v. State, 8 Md.App. 3......
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...were the sole issue presented, our review of this question would be de novo, and our answer would be "yes." See People v. Ardella, 49 Ill.2d 517, 522, 276 N.E.2d 302 (1971). However, this is not defendant's argument. Defendant argues that he did not impliedly consent. This is a factual ques......
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Stamatiou v. United States Gypsum Company, 73 C 3257.
...calls were being recorded and consented thereto. A clear manifestation of consent would constitute a good defense. People v. Ardella, 49 Ill.2d 517, 276 N.E.2d 302 (1971). The transcript passage upon which the defendants rely to establish consent, however, does not make clear that the plain......
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People v. Beardsley
...to the recording of their conversation constituted consent for the purpose of the eavesdropping statute. People v. Ardella (1971), 49 Ill.2d 517, 522, 276 N.E.2d 302. The evidence, however, showed that the officers did not know defendant was recording their conversation. From their position......