People v. Arendarczyk

• Decision Date: 22 December 1937
• Docket Number: No. 24318.,24318.
• Citation: 367 Ill. 534,12 N.E.2d 2
• Parties: PEOPLE v. ARENDARCZYK.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

367 Ill. 534

12 N.E.2d 2

PEOPLE

v.ARENDARCZYK.

No. 24318.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 22, 1937.

Jacob Arendarczyk was convicted of incest, and he brings error.

Reversed and remanded.Appeal from Criminal Court, Cook County; Robert C. O'Connell, judge.

A. Jefferson Schultze and Stephen Lee, both of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

Otto Kerner, Atty. Gen., Thomas J. Courtney, State's Atty., of Chicago, and A. B. Dennis, of Danville (Edward E. Wilson, John T. Gallagher, Blair L. Varnes, and Melvin S. Rembe, all of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

FARTHING, Chief Justice.

Jacob Arendarczyk, herein called the defendant, has sued out this writ of error to review a judgment of conviction rendered by the criminal court of Cook county against him on a charge of incest. The trial was had before the court, a jury having been waived, and in the judgment and sentence there is no mention of the specific charge of incest between a father and a daughter. The defendant was found guilty of ‘incest as charged in the indictment’ and sentenced ‘for the crime of incest in manner and form as charged in the * * * indictment whereof he stands convicted for a term of years not less than one year nor more than twenty years,’ etc.

The defendant relies on the fact that there is also another crime called incest; namely, that between males and females within certain prescribed degrees of consanguinity, which is punishable by a sentence of not less than one year nor more than ten years, 38 S.H.A. 375, in contending that the judgment was erroneous because it made no mention of the particular charge of incest on which he was tried. 38 S.H.A. 374. He relies on our holding in People v. Wood, 318 Ill. 388, 149 N.E. 273. We said 318 Ill. 388, at page 393, 149 N.E. 273, 275: ‘The term fixed by the section of the Criminal Code relating to the crime of which the prisoner stands convicted is read into every judgment, but it is necessary to state in the judgment the name of the crime, or so describe it that it can be identified by the warden. In the case of incest there are two sections of the Criminal Code describing two different crimes, and each fixing a different term of imprisonment. Plaintiff in error stands convicted of cohabiting with his own daughter, and that is the crime that must be described in the judgment, so that the punishment fixed for that offense will be taken as a part of the sentence, whether written in the judgment or not.’ In the case before us, the judgment fixed a sentence of one to twenty years, which is the penalty fixed by section 156 of the Criminal Code, 38 S.H.A. 374, and the warden could readily tell which crime of incest the defendant had been charged with and convicted of without further descriptive words in the judgment and sentence.

The defendant contends that his alleged confession was improperly admitted in evidence. His counsel objected to the assistant state's attorney, Papanek, testifyingas to statements made by the defendant, and to the confession itself, on the ground that they were the results of threats and violence. No other witnesses were called, although the confession was signed by Long, an assistant state's attorney, and Officer La Roy, as witnesses. The testimony showed other persons were also present before and at the time the confession was signed. The defendant testified the confession was wrung from him by threats and violence. The burden is on the People to show that a confession was made voluntarily, where it is objected to, as here. The evidence should show all the circumstances under which the alleged confession was made. People v. Cope, 345 Ill. 278, 178 N.E. 95;People v. Basile, 356 Ill. 171, 190 N.E. 307. Where there is evidence tending to show the use of violence, threats, torture, or promises, all the persons having any authority or control over the person making the confession and charged by the evidence with the use of such means must be called, if practicable, and examined as witnesses before the confession may be admitted. People v. Rogers, 303 Ill. 578, 136 N.E. 470;People v. Sweeney, 304 Ill. 502, 136 N.E. 687. The facts as to what took place at the trial in the case before us are similar to those in People v. Holick, 337 Ill. 333, 169 N.E. 169. There, only one witness testified as to the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the signed confession, although, as here, other persons were then present, and that witness, like Papanek, could not cover all of the time during which the defendant was questioned or in custody before making the alleged confession. The witness in that case, a police officer, denied the use of threats or violence, just as Papanek did. At page 337 of 337 Ill.,169 N.E. 169, 171, of the Holick Case we said: ‘For all that appears, this witness was the one who knew the least about what had taken place.’ We have...