People v. Sims

• Decision Date: 29 March 1961
• Docket Number: No. 35519,35519
• Citation: 21 Ill.2d 425,173 N.E.2d 494
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. George SIMS, Plaintiff in Error.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 494

173 N.E.2d 494

21 Ill.2d 425

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. George SIMS, Plaintiff in Error.

No. 35519.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 29, 1961.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Sept. 20, 1961.

Julius Lucius Echeles and Barry Goodman, Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

William L. Guild, Atty. Gen., and Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Francis X. Riley, Asst. State's Atty., Chicago, of counsel), for defendant in error.

HERSHEY, Justice.

Defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of 199 years. He assigns as error the admission into evidence of a confession which he claims was not voluntarily given.

Defendant confessed after having been held in custody by the police for approximately 19 hours. It is not clear whether his contention that his confession was involuntary is based primarily upon alleged specific acts of coercion or upon the theory that the questioning to which he was subjected during the period of detention was of itself sufficiently coercive as to render his confession involuntary. The testimony at the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress the confession shows that, although there were frequent periods of questioning, these were interspersed with rest periods, and there is nothing to indicate that the interrogation of defendant was sufficiently prolonged or intensive to compel the exclusion of his confession. In this respect, the facts shown by the present record fall far short of the situation presented in People v. Vinci, 295 Ill. 419, 129 N.E. 193, and People v. Goldblatt, 383 Ill. 176, 49 N.E.2d 36.

The specific coercive acts alleged by defendant are limited to a relatively short span of time. Defendant testified that, at one stage in the questioning period, a sergeant Flanagan told defendant he was tired of folling around on this case and hit him across the face and in the stomach and across the back of his neck. At the time this is alleged to have occurred no one else was present. Then, according to defendant's charges a lieutenant Noonan entered the room, told the defendant that he was sure he could not take the punishment, and urged him to confess. The officers involved took the stand and denied these charges. Defendant testified that he was advised by an unidentified officer that, if he did not cooperate, his wife would be implicated on some other charge. Since defendant was separated from his wife the likelihood that this threat was an effective factor in inducing his confession is remote. The foregoing evidence of coercive acts given only by the defendant is the only evidence of that nature in the record.

Six police officers testified at the hearing on the voluntary nature of the confession. Defendant urges that there were other officers, whom, with one exception, he does not name, involved in the interrogation of defendant who should have been called, and that the State's failure to call them rendered the confession inadmissible.

The recent case of People v. Dale, 20 Ill.2d 532, 171 N.E.2d 1, is the latest application by this court of the rule that a confession objected to as involuntary should not be admitted unless each material witness on the issue is either produced or his absence explained. The persons required to be called as witnesses have been variously described as 'all the police department men engaged or present at the sweating' (People v. Spranger, 314 Ill. 602, 610, 145 N.E. 706, 710; People v. Sweeney, 304 Ill. 502, 513, 136 N.E. 687); 'all the persons who had control over the defendant and are allegedly involved in the use of coercion' (People v. LaCoco, 406 Ill. 303, 311, 94 N.E.2d 178, 183; People v. Cope, 345 Ill. 278, 283, 178 N.E. 95); 'all persons present at the time the confession is made' (People v. Kraus, 395 Ill. 233, 236, 69 N.E.2d 885, 887); 'all the persons having any authority or control over the defendant' (People v. Wagoner, 8 Ill.2d 188, 197, 133 N.E.2d 24, 30); 'every police officer and every other person connected with taking' the confession (People v. Jennings, 11 Ill.2d 610, 144 N.E.2d 612, 615; People v. Sloss, 412 Ill. 61, 718 104 N.E.2d 807); and 'all of the persons who were present at the time the confession was made, and at the time of the alleged promise of leniency and the alleged police brutality.' People v. Sammons, 17 Ill.2d 316, 320, 161 N.E.2d 322, 324. Throughout these variations in phraseology there runs the dominant theme that, when the voluntary character of a confession has been timely and properly put in issue, all witnesses whose testimony is material to that issue should be called or their absence explained. Despite the fact that the argument has not always been stated in identical terms, the decisions are found to be in harmony when the facts of each case are examined.

That the real basis for the requirement that certain witnesses be called is the materiality of their testimony on the issue of the voluntary nature of the confession is shown by our most recent decision involving the problem. People v. Dale, 20, Ill.2d 532, at page 533, 171 N.E.2d 1, at page 2 where we said: 'This court on numerous occasions has held that where there is evidence that a confession has been extorted from an accused, the prosecution must, if feasible, produce all persons connected with taking the confession in order to ascertain whether it was voluntary. (People v. Sammons, 17 Ill.2d 316, 161 N.E.2d 322; People v. Wagoner, 8 Ill.2d 188, 133 N.E.2d 24; People v. Rogers, 303 Ill. 578, 136 N.E. 470.) However, as was pointed out in People v. Jennings, 11 Ill.2d 610, 144 N.E.2d 612, it is not a mechanical rule but a practical one, designed to assist the court in determining whether the confession was voluntary. It was there held that each material witness, on the issue of the voluntary nature of the confession, must be produced or his absence explained. The question is whether the requirement was satisfied here.' (Emphasis supplied.) Applying the test of materiality, we held in the Dale case, 20 Ill.2d at page, 534, 171 N.E.2d at page 2 that a confession was erroneously admitted where one of the two police officers who had allegedly beaten the defendant was not called, stating that this officer was 'certainly a material witness since he is the one of the two officers who allegedly coerced the confession.'

In People v. Sammons, 17 Ill.2d 316, 161 N.E.2d 322, the claim that the confession was involuntary was based upon defendant's allegations (1) that he was beaten by a police officer and (2) that a promise of leniency was made by an examiner at a lie-detector test. Both an assistant State's Attorney and a court reporter were present at the time of the alleged beating. The assistant State's Attorney did not testify and no explanation was offered for the failure to call him. The court reporter testified only as to the accuracy of the statement he had reported and not on the question of the alleged police brutality. At the time the promise of leniency was allegedly made, there were present two polygraph operators, neither of whom testified. Obviously all four of these persons were material witnesses on the question of the voluntary nature of the confession, and we held that failure to call them or explain their absence rendered the confession inadmissible.

In People v. Wagoner, 8 Ill.2d 188, 133 N.E.2d 24, the real basis for the reversal was the complete failure of the trial court to hold any preliminary hearing out of the presence of the jury to determine the admissibility of the confession. Although the opinion reiterated the rule requiring the production of certain witnesses, it does not appear just who the witnesses were or the materiality of their testimony.

In People v. Sloss, 412 Ill. 61, 104 N.E.2d 807, several officers who were present throughout the questioning and the alleged beating of the defendant were not called. Also not testifying was an assistant State's Attorney to whom the defendant had allegedly complained concerning the tactics of the police. Here again, these were all material witnesses on the issue of the voluntary nature of the confession, and we reversed, holding that the confession was improperly admitted. In People v. Davis, 399 Ill. 265, 77 N.E.2d 703, all the officers implicated in the alleged coercion were not called, and those who testified did not specifically deny the alleged acts of mistreatment. In People v. Arendarczyk, 367 Ill. 534, 12 N.E.2d 2, the State called only one witness, despite the fact that others were present at the time of the alleged coercion. Moreover, the testimony of the one who took the stand did not cover the entire period of time involved. In People v. Holick, 337 Ill. 333, 169 N.E. 169, the defendant claimed that his confession was involuntary, because he was constantly grilled over an extended period of time while he was sick and in a weakened condition, and was subjected to threats and physical violence. The prosecution produced only one police officer, whose testimony covered only about 1/10 of the period involved and who did not specifically deny the facts alleged by the defendant. In People v. Spranger, 314 Ill. 602, 145 N.E. 706, one of the police officers present at the time of the alleged threats was not called, and in People v. Sweeney, 304 Ill. 502, 136 N.E. 687, there was a failure to call some officers who were charged with brutality or who were present at the time of the alleged brutality.

An examination of the foregoing cases reveals that each of them involved a failure to produce one or more witnesses whose testimony would have been material to the issue of the voluntary nature of the confession. For this reason, in each case, the confession was held to have been improperly admitted in evidence.

Conversely, we have affirmed convictions in cases where a confession was admitted despite the failure of the State to call certain persons, where the...