People v. Arnau

• Decision Date: 15 December 1982
• Citation: 58 N.Y.2d 27,457 N.Y.S.2d 763,444 N.E.2d 13
• Parties: , 444 N.E.2d 13 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Ricardo ARNAU, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 763

457 N.Y.S.2d 763

58 N.Y.2d 27, 444 N.E.2d 13

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Ricardo ARNAU, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 15, 1982.

Elizabeth Holtzman, Dist. Atty. (Alan D. Rubinstein and Barbara D. Underwood, Asst. Dist. Attys., of counsel), for appellant.

Donald I. Marlin, New York City, for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

JASEN, Judge.

The issue raised on this appeal is whether evidence seized pursuant to a valid search warrant obtained after the police illegally entered defendant's apartment should be suppressed even though the search warrant was obtained on the basis of information gathered from lawful sources prior to and independent of the illegal entry.

On June 21, 1977, at 3:55 p.m., an undercover police officer purchased a quantity of cocaine from the defendant at his apartment at 398 Cornelia Street in Brooklyn. After observing the undercover officer leaving defendant's apartment, Officer Randazzo, the remainder of the narcotics squad surveillance team and the undercover officer met a prearranged location. When the undercover officer informed the team that he had observed a large quantity of narcotics in defendant's apartment, a decision was made to enter and secure the apartment immediately.

At 4:30 p.m., Officer Randazzo and other officers entered the building at 398 Cornelia Street, a two-family, three-floor structure occupied solely by defendant and his family, and found defendant in the first floor foyer making house repairs. Defendant was arrested, handcuffed and led to his apartment on the top floor. The officers entered the apartment through an open door and handcuffed defendant to a radiator while the officers checked the apartment for other occupants and additional entrances and exits. No search for evidence was conducted at that time and no evidence was discovered or seized.

Officer Randazzo then called for assistance and at 5:10 p.m. four additional officers arrived to secure the apartment. Thereupon, Officers Randazzo and Scagnelli left the apartment to meet with the undercover officer. At 6:20 p.m., they proceeded to the District Attorney's office for the purpose of preparing an application for a search warrant. The paper work having been completed at approximately 7:45 p.m., the team, in the company of the Assistant District Attorney, left for the courthouse. The search warrant affidavit, prepared by the team and sworn to by Officer Randazzo, which reflected only information obtained from the undercover officer with respect to the type, quantity and location of the contraband which he observed in defendant's apartment, was presented to the Presiding Judge. Nothing observed by the officers upon their initial entry into defendant's apartment was mentioned in the affidavit. Based upon the information contained in the affidavit, the Presiding Judge signed the search warrant at approximately 8:30 p.m.

At approximately 9:00 p.m., the officers bearing the search warrant returned to the premises. After displaying the warrant to the defendant, the apartment was searched. The search uncovered a plastic bag containing cocaine lodged in an ice cream container in the refrigerator; a large quantity of marihuana and a three-beam scale was fou in a closet. More cocaine was discovered in a black leather bag inside a metal box in defendant's bedroom.

After the search was completed at 11:10 p.m., the defendant was taken to the police station and charged with criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first, third, fifth and sixth degrees, and criminally using drug paraphernalia in the third degree.

A pretrial suppression hearing was conducted, after which defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence discovered during the search of his apartment was denied. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, granted the motion to suppress, and remitted for further proceedings.

The People now appeal from the Appellate Division order contending that the initial entry into defendant's apartment was lawful because it was necessary to prevent the drugs from being sold or destroyed, and that the subsequent seizure of the challenged evidence was likewise lawful. It is further contended that, regardless of whether or not exigent circumstances existed, the evidence should not be suppressed since it was obtained pursuant to a valid search warrant based solely on information obtained prior to and independent of the initial entry.

Defendant contends that there was no exigency which justified the initial warrantless entry and, additionally, that the evidence seized should be suppressed as the fruit of the initial illegal entry.

We note at the outset that we are not confronted with a situation where the police have illegally entered a home, discovered contraband, and then sought a search warrant in an attempt to validate the seizure of the fruits of the illegal entry. (United States v. Griffin, 6 Cir., 502 F.2d 959, cert. den. 419 U.S. 1050, 95 S.Ct. 626, 42 L.Ed.2d 645.) Furthermore, this is not a situation where a search was conducted pursuant to an invalid warrant (People v. Williams, 37 N.Y.2d 206, 371 N.Y.S.2d 880, 333 N.E.2d 160), nor does this case involve a warrantless search of a home which is sought to be justified as incident to a lawful arrest outside that home (Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 26 L.Ed.2d 409). What we are confronted with here is a situation where the police, having firsthand information that a suspect was currently selling lar quantities of narcotics from his home, enter the suspect's home solely for the purpose of securing the premises and prevent ing the destruction of evidence and then wait until a search warrant arrives before conducting a search of the premises which ultimately turns up large quantities of illegal narcotics and drug paraphernalia.

In determining whether or not evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant based entirely on information obtained prior to and independent of the initial warrantless entry should be suppressed, we are guided by the realization that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created tool designed to effectuate rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. (Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 483, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3047, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S.Ct. 613, 620, 38 L.Ed.2d 561; People v. McGrath, 46 N.Y.2d 12, 21, 412 N.Y.S.2d 801, 385 N.E.2d 541.) The rule provides that evidence which is obtained as a result of illegal police activity may not be used against a defendant at his criminal trial. It must be remembered, however, that the exclusionary rule, when applied, exacts a heavy price by encroaching upon the public interest in prosecuting persons accused of criminal activity and having their guilt or innocence determined on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth. (Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175, 89 S.Ct. 961, 967, 22 L.Ed.2d 176; People v. Rogers, 52 N.Y.2d 527, 534-535, 439 N.Y.S.2d 96, 421 N.E.2d 491.) Consequently, courts have long held that only evidence which " 'has been come at by exploitation of that illegality' " should be suppressed. (Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441, quoting Maguire, Evidence of Guilt [1959], p. 221; 3 La Fave, Search & Seizure, § 11.4, p. 613.) As a result of this recognition, the defendant challenging the admission of the evidence has the burden of showing that the seizure of the evidence was causally related to the illegal police conduct. To use the timeworn phrase used by Justice Frankfurter, only evidence which is the "fruit of the poisonous tree" should be excluded. (Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341, 60 S.Ct. 266, 267, 84 L.Ed. 307.)

To resolve this appeal, we consider the independent source rule as one of the exceptions carved from the exclusionary rule. This rule was first articulated in the Silverthorne Lbr. Co. case, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319, wherein the Supreme Court indicated that when the police act illegally during the process of obtaining evidence, "this does not mean th the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others " (Silverthorne Lbr. Co. v. United States, supra, at p. 392, 40 S.Ct. at p. 183 [emphasis supplied].)

Applying the independent source rule to the facts of this case, it would be inappropriate to order suppression of the evidence which was lawfully seized pursuant to a valid search warrant ¹ based solely on information obtained prior to and independent of the illegal entry. An undercover police officer personally observed large quantities of drugs in defendant's apartment at the time he purchased $325 worth of cocaine from the defendant. This information, as found by both courts below, was sufficient to constitute probable cause to arrest the defendant. After arresting the defendant, the police officers entered defendant's apartment not for the purpose of searching for and seizing evidence, but merely to secure the premises to assure that the drugs would not be sold or otherwise disposed of. ² No search for evidence was conducted at that time and no evidence was uncovered or seized. After the apartment was secured, a warrant was obtained based solely on information obtained by the undercover officer prior to and independent of the illegal entry. Only after the warrant arrived did the police search the apartment and uncover the drugs. It was during the course of that lawful search, authorized by a neutral Judge, that the challenged evidence was discovered and seized. Since there is not the slightest hint that the search warrant was in any way tainted by the illegal entry or that the police exploited the entry in an effort to obtain evidence, we hold that the evidence seized is not the fruit of the poisonous tree...