People v. Arnold

• Decision Date: 28 June 2004
• Docket Number: No. S106444.,S106444.
• Citation: 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 840,92 P.3d 335,33 Cal.4th 294
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Clemantt ARNOLD, Defendant and Appellant.

14 Cal.Rptr.3d 840

92 P.3d 335

33 Cal.4th 294

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Clemantt ARNOLD, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S106444.

Supreme Court of California.

June 28, 2004.

Shama H. Mesiwala, Sacramento, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and William M. Duncan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Stan A. Cross and Patrick J. Whalen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

BAXTER, J.

In this case we interpret the scope and effect of a defendant's waiver of custody credits — commonly referred to as a "Johnson waiver" (People v. Johnson (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 183, 147 Cal.Rptr. 55 (Johnson)) — which enables a sentencing court to reinstate a defendant on probation after he or she has violated probation, conditioned on service of an additional county jail term, as an alternative to imposing a state prison sentence. We conclude that when a defendant knowingly and intelligently waives jail time custody credits after violating probation in order to be reinstated on probation and thereby avoid a prison sentence, the waiver applies to any future use of such credits should probation ultimately be terminated and a state prison sentence imposed. The Court of Appeal having concluded otherwise, the judgment of that court will be reversed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant was detained by police and found to be in possession of rock cocaine base, a pager, and a large amount of cash. On October 21, 1997, representing himself, he pled no contest to possession of a controlled substance. (Health & Saf.Code, § 11350, subd. (a).) To avoid a state prison sentence, he entered a Johnson waiver. The trial court informed defendant that as part of his plea he was "waiv[ing] all time credits through today, and there would be no immediate state prison in this case." Defendant indicated on the record that he understood. As part of the plea form, he executed a written waiver that stated, "I WILL WAIVE ALL CREDITS FOR JAIL TIME SERVED THROUGH 10-21-97." On November 18, 1997, defendant was placed on probation for three years, conditioned on his serving 60 days in the county jail, with credit for 28 days already served (from the date of entry of the plea to sentencing).

One month after sentencing, a petition was filed in the Butte County Superior Court alleging that defendant was in violation of the terms of his probation. Several weeks later, that petition was withdrawn. One year after sentencing, a second petition was filed alleging that defendant was in violation of probation. On May 3, 1999, defendant admitted the allegations of that petition. On June 14, 1999, defendant was reinstated on probation conditioned on his serving an additional 90 days in the county jail. Defendant again entered a Johnson waiver, waiving all custody credits for time already served. On this second occasion the trial court did specifically advise defendant that his waiver of credits applied to any future prison sentence that might be imposed.

On August 4, 2000, a third petition was filed alleging that defendant was once again in violation of the terms of his probation. On November 7, 2000, the petition was sustained. On December 4, 2000, defendant was ordered to undergo a 90-day psychological evaluation pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.03. Thereafter, on March 5, 2001, defendant was sentenced to the middle term of two years in state prison. He was awarded 162 days of actual time served, and 80 days of additional credit. He was not, however, awarded custody credits for the time he served in county jail in 1997 and 1999 under his previously entered Johnson waivers.

Defendant appealed his sentence. He conceded in his opening brief that credit for the time he served in county jail under his second Johnson waiver was unavailable against his prison term, as that waiver was preceded by an express advisement by the trial court informing him that it applied to, and would preclude credit against, any possible future prison sentence. Defendant nonetheless contended that the entry of his first Johnson waiver was not knowing and intelligent in that he did not understand at that time that he was waiving custody credits against a possible future prison sentence.

In an unpublished opinion, over the dissent of one justice, the Court of Appeal agreed, concluding that defendant's initial Johnson waiver was not knowing and intelligent regarding whether the waived custody credits would still be available for crediting against a possible future prison sentence. The Court of Appeal indicated it was specifically following the rationale of People v. Harris (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 717, 240 Cal.Rptr. 891 (Harris), and rejecting the rationale and holding of People v. Burks (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 232, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 698 (Burks). We granted the Attorney General's petition for review.

DISCUSSION

The Johnson court held that "a defendant who has served one year in jail as a condition of probation and who thereafter violates probation may be sentenced to an additional period of up to one year in jail if he knowingly and intelligently waives the provisions of Penal Code section 2900.5." (Johnson, supra, 82 Cal.App.3d at pp. 184-185, 147 Cal.Rptr. 55.) Although Johnson's waiver rule has been a settled rule of criminal procedure in this state for over two decades, it will be helpful to begin our analysis with a brief explanation of the statutory framework that gave rise to the need for the waiver rule in the first instance.

Statutory background

Penal Code section 19.2¹ has long imposed a one-year limitation on the time that can be served in county jail as a condition of probation upon conviction of a felony or misdemeanor, or upon recommitment to the county jail as a condition of reinstatement of probation. (Johnson, supra, 82 Cal.App.3d at p. 185,147 Cal.Rptr. 55.)

Section 2900.5, enacted in 1971 (Stats.1971, ch. 1732, § 2, p. 3686), originally established a custody credit scheme for the benefit of defendants who were actually sentenced to state prison.² Although a defendant committed to state prison received credit against his or her prison sentence for any local time spent in jail, including jail time previously served as a condition of probation for the same offense, the credit scheme first embodied in section 2900.5 had no application to defendants who were being sentenced to local jail time as a condition of probation or reinstatement of probation. (See People v. Brasley (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 311, 314-317, 115 Cal.Rptr. 910 [section 2900.5, as then in effect, applicable only to state prison commitments]; In re Hays (1953) 120 Cal.App.2d 308, 311, 260 P.2d 1030 [no statute then in existence authorized credit against jail sentences for local time previously served as a condition of probation].)

Hence, prior to the amendment of section 2900.5 in 1976, neither section 19.2 standing alone, nor the interplay of sections 19.2 and 2900.5, provided for any custody credits to be awarded against jail terms for local time previously served in jail as a condition of probation. Section 19.2 merely placed a one-year limitation on county jail terms for any single offense or probation violation, as it does today, and the custody credit scheme of section 2900.5 in effect at that time, although mandating credit for jail time previously served as a condition of probation or otherwise against prison commitments, had no application whatsoever to new county jail commitments.

In 1976, however, subdivision (c) of section 2900.5, which had limited the application of the custody credit scheme of that section to state prison commitments, was amended (Stats.1976, ch. 1045, § 2, p. 4666), in pertinent part, to redefine the "term of imprisonment," i.e., the term against which custody credits are to be applied, to include any "period of imprisonment imposed as a condition of probation...." As a result of this amendment, actual time previously served in county jail, including time served as a condition of probation, would now be credited against any new "term of imprisonment" served in the county jail for the same offense, including any new jail term imposed as a condition of continuing or reinstating the defendant on probation. (See generally People v. Bruner (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1178, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 534, 892 P.2d 1277; In re Rojas (1979) 23 Cal.3d 152, 156, 151 Cal.Rptr. 649, 588 P.2d 789.)

Chamberlain and Johnson

Two years after section 2900.5 was amended, as explained above, "Justice Bernard Jefferson's concurrence in In re Chamberlain (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 712, 720, 144 Cal.Rptr. 326 (Chamberlain) pointed out that nothing in the language of section 2900.5 prohibited a defendant from knowingly and intelligently waiving entitlement to custody credits. [¶] In Chamberlain, the trial court suspended a state prison sentence and placed the defendant on probation conditioned upon service of one year in county jail with no credit for the days the defendant had already spent in jail before sentencing. In a petition for habeas corpus filed in the Court of Appeal, the defendant unsuccessfully challenged that order. In a concurring opinion, Justice Jefferson agreed with the majority's denial of relief, but he did so for the following reason: By accepting probation, the defendant had waived his right to custody credits under section 2900.5, and he had done so knowingly and intelligently. But absent such a waiver, Justice Jefferson explained, any period of incarceration without credits would be an illegal sentence under former section 19a (now § 19.2), which `places a one-year limit upon a county jail commitment given as a condition of probation.' (Chamberlain, supra, 78 Cal.App.3d at pp. 720-721,144 Cal.Rptr. 326 (conc. opn. of Jefferson, J.).)" (People v. Johnson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1050, 1053-1054, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 700, ...