People v. Askar, Docket No. 1607

• Decision Date: 16 November 1967
• Docket Number: No. 2,Docket No. 1607,2
• Citation: 8 Mich.App. 95,153 N.W.2d 888
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Fawzy ASKAR, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 888

153 N.W.2d 888

8 Mich.App. 95

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Fawzy ASKAR, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 1607.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 2.

Nov. 16, 1967

Albert Summer, Weller, Summer & Feder, Detroit, for appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Lansing, S. Jerome Bronson, Pros. Atty., Tower, for appellee.

Before T. G. KAVANAGH, P.J., and McGREGOR and QUINN, JJ.

T. G. KAVANAGH, Presiding Judge.

Defendant was convicted of sodomy. ¹ He appeals.

The appeal makes five assertions of error--the first questioning the sufficiency of the evidence, the second challenging the construction of the statute as forbidding anal intercourse between male and female, and the remaining three asserting that the trial court's rulings and the conduct of the prosecutor prevented the defendant from having a fair trial.

Concerning the sufficiency of the evidence we find no error. There was indeed evidence of the commission of the offense charged and since the weight of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses is for the jury's consideration we will not disturb their findings in this regard. See People v. Petrosky (1938), 286 Mich. 397, 282 N.W. 191; People v. Schram (1965), 1 Mich.App. 279, 136 N.W.2d 44.

Similarly we are not persuaded of error in the construction of the statute. The defendant maintains that the term 'mankind' as used in the statute does not include women.

'It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that the legislative intent must be gathered from the language used, if possible, and that such language shall be given its ordinary meaning unless a different interpretation is indicated.' Goethal v. Kent County Supervisors (1960), 361 Mich. 104, 111, 104 N.W.2d 794, 797. 'Mankind' is a generic term embracing all of humanity. Black, Law Dictionary (4th ed 1951), p. 1115. There is nothing in the statute to indicate that the legislature used the term in a more restrictive sense.

The statute does not define the crime of sodomy. The Michigan Supreme Court has held that in construing the statute we must refer to the common law for the particular acts constituting the offense. People v. Schmitt (1936), 275 Mich. 575, 267 N.W. 741. At common law, sodomy is a carnal copulation between human beings in an unnatural manner. 2 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure, § 751; 2 Bouv. Law Dict., Rawle's Third Revision, p. 3088. The act which defendant is alleged to have performed clearly falls within the terms of this definition. We hold that such conduct constitutes the crime of sodomy under our statute.

In connection with the three remaining assertions of error, however, we are convinced a grave danger is present in cases of this type which warrants close study.

The act of which defendant is accused allegedly occurred in his home in the Bedroom shared by the chief witness and defendant's young son. At trial the prosecutor introduced evidence of two other improper acts by defendant with this witness, one taking place in the Basement of his home, the other in an Apartment which he had rented.

The general rule is well settled that in a criminal trial evidence of other, distinct offenses is not admissible even though they are of the same kind as the offense charged. People v. Schweitzer (1871), 23 Mich. 301. Michigan has recognized two exceptions to this general rule, one being statutory and the other having evolved out of case law. Section 27 of the code of criminal procedure provides:

'In any criminal case where the defendant's motive, intent, the absence of, mistake or accident on his part, or the defendant's scheme, plan or system in doing an act, is material, any like acts or other acts of the defendant which may tend to show his motive, intent, the absence of, mistake or accident on his part, or the defendant's scheme, plan or system in doing the act, in question, may be proved, whether they are contemporaneous with or prior or subsequent thereto; notwithstanding that such proof may show or tend to show the commission of another or prior or subsequent crime by the defendant.' C.L.1948, § 768.27 (Stat.Ann.1954 Rev. § 28.1050).

The Supreme Court has held that this statute is not applicable to prosecutions for gross indecency or for suggesting to a minor that he submit to an act of sexual intercourse with an adult female, because in these types of cases the question of motive, intent, mistake or accident or the existence of a scheme or plan is not involved. See People v. Dean (1931), 253 Mich. 434, 235 N.W. 211; People v. Riddle (1948), 322 Mich. 199, 33 N.W.2d 759. Neither are these elements material in a prosecution for sodomy and we hold that the statutory exception to the general rule of exclusion does not apply to the case at bar.

In some cases another exception to the general rule has been recognized as to certain sexual crimes, under some circumstances. People v. Riddle, supra. Briefly stated, this exception permits the introduction of evidence of prior offenses, identical with the one charged, between the defendant and the person with whom he is alleged to have committed the act for which he is being tried. See People v. Swift (1912), 172 Mich. 473, 138 N.W. 662; People v. Williams (1965) 2 Mich.App. 91, 138 N.W.2d 498. With regard to sexual offenses, the general rule of exclusion is 'based upon the obvious potential prejudicial effect of such evidence, and the courts have frequently pointed out that such evidence is not admissible merely to show the criminal character of the accused.' Annotation, Admissibility in prosecution for sexual offense, of evidence of other similar offenses, 77 A.L.R.2d 841 at pages 846, 847. Because of this potential prejudice to the accused the exception has been strictly construed and evidence of prior offenses is admissible only for certain purposes, i.e. to show 'opportunity, disposition of the parties, and intimate relations tending to break down self-respect.' People v. Williams, supra, 2 Mich.App. at page 94, 138 N.W.2d at page 500. The burden is upon the prosecutor to show for which of these purposes he seeks to introduce evidence of prior offenses and to show that the purpose is material and relevant to the case being tried. Moreover, once the requisite showing has been made and the evidence admitted, we perceive it to be incumbent upon the trial court, whether or not so requested by the defendant, to instruct the jury immediately that the evidence was admitted for a specific purpose and that they shall consider it only for that purpose. In the case at bar there was no showing by the prosecutor of a proper ground for admitting evidence of prior offenses, nor were any instructions given to the jury regarding this evidence. Consequently, evidence of prior offenses by defendant was erroneously admitted and a new trial must be ordered. At such trial nothing will be admissible under this exception other than a prior act of sodomy between defendant and the chief witness for the prosecution, with whom defendant is alleged to have committed the act charged. This will exclude testimony relating to events in defendant's apartment because those events did not involve acts of sodomy...