People v. Dean, 153.

• Decision Date: 27 February 1931
• Docket Number: No. 153.,153.
• Citation: 253 Mich. 434,235 N.W. 211
• Parties: PEOPLE v. DEAN.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

253 Mich. 434

235 N.W. 211

PEOPLE

v.DEAN.

No. 153.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Feb. 27, 1931.

Error to Circuit Court, St. Joseph County; William B. Brown, Judge.

Ray E. Dean was convicted of gross indecency with a boy 17 years of age, in violation of statute, and he brings error.

Reversed, and new trial granted.

Argued before BUTZEL, C. J., and WIEST, CLARK, McDONALD, POTTER, SHARPE, NORTH, and FEAD, JJ.Edward H. Andrews and George H. Arnold, both of Three Rivers, and Harry C. Howard, of Kalamazoo, for appellant.

Paul W. Voorhies, Atty. Gen., M. M. Larmonth, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Lawrence H. Niendorf, Pros. Atty., of Centerville, for the People.

SHARPE, J.

The information in this case charged the defendant with the commission of an act of gross indecency with one Charles Wells, a boy 17 years of age, in violation of section 15511, 3 Comp. Laws 1915 (3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 16851). He reviews his conviction thereof by writ of error.

The prosecution was permitted to prove the commission of similar acts by the defendant with several other boys at times before the charge herein was laid. This evidence was received over objection, and error is assigned thereon.

In People v. Swift, 172 Mich. 473, 138 N. W. 662, it was held that in such cases testimony of previous acts of misconduct between the same parties similar to the one relied on for conviction was admissible, under the authority of the early case of People v. Jenness, 5 Mich. 305, 324. But the same justice who wrote the opinion in the Jenness Case (Christiancy) in People v. Schweitzer, 23 Mich. 301, 304, said: ‘The general rule is well settled that the prosecution are not allowed to prove the commission of another and distinct offense, though of the same kind with that charged, for the purpose of rendering it more probable in the minds of the jury that he committed the offense for which he is on trial; and this would be the natural and inevitable effect upon the minds of the jury, of the admission of such evidence, on whatever ground or pretense it might be admitted; and the defendant would thus be prejudiced on the trial of the offense charged, by proof which he has no reason to anticipate, of an offense for which he is not on trial, and to which, when properly called upon to defend, he may have a perfect defense.’

The rule thus stated has been consistently adhered to by this court. Our last expression relating thereto will be found in People v. Cowles, 246 Mich. 429, 224 N. W. 387.

But, in the opinion of the trial court, this estimony was rendered admissible by the provision in our Criminal Code (Act No. 175, Pub. Acts 1927, chap. 8, § 27, 3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 17320), which reads as follows: ‘In any criminal case where the defendant's motive, intent, the absence of, mistake or accident on his part, or the defendant's scheme, plan or system in doing an act, is material, any like acts or other acts of the defendant which may tend to show his motive, intent, the absence of, mistake or accident on his part, or the defendant's scheme, plan or system in doing the act, in question, may be proved, whether they are contemporaneous with or prior or subsequent thereto; notwithstanding that such proof may show or tend to show the commission of another or prior or subsequent crime by the defendant.’

Counsel for the prosecution urge that, in placing a construction upon the language of this section, we should consider the law as it existed prior thereto, the evident purpose of the Legislature, and the mischief sought to be remedied. Michigan Dairy Co. v. Runnels, 96 Mich. 109, 55 N. W. 617;Laing v. Township of Forest, 139 Mich. 159, 102 N. W. 664.

The question of defendant's ‘motive, intent, the absence of, mistake or accident on his part’ is clearly not involved in the charge as laid. Neither do we think that it can be said that in the commission of the crime charged he was acting in conformity with any ‘scheme’ or ‘plan’ theretofore formulated by him, or that proofs of similar acts with others in any way tend to inform the court or jury as to his ‘...