People v. Atkins
| Decision Date | 23 August 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. C029002,C029002 |
| Citation | 74 Cal.App.4th 466,88 Cal.Rptr.2d 176 |
| Parties | , 1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8757 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert Nelson ATKINS, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Victor Blumenkrantz, by appointment of the Court of Appeal under the Central California Appellate Program, Berkeley, for Defendant and Appellant.
Daniel E. Lungren and Bill Lockyer, Attorneys General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Mathew Chan and Kelly E. LeBel, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted defendant Robert Nelson Atkins of arson of forest land, found he had two prior convictions that qualified as "strikes" under the three strikes law (a 1983 robbery conviction and a 1991 firearm assault conviction), and found that the 1991 conviction was a serious felony for which he had served a recent prison sentence. (Pen.Code, §§ 451, subd. (c); 667, subds. (b)-(i); 667, subd. (a)(1); 667.5, subd. (b); all further references to statutory sections are to the Penal Code.)
The principal issue in this appeal is whether a trier of fact may consider evidence of voluntary intoxication regarding the intent required for arson, an intent delineated in our decisions in In re Stonewall F. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1054, 256 Cal.Rptr. 578 (Stonewall F.) and People v. Fabris (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 685, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 667 (Fabris ). We conclude the trier of fact may consider evidence of voluntary intoxication on the issue of whether an arson defendant actually formed this intent. (Pen.Code, § 22, subd. (b).) The trial court essentially instructed the jury that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to the charge of arson of forest land and has no effect on defendant's liability for the crime. The trial court consequently erred in so instructing. We conclude this error was prejudicial and reverse. 1
On September 26, 1997, defendant told his friends Shirley Kruse and Johnny Ogle that he hated Orville Figgs and that he was going to burn down Figgs's house.
On the afternoon of September 27, 1997, defendant and his brother, David Atkins, drove by the Ponderosa Sky Ranch, where Figgs lived. Defendant "flipped the bird" at Figgs as defendant passed by.
Later that evening (on the 27th), around 5:00 p.m., David Rudolph, who lived on Ponderosa Sky Ranch, saw David Atkins drive a white pickup truck down into the Ponderosa Sky canyon. Rudolph could not see if there was a passenger in the pickup. Around 9:00 p.m. that night, Rudolph saw the pickup come quickly out of the canyon by his house. About one-half hour later, Rudolph's wife awakened him and said there was a fire.
The fire came within 150 feet of Orville Figgs's house.
A fire investigator, Alan Carlson, traced the origin of the blaze to a 10-by-10 or 10-by-12-foot area that was completely burned and black and that smelled of chainsaw mix, a mixture of motor oil and About 40 feet from the initial burn site, Carlson found defendant's wallet. Not far from the wallet, Carlson found a fresh beer can and some tire tracks. Nearby, Carlson also found a disposable lighter under a piece of corrugated tin and farther away he found two other beer cans (with the same freshness date as the original one found).
gasoline. A soil sample taken from this area contained gasoline.
Defendant told Investigator Carlson that after drinking with his brother, David, throughout much of the day on which the fire occurred, the two of them drove down into the Ponderosa Sky canyon in the white pickup. They stayed between three-and-a-half and five hours and drank some more down there. Defendant's family had once lived in the canyon. Defendant saw that his family's former homesite was in poor condition. He decided to burn some of the weeds there. He pulled some of them out and put them in an eight-inch pile in a cleared area. He poured some chainsaw mix on the pile, placed the plastic gas jug containing the mix (that he had retrieved from David's truck) two or three feet away, and lit the pile with a disposable lighter. The fire leaped from the pile to the gas jug and quickly got out of hand. The jug melted. Defendant and perhaps David tried unsuccessfully to extinguish the fire. Then they panicked and took off. The fire was an accident. Defendant meant no harm.
Defendant acknowledged there were hard feelings between his family and the Figgs family. Defendant also said he had "flipped off" Orville Figgs, but he made that gesture after the fire.
David Atkins largely confirmed his brother's account. He and defendant drank throughout much of the day on which the fire occurred. They continued drinking at the Ponderosa Sky canyon. They went to their family's former homesite there. All that remained of their former house was the tin roofing. The place had sentimental significance to defendant and David. Defendant began crying. Defendant was concerned about the weeds on the property and began pulling them out; he stated they should clean the place and burn the weeds. David went to relieve himself and to grab a couple more beers. David's last recollection is seeing defendant kick the gas jug. Because of the drinking, David could not recall leaving the site or driving away.
On the evening of the fire, around 9:00 or 9:30 p.m., Shirley Kruse saw defendant at David's apartment. He was mad and was throwing stuff around. Shirley was asked at trial whether she would describe defendant as "heavily intoxicated" that evening. She answered,
The fire investigator, Alan Carlson, found no indication that the fire had started in a cleared area, or that there had been a debris burn that had gotten out of control, or that anyone had tried to put out the fire. Carlson concluded the fire was not an accident.
The fire burned between 2.5 and 2.8 miles of forest land.
Defendant was charged and convicted of arson of forest land. (Pen.Code, § 451, subd. (c).)
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that "in the crimes of arson of forest land charged in Count I and the lesser crimes thereto, the fact that the defendant was voluntarily intoxicated is not a defense and does not relieve defendant of responsibility for the crime." Defendant contends that evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible to show that he lacked the required mental state for arson.
Section 22 governs the admissibility of evidence of voluntary intoxication on the issue of an accused's mental state. That section provides in pertinent part: "(b) Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible The issues here are (1) whether section 22 permits a trier of fact to consider evidence of voluntary intoxication on the question of whether the accused actually formed the required mental state of intent for arson, and (2) if so, what is the effect of the trial court's failure to so instruct here.
solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent...."
As set forth initially by this court in Stonewall F., supra, 208 Cal.App.3d 1054, 256 Cal.Rptr. 578 and as we reaffirmed in Fabris, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th 685, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 667, arson, as defined in section 451, requires as one of its elements an intent to set fire to or burn or cause to be burned a structure, forest land or specified property. (Fabris, supra, at pp. 688, 698, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 667.) We arrived at this conclusion as follows.
We started with the definition of arson as set out in the first paragraph of section 451. That paragraph states that "[a] person is guilty of arson when he or she willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned ... any structure, forest land, or property." (Italics added.) (Fabris, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 694, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 667.) "Willfully" is defined in section 7, subdivision 1. That section states in pertinent part that "[t]he word 'willfully,' when applied to the intent with which an act is done ..., implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act...." "Maliciously" is defined in section 450, subdivision (e)--it "imports a wish to vex, defraud, annoy, or injure another person, or an intent to do a wrongful act...."
We then substituted the definitions for the terms "willfully" and "maliciously" in the definition of arson, concluding that arson requires an intent to do the act there condemned, i.e., an intent to set fire to or burn or cause to be burned a structure, forest land or property. (Stonewall F., supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 1065, 256 Cal.Rptr. 578; Fabris, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 699, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 667.) 2
We found further support for concluding that the mental state required for arson is intent when we compared the mental state required for the lesser companion offense of unlawfully causing a fire. These two offenses--arson (§ 451) and unlawfully causing a fire (§ 452)--were enacted as part of the same legislative package. (Stats.1979, ch. 145.) The two offenses are essentially the same except for penalty structure and the mental state standard. (Stonewall F., supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 1064, 256 Cal.Rptr. 578.) "A person is guilty of unlawfully causing a fire when he recklessly sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned, any structure, forest land or property." (§ 452, first paragraph, italics added.) The term "recklessly" was also defined as part of this same legislative package. (§ 450, subd. (f).) " 'Recklessly' means a person is aware of [i.e. knows of] and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk," a risk whose disregard constitutes a gross deviation from objectively reasonable conduct. (§ 450, subd. (f); Stonewall F., supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 1067, 256 Cal.Rptr. 578.) As we explained in Stonewall F.: "Since recklessness, as defined, entails the subjective appreciation ...
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Judicial Exploitation of Mens Rea Confusion, at Common Law and Under the Model Penal Code
...that require specific intent. So the result, if not the bizarre reasoning, in Reyes is defensible. [86]. See People v. Atkins, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 183 (Ct. App. 1999) (allowing voluntary intoxication defense), rev'd, 18 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2001). [87]. See People v. Mendoza, 959 P.2d 735, 739 ......