People v. Balone

Citation52 A.D.2d 216,383 N.Y.S.2d 726
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent. v. Gerald BALONE, Appellant.
Decision Date21 May 1976
CourtNew York Supreme Court Appellate Division

Nathaniel A. Barrell, Buffalo (Rosalie Stoll, Buffalo, of counsel), for appellant.

Edward C. Cosgrove, Dist. Atty., Buffalo (Judith Manzella, Buffalo, of counsel), for respondent.

Before MARSH, P.J., and CARDAMONE, SIMONS, MAHONEY and GOLDMAN, JJ.

OPINION

GOLDMAN, Justice.

The sole question in this appeal is whether the introduction into evidence of defendant's police fingerprint card was reversible error. In the circumstances here presented, we hold that it was. The card, which was offered in support of identification testimony by a police fingerprint expert, bore on one side a typical fingerprint chart, together with front and profile mug shots of the defendant. On the reverse side were the defendant's name, address, date and place of birth, and various other personal information. On one portion of the reverse side was a recital of defendant's criminal history, which included references to burglary and murder. The court ordered that portion masked with heavy paper, so that the jury could not see it and it was so masked. However, the caption, 'Arrest Record', which appeared at the top of the partly-masked side, remained uncovered. Also left exposed was a small box, captioned 'Bur. I.D. No.', containing a handwritten number which matched a number that appeared on a tag in the mug photos. One police witness indicated that the 'Bur. I.D. No.' was a 'mug number', and said: 'That number indicates a previous arrest'.

The card was dated April 24, 1973; the subject crime had been committed on April 21, 1973. The proximity of dates, however, was wholly coincidental, for the card was actually prepared in connection with an unrelated crime which was committed Subsequent to the subject crime, and for which appellant was arrested and fingerprinted on April 24, 1973. However, the jury was never told whether or not the card was prepared in connection with the offense being tried. The court instructed the prosecutor to caution his witnesses 'not to volunteer for what (appellant) was arrested'.

After admitting the card into evidence, over defense objection, the court advised the jury that 'those portions which I felt were immaterial to this lawsuit I covered up with a piece of cardboard, so that (the card) as it now exists and stands, is in evidence'. The jurors were told that they would be allowed to view the card in the courtroom but not in the jury room, 'due to the fact that parts of it were covered up'.

Appellant contends that it was error to admit the fingerprint card into evidence because it implied to the jury that he had committed other crimes, although he did not take the stand or otherwise place his character in issue. Had the criminal history on the fingerprint card been left uncovered, there would of course be no question that it should not be used (People v. Wiggins, 30 A.D.2d 948, 294 N.Y.S.2d 2; People v. Barile, 239 App.Div. 637, 268 N.Y.S. 127; United States v. Dressler, 7 Cir., 112 F.2d 972). But the People urge that prejudice was successfully avoided by the masking of the portion of the card that referred to other crimes. Of the four cases we have found that have discussed the soundness of this practice, one has unequivocally approved it (Moon v. State, 22 Ariz. 418, 198 P. 288), one has deemed it 'not reversible error' (Lester v. State, 416 P.2d 52 (Okl. Cr.)), and two others, which on their facts are distinguishable from the case at bar, found it not prejudicial in the circumstances (State of Jackson, 284 N.C. 321, 200 S.E.2d 626 (introduction of fingerprint card not prejudicial error, although police witness testified that covered portion referred to prior offense, in light of positive voice identification by complainant); State v. Viola, 51 Ohio Law Abst. 577, 82 N.E.2d 306, app. dsmd., 148 Ohio St. 712, 76 N.E.2d 715, cert. den., 334 U.S. 816, 68 S.Ct. 1070, 92 L.Ed. 1746 (not prejudicial error where defense counsel himself had volunteered some details of defendant's criminal history to jury)).

Authority is both more plentiful and more illuminating, however, on the cognate problem of police mug photographs which tend to imply prior criminal activity by the accused (see generally, Anno., 'Admissibility, and prejudicial effect of admission of 'mug shot', 'rogues' gallery' photograph, or photograph taken in prison of defendant in criminal trial', Ann. 30 A.L.R.3d 908, 922--927, § 4; cf. People v. Caserta, 19 N.Y.2d 18, 277 N.Y.S.2d 647, 224 N.E.2d 82; People v. Ochs, 9 A.D.2d 792, 194 N.Y.S.2d 719). In Caserta, where it was held error to receive a witness's testimony as to his prior identification of the defendant from photographs, the court observed that 'where the identification is from photographs in the rogues' gallery (even though the name or number on the picture has been excinded) the inference to the jury is obvious that the person has been in trouble with the law before' (19 N.Y.2d 18, 21, 277 N.Y.S.2d 647, 649, 224 N.E.2d 82, 84 Supra).

A case quite analogous to the present one is Barnes v. United States, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 318, 365 F.2d 509. There it was held reversible error, where defendant did not testify, to introduce typical front-and-profile 'mug shots' with tape covering prison numbers on the photos and a piece of paper over the back to cover written material. The court stated at pages 510--511:

'The double-shot picture, with front and profile shots alongside each other, is so familiar, from 'wanted' posters in the post office, motion pictures and television, that the inference that the person involved has a criminal record, or has at least been in trouble with the police, is natural, perhaps automatic. The rudimentary tape cover placed over the prison numbers on the photograph, and over the notations on the reverse side, neither disguised the nature of the picture nor avoided the prejudice. If anything, by emphasizing that something was being hidden, the steps taken here to disguise the nature of...

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3 cases
  • Boatright v. State
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Indiana
    • December 20, 2001
    ...which, although defendant's arrest record had been blocked out, the uncovered caption "arrest record" appeared. People v. Balone, 52 A.D.2d 216, 217, 383 N.Y.S.2d 726 (1976). Here, the cumulative effect of the photographs and fingerprints may have suggested to the jury that Defendant had a ......
  • People v. Woods
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court Appellate Division
    • May 11, 1990
    ...fingerprint card was not in evidence, nor was defendant's prior criminal history referred to in any way ( cf., People v. Balone, 52 A.D.2d 216, 383 N.Y.S.2d 726). Although it was improper for the prosecutor to elicit identification testimony, the error was harmless. There was overwhelming p......
  • People v. Rudenko
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court Appellate Division
    • June 16, 1997
    ...(see, United States v. Baker, 2nd Cir., 442 F.2d 1024, cert. denied 404 U.S. 883, 92 S.Ct. 219, 30 L.Ed.2d 165; People v. Balone, 52 A.D.2d 216, 383 N.Y.S.2d 726; see also, People v. Woods, 161 A.D.2d 1176, 555 N.Y.S.2d The defendant's remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appell......

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