People v. Banks

• Decision Date: 23 December 1993
• Docket Number: No. S030479,S030479
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 863 P.2d 769, 62 USLW 2440 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Mary Louise BANKS, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 524

25 Cal.Rptr.2d 524

6 Cal.4th 926, 863 P.2d 769, 62 USLW 2440

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Mary Louise BANKS, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S030479.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Dec. 23, 1993.

Ronald Y. Butler, Public Defender, Carl C. Holmes, Chief Deputy Public Defender, Thomas Havlena and Alan J. Crivaro, Deputy Public Defenders, for defendant and appellant.

Amitai Schwartz, Paul L. Hoffman, Alan L. Schlosser, Ann Brick, Edward M. Chen, Matthew A. Coles and Margaret C. Crosby as Amici Curiae on behalf of defendant and appellant.

Michael R. Capizzi, Dist. Atty., Maurice L. Evans, Chief Asst. Dist. Atty., Wallace J. Wade, Asst. Dist. Atty., Kathleen M. Harper, James F. Bacin and Gregory J. Robischon, Deputy Dist. Attys., for plaintiff and respondent.

Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., George Williamson, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Ronald A. Bass, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ronald E. Niver and Charles R.B. Kirk, Deputy Attys. Gen., James K. Hahn, City Atty. (Los Angeles), Debbie Lew and Lisa S. Berger, Deputy City Attys., as Amici Curiae on behalf of plaintiff and respondent.

GEORGE, Justice.

In this case we decide whether advance publicity is a prerequisite to the operation of a constitutionally permissible highway "sobriety checkpoint."

In Ingersoll v. Palmer (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1321, 241 Cal.Rptr. 42, 743 P.2d 1299 (hereafter Ingersoll ), this court upheld the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints conducted pursuant to various safeguards, observing, in the course of our analysis, that advance publicity is one such safeguard "important to the maintenance of a constitutionally permissible sobriety checkpoint." (Id. at p. 1346, 241 Cal.Rptr. 42, 743 P.2d 1299.) In the present case, the Court of Appeal interpreted Ingersoll to require advance publicity as a prerequisite to the constitutional validity of a sobriety checkpoint, 16 Cal.App.4th 1188, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 920. As we shall explain, however, the United States Supreme Court's analysis of the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints in Michigan State Police Dept. v. Sitz (1990) 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (hereafter Sitz ), decided three years after our Ingersoll decision, establishes that advance publicity is not a constitutional prerequisite to the operation of such a checkpoint. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant Mary Louise Banks was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol on November 18, 1990, after being stopped at a sobriety checkpoint located on Pacific Coast Highway at the intersection of First Street in the City of Seal Beach. The checkpoint was operated by law enforcement officials of the Seal Beach, Cypress, La Palma, and Los Alamitos police departments.

A complaint thereafter was filed in municipal court charging defendant with violations of Vehicle Code former section 23152, subdivisions (a) and (b), and other vehicular offenses. ¹ Defendant entered a plea of not guilty and moved, pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, to suppress evidence (obtained at the sobriety checkpoint) establishing her alcohol-related impairment. Her motion, challenging the lawfulness of the sobriety checkpoint under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, maintained that the checkpoint did not conform to the guidelines set forth in Ingersoll.

At the hearing on the motion, the following evidence was adduced. The location of the sobriety checkpoint, on a heavily congested roadway, was chosen by supervisory law enforcement officials. The officers at the checkpoint were instructed to select the first four vehicles from every ten vehicles that approached the checkpoint between 10:10 p.m. and 12:15 a.m., and the first four vehicles from every six vehicles thereafter until 2:30 a.m., for the purpose of questioning the occupants. Prior to establishment of the checkpoint, the law enforcement officers operating it were briefed as to the manner in which the checkpoint was to be marked clearly and conspicuously. The officers used highway flares, cones, stop signs, overhead white lights, traffic barricades mounted with flashing lights, and a truck marked with arrows to identify the checkpoint and to divert motor vehicles safely away from the flow of traffic. Drivers approaching the checkpoint were confronted with a sign that read "Sobriety Checkpoint Ahead." Officers were instructed not to pursue motorists who turned their vehicles away before reaching the checkpoint. Numerous uniformed officers and marked police vehicles were visible at the checkpoint. Officers were instructed to detain approaching vehicles only for such time as was necessary to question the driver briefly and look for signs of intoxication. In the event such signs were found, the driver was asked to exit from his or her vehicle so that a law enforcement official could administer a field sobriety examination.

At the hearing, defendant testified that she did not observe highway flares, a flashing arrow, or a sign indicating the presence of a sobriety checkpoint, and that she drove through the checkpoint (until she was asked to stop, as she was exiting from it) because she believed someone was "making a movie." The municipal court found defendant's testimony regarding the warnings at the checkpoint to be less credible than that furnished by law enforcement officials.

Although one of the police officers testified that he previously had participated in the operation of sobriety checkpoints, and that the establishment of these prior checkpoints had been preceded by publicity, the prosecution did not adduce any evidence specifically demonstrating that the establishment of this particular sobriety checkpoint was preceded by advance publicity.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the municipal court denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence, ruling that advance publicity was not a prerequisite to the constitutional validity of a sobriety checkpoint and that the checkpoint otherwise complied with the standards set forth in Ingersoll.

Following the municipal court's denial of her motion to suppress, defendant pled guilty, received a suspended sentence, and was placed on informal probation pending disposition of the present appeal.

In the appellate department of the superior court, defendant reiterated her contention that advance publicity was required in order to establish a constitutionally permissible sobriety checkpoint. Rather than decide the issue, the appellate department certified defendant's case to the Court of Appeal, which ordered transfer of the case. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 62(a), 63(a).) ² The Court of Appeal thereafter reversed the judgment of the municipal court, resting its decision on twin premises: (1) that under our decision in Ingersoll, advance publicity is a "requirement" of a constitutionally permissible sobriety checkpoint, and (2) because the United States Supreme Court, in Sitz, supra, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, upheld a sobriety checkpoint program that provided for advance publicity (and that otherwise was similar to the program discussed in Ingersoll ), pre-checkpoint publicity is necessary if a checkpoint is to pass constitutional muster.

We granted the People's petition for review. ³

II. DISCUSSION

Pursuant to article I, section 28, of the California Constitution, a trial court may exclude evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5 only if exclusion is mandated by the federal Constitution. (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 896, 210 Cal.Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744.) Thus, exclusion of the evidence obtained at the sobriety checkpoint, supporting That amendment provides, in pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated...." (U.S. Const., Amend. IV.) State and local law enforcement officials are subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment based upon the operation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081; Wolf v. Colorado (1949) 338 U.S. 25, 27-28, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 1361-1362, 93 L.Ed. 1782.) The detention incident to the operation of sobriety "checkpoints" (which, for purposes of our analysis, we consider indistinguishable from sobriety "roadblocks") constitutes a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. (Sitz, supra, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2485.) The purpose of the Fourth Amendment prohibition is to "safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials." (Camara v. Municipal Court (1967) 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1730, 18 L.Ed.2d 930; see also Delaware v. Prouse (1979) 440 U.S. 648, 653-654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395-1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660.) Thus, the narrow question presented in the present case is whether the detention involved in a sobriety checkpoint, established without advance publicity, constitutes a "reasonable" seizure and thus complies with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.

the charge that defendant was under the influence of alcohol while driving her vehicle, was proper only if that evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The People contend this court's decision in Ingersoll does not require advance publicity, which we identified as one of eight factors to be examined in determining whether a sobriety checkpoint satisfies the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. In the People's view, Ingersoll contemplates a balancing of all relevant factors in determining the constitutionality of a sobriety checkpoint. The People further contend that, because the United States Supreme Court's decision in Sitz relied upon a balancing test identical to that employed in Ingersoll, Sitz is corroborative of Ingersoll's analysis and therefore lends no support to defendant's argument. F...