People v. Beam
| Decision Date | 19 October 1982 |
| Citation | 455 N.Y.S.2d 575,441 N.E.2d 1093,57 N.Y.2d 241 |
| Parties | , 441 N.E.2d 1093 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Steven Kelly BEAM, Appellant. (1978 Conviction.) The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Steven Kelly BEAM, Appellant. (1979 Conviction.) |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
We are asked on this appeal to decide whether evidence of similar crimes allegedly committed by the defendant were properly admitted for the purpose of establishing the defendant's identity. Additionally, we are asked to consider whether certain statements taken after the defendant had retained counsel were properly admitted into evidence.
Between mid-February and the middle of May, 1978, five young men reported incidents of homosexual assaults to the Binghamton police. In each case, the victim described his attacker as being in his early twenties, approximately 5 feet, 11 inches tall and weighing 160 pounds, with blond hair hanging down around his ears and gold, wire-rimmed, teardrop-shaped glasses. Each young man told the police that he had been approached by the assailant, who offered to share some marihuana with him. These initial encounters all were reported to have occurred in the same gene area of Binghamton. After agreeing to share the marihuana, the young men reported that they went with the assailant to isolated locations along the floodwall near the river, or in one case into the football stadium which was similarly nearby and desolate. When they reached their destination, rather than producing the marihuana, the assailant would, according to the reports, overpower his companion, forcing him to engage in French kissing, followed by acts of oral and anal sodomy.
The police, suspecting the defendant on the basis of the victims' descriptions, began leaving word that he was wanted for questioning. When the defendant heard that the police wanted to question him, he contacted a local attorney. He told the attorney that he thought the police wanted to question him in connection with an incident in which he and another person had had a disagreement which led to some pushing and shoving. He made no mention of any other incident, nor of any sexual aspect to the incident. The attorney advised him to go and speak with the police, but not to sign anything.
At the station house, the defendant was read Miranda warnings and asked about an incident on May 15 when a young man was attacked, although not sexually assaulted. The defendant told the police that he had been attacked by the young man and that he had run away from him.
At that point in the questioning, the attorney whom defendant had consulted called to see if his client had gone to the police station. The attorney spoke with the interrogating officer who told him that the defendant refused to sign the Miranda card and that they were going to question him concerning other similar incidents. The attorney told the officer to tell his client that he could sign the Miranda warning card and could discuss the other incidents, but that he should not sign any statement until his attorney had seen it.
When the questioning resumed, the police told the defendant that they had tried to stop someone matching the defendant's description to question him concerning an assault on April 11, but the person had run away. The defendant admitted he was that person and stated that had run because he was afraid the police wanted him for something. In response, the police said that they had wanted to discuss the recent homosexual assaults. The defendant then attempted to bargain with the police by offering to tell them about the incidents if, rather than charging him with anything, they would allow him to sign himself into a mental hospital. He was told that he would have to be charged. At this point, he indicated that he wished to call his attorney and questioning ceased.
Later that afternoon, a lineup was arranged, at which a partner of the attorney that defendant had contacted was present. Another associate of the lawyer had also been allowed to talk with the defendant earlier in the day. On both occasions, he was told not to talk to anyone and no further statements were made. At the suppression hearing, the defendant sought to suppress his statements which indicated knowledge of the crimes, most particularly his offer to tell the police about them if they let him commit himself to a hospital.
A 12-count indictment was returned stemming from four assaults which involved sodomy and from the attack on the young man not sexually assaulted. A motion for separate trials was made and granted. This appeal arises from the second and fifth trials, both of which resulted in the defendant being convicted of first degree sodomy.
At each trial, the victim identified the defendant as the person who had attacked him. Each also testified that he had accompanied the defendant to these isolated locations after defendant had approached him and offered to share some marihuana. Instead of supplying the marihuana, each testified that the defendant attacked and overpowered him. Although each story of the attack and sexual assault involved slight variations, each testified to a specific scenario which involved French kissing and then oral sodomy followed by anal sodomy.
On cross-examination, defense counsel raised issues concerning the validity of the identification. In response, the People sought the court's permission to allow several other of the victims to testify so that they might identify the defendant and describe the nature of the attacks agai them. The defense objected on the ground that the prejudicial effect of allowing testimony concerning similar crimes allegedly committed by the defendant outweighed the probative value of the testimony.
Trial court allowed the testimony of several of the other victims under what has come to be known as the identity exception first articulated by this court in People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286. Proper limiting instructions were given to the jury immediately prior, to the testimony of each victim and again during the charge. Defense counsel raised further objections, arguing that identity was not in issue to the extent necessary to allow testimony concerning other crimes and that this was not a proper application of the identity exception.
On appeal, the Appellate Division, Third Department, found this argument to be "unconvincing". (People v. Beam, 84 A.D.2d 653, 654, 444 N.Y.S.2d 297.) That court noted that identity was put into issue by the cross-examination of the victim which raised questions concerning the validity of the identification, and by the defendant's own testimony, during which he denied any contact with the victim. The nature of the attacks was sufficiently similar, the court reasoned, to allow the testimony for the limited purpose of identification.
In considering the defendant's claim that statements made by him to the police should have been suppressed because they were taken in violation of his right to counsel, the Appellate Division found that the statements were properly admitted. The majority reasoned that the statements had been voluntarily made by the defendant after consultation with his attorney, and the fact that the defendant had misled his attorney as to the severity of the charges should not inure to the defendant's benefit by effectively enlarging his right to counsel to include receiving specific advice. Neither did the majority believe that the retaining of counsel imposed an affirmative duty on the police to see that the client has been candid with the attorney when seeking the attorney's advice.
The dissenter argued that since the police knew the defendant had retained counsel, they could not quest the defendant unless he waived his right to counsel. Furthermore, this could only be done by the defendant, not the attorney, and only with the attorney present.
For the reasons that follow, we agree with the majority at the Appellate Division that both the testimony concerning the other assaults and the statements made by the defendant to the police were properly admitted by the trial court. We would also add that, like the Appellate Division, we find no merit to defendant's other claims that the People failed to prove the use of forcible compulsion as defined by subdivision 8 of section 130.00 of the Penal Law or that that statute is unconstitutionally vague. While it is true that forcible compulsion is an abstract concept, the statute cannot be termed ambiguous. There was adequate evidence in both cases that the defendant used physical force and intimidation in order to force his victims to comply with his desires.
Turning then to the propriety of allowing other victims to testify and identify the defendant as their attacker, it must be noted that this testimony was admitted for the limited purpose of establishing the defendant's identity and proper limiting instructions were given. The question thus presented is whether the defendant's modus operandi was sufficiently unique to tend to establish his identity and accordingly make use of the identity exception proper. (People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286, supra; People v. Condon, 26 N.Y.2d 139, 309 N.Y.S.2d 152, 257 N.E.2d 615; People v. Allweiss, 48 N.Y.2d 40, 421 N.Y.S.2d 341, 396 N.E.2d 735; Richardson, Evidence § 180, p 149.)
It has long been the general rule that evidence of uncharged crimes is not admissible because it is feared that the jury may convict the defendant not of the crime charged, but rather because of his predisposition to criminal conduct. (People v. Molineux, supra, 168 N.Y. at p. 291, 61 N.E. 286; People v. Condon, supra, 26 N.Y.2d at p. 143, 309 N.Y.S.2d 152, 257 N.E.2d 615; People v. Allweiss, supra, 48 N.Y.2d at pp. 46-47, 421 N.Y.S.2d 341, 396 N.E.2d 735.) However, when...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- Oswin v. Shaw
-
Roldan v. Artuz
...551, 313 N.Y.S.2d 123, 261 N.E.2d 264; People v. Allweiss, 48 N.Y.2d, 40, 421 N.Y.S.2d 341, 396 N.E.2d 735; People v. Beam, 57 N.Y.2d 241, 455 N.Y.S.2d 575, 441 N.E.2d 1093 (1982). Accordingly, the People will not be allow[ed] to introduce on their direct case evidence concerning the two Ma......
-
Claudio v. Scully
...by New York constitutional law. In reaching its decision, the district court relied almost exclusively on People v. Beam, 57 N.Y.2d 241, 455 N.Y.S.2d 575, 441 N.E.2d 1093 (1982), "the only Court of Appeals case dealing with effectiveness of attorney advice in such preliminary encounters wit......
-
People v. Hudy
...e.g., People v. Alvino, 71 N.Y.2d 233, 241-242, 525 N.Y.S.2d 7, 519 N.E.2d 808; People v. Lewis, supra; People v. Beam, 57 N.Y.2d 241, 250-251, 455 N.Y.S.2d 575, 441 N.E.2d 1093; People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350, 359, 438 N.Y.S.2d 261, 420 N.E.2d 59; People v. Allweiss, 48 N.Y.2d 40, 46......
-
Narrative and jurisprudence in state courts: the example of constitutional challenges to sex conduct regulation.
...a public restroom in a public park). Neville v. State, 430 A.2d 570 (Md. 1981) (consensual heterosexual adult fellatio). People v. Beam, 441 N.E.2d 1093 (N.Y. 1982) (adult male engaged in a pattern of offering young men under 20 some marijuana if they would accompany him, then forcing them ......