People v. Beamon
| Decision Date | 04 January 1973 |
| Docket Number | Cr. 16384 |
| Citation | 8 Cal.3d 625,105 Cal.Rptr. 681,504 P.2d 905 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 504 P.2d 905 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Willie Lee BEAMON, Defendant and Appellant. In Bank |
Willie Lee Beamon, in pro. per., and Robert A. Scott, Los Angeles, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.
Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Herbert L. Ashby, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., William R. Pounders and Geoffrey S. Cantrell, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.
Willie Lee Beamon appeals from a judgment following jury convictions of robbery (Pen.Code, § 211) and kidnaping for the purpose of robbery (Pen.Code, § 209). 1
Defendant was charged with and found to have been armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the commission of each offense. 2 The jury further found that the victim did not suffer 'great bodily injury' in connection with the robbery (see § 213), but that he did suffer 'bodily harm' in connection with the kidnaping committed for the purpose of such robbery (see § 209). Defendant waived his right to a jury trial on the penalty phase of the kidnaping charge (see §§ 190.1, 209) and submitted such penalty issue on the proceedings had at the trial on the guilt phase. The trial court determined that 'the penalty to be imposed will be life imprisonment without possibility of parole.'
On a motion for a new trial the prosecutor and defense counsel stipulated that the injuries received by the victim '. . . were such that (defendant) could receive the possibility of parole.' Although the court denied the motion it nevertheless exercised its discretionary power (see § 1181, subd. 7) to revise the finding of bodily harm, stating that 'for the purpose of sentencing I'll find that the victim in this case was not subjected to bodily injury.' The judgment, however, fails to reflect the revised finding or the mitigating effect thereof. 3 We deem this failure to constitute a clerical error which we can and do correct. For reasons which hereinafter appear, we otherwise hold that defendant may not be punished for both the robbery and kidnaping for purpose of such robbery (see § 654), reject defendant's remaining contentions and affirm the judgment as necessarily modified. 4
On July 2, 1970, in the early afternoon Gerald Ashcraft, the victim herein, parked his employer's truck for the purpose of making a delivery of liquor to a customer. The truck contained, after the delivery, merchandise worth about $2,500. When Ashcraft returned to the cab of the truck but before he started the motor defendant entered from the passenger side with a gun in his hand. Ashcraft was ordered to lie face down on the floor of the cab. Defendant took the keys from the victim's hand, started the motor and drove away.
After the truck had been driven a few blocks Ashcraft looked up at the driver. Eighteen months earlier he had suffered a similar highjacking and he now recognized defendant as the person who had been tried for and acquitted of criminal charges filed in connection therewith. 5 Defendant pointed the gun at Ashcraft's face, ordered him to 'get back down' on the floor and stated that 'this time' he would be killed.
Ashcraft returned to his position on the floor but moved his hand to take possession of a gun which he kept under the driver's seat and triggered a silent emergency alarm. At a time when he could see that both of defendant's hands were occupied with driving tasks, Ashcraft extended his arm, pointed his gun at defendant's face and squeezed the trigger. The gun misfired. Before he could pull the trigger again defendant grabbed the gun and twisted it from Ashcraft's hand. As Ashcraft arose from his position defendant struck him with the butt of the gun on the side of the face, on the top of the head and on the wrist as Ashcraft sought to protect himself. Defendant then brought the truck to a halt.
After the truck was stopped a third person, who was a stranger to Ashcraft, stepped onto the running board on the passenger side. Defendant instructed this person to 'Kill (Ashcraft), shoot him, . . . he's recognized me.' Defendant lost possession of the gun as he and Ashcraft struggled in the cab. The person on the running board extended his arm into the cab, holding a handgun. Ashcraft managed to kick at the gun and at the face of the man who fell back. Ashcraft then forced the door open and fled from the truck where it was stopped near the middle of the street. Defendant was then still in the driver's compartment, the third person was on the running board on the driver's side, and two other persons were approaching the truck from a driveway. When Ashcraft looked back for the last time such persons appeared to be returning to the driveway. He telephoned the police from an eating establishment a short distance from where he had made his escape.
The truck had been driven a distance of about 15 blocks during the 20-minute period since defendant entered it. Police officers found the truck abandoned where Ashcraft had left it. His wounds required 33 stitches to close.
Ashcraft identified defendant by name at the time police officers arrived in response to his telephone call. Defendant was arrested 10 days later as he sought to conceal himself in a closet when officers came to his fiancee's home with a warrant for his arrest. His defense at trial was a flat denial of any involvement. In a pretrial extrajudicial statement to officers defendant claimed that he had left California for Kentucky three days before the commission of the crimes. At trial he conceded that such statement was false.
We first address ourselves to defendant's claim that evidence of two prior robberies was erroneously and prejudicially received at trial. The first such robbery was the previously mentioned highjacking of Ashcraft and his truck which had occurred some 18 months earlier. At the trial of defendant in that case the victim and another witness made identifications which were only tentative but during the course of those proceedings Ashcraft did have the opportunity to observe defendant on numerous occasions. The victim as well as other witnesses testified at the instant trial to the facts of the prior highjacking.
Although evidence of character is inadmissible when offered to prove specific conduct on a particular occasion, there is no prohibition against 'the admission of evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive . . ., plan, knowledge, identity . . .) other than his disposition to commit such acts.' (Evid.Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) In particular issue here is the accuracy and integrity of Ashcraft's identification of defendant. The identification, essential to the People's case, is materially buttressed by evidence that the victim was familiar with and able to recognize defendant because of observations made at a time prior to the kidnaping and robbery. Evidence of the circumstances which made it possible for the victim to identify defendant, although it disclosed a prior highjacking, was thus relevant to establish the credibility of the identification.
But proof of the identification was not the only verification of a material factual matter served by the receipt of evidence of the earlier highjacking of Ashcraft's truck. Defendant's motive or plan in seizing the truck is explained by the circumstances of the earlier highjacking where he brought the truck to the home of a confederate for the purpose of removing the liquor. Such evidence constituted some confirmation that defendant entertained the necessary mens rea for robbery in the instant case. By reason of the victim's escape as hereinabove set forth the liquor was not removed from the truck and the evidence of an intent to steal is thus circumstantial in nature. It was incumbent on the People to attempt to buttress their proof of felonious intent by evidence of a plan or scheme in common with that on the occasion of the prior highjacking. Moreover, evidence of the earlier offense is necessary to explain defendant's threat that he would kill Ashcraft 'this time,' and his instructions to his unknown accomplice to shoot the victim because he had recognized defendant. Such remarks tend to establish intent to commit bodily harm, an element of the charged offenses.
We have dealt with the applicability of the rules enunciated in Evidence Code section 1101 which is a codification of the existing law at the time of its enactment (see comment, Law Revision Commission, Evid. Code, § 1101). In People v. Haston (1968) 69 Cal.2d 233, 70 Cal.Rptr. 419, 444 P.2d 91, we held: 'When . . . a primary issue of fact is whether or not defendant rather than some other person was the perpetrator of the crime charged, evidence of other crimes is ordinarily admissible if it discloses a distinctive modus operandi common to both the other crimes and the charged crime.' (Id., at p. 245, 70 Cal.Rptr. at p. 426, 444 P.2d at p. 98.) However, the inference that the accused is guilty of the charged crime because of its common marks with uncharged crimes committed by him, does not arise ...
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