People v. Beattie
| Decision Date | 29 September 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 38175,38175 |
| Citation | 31 Ill.2d 257,201 N.E.2d 396 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Fred BEATTIE, Plaintiff in Error. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Gus P. Giannis, Chicago, for plaintiff in error.
William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Chicago , for defendant in error.
Defendant, Fred Beattie, was indicted for unlawful possession of narcotic drugs, tried before the criminal court of Cook County without a jury, convicted and sentenced to the Illinois State Penitentiary for a term of not less than two nor more than five years. He prosecutes this writ of error to review his conviction.
On June 29, 1962, two police officers named Lemont Knazze and Wayman Crigler, acting on information received from an 'informer', went to 5134 Kenwood, Chicago, where moments later they observed the defendant entering into a taxicab. The officers then left their squad car and approached the taxi where officer Knazze grabbed the defendant's right arm. The defendant threw a tinfoil packet out of the taxicab which was recovered by the officers and later identified as heroin.
Prior to trial the defendant made a motion to suppress evidence. At the hearing the officers testified that the defendant had been acquainted with them for some time and that they had a conversation with the defendant the evening before his arrest at which time the evening before his arrest them that he was a user of narcotics. During examination of the officers they were asked to divulge the identity of the informer. Objection was made on the ground of the 'informer's privilege', which objection was sustained by the court. The defense counsel then objected to the admission of any testimony concerning the information given by the informer unless his name was revealed on the theory that the defendant had the right to confront all witnesses against him. The court overruled the objection subject to a motion to strike and permitted the officers to testify. However, upon conclusion of their testimony defense counsel's motion to strike all testimony given with regard to the undisclosed informer was allowed.
The court considered the question of whether the communication by the undisclosed informer was sufficient to establish probable cause to justify defendant's arrest. The court rejected the People's contention that the police officers were justified in their arrest of the defendant on the basis of such information. Nevertheless, the court denied the defendant's motion to suppress on the grounds that there was probable cause to arrest the defendant based upon the evidence that (1) the arresting officers were previously acquainted with the defendant for some time prior to his arrest and he with them, and (2) knowledge that the defendant was a self-admitted narcotics user.
The defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and seeks reversal of his conviction on the ground that the evidence was the product of an unlawful search in that there was no probable cause to justify his arrest.
The trial court made a part of the record an extensive written memorandum of law in support of its view that any testimony concerning information supplied by an undisclosed informer should not be allowed. The trial court concluded that the prosecution had a choice between disclosure of the informant's identity or the striking of any testimony relating to the communication from the informer.
In view of this court's subsequent ruling in the case of People v. Durr, 28 Ill.2d 308, 192 N.E.2d 379, it is now clear that the trial court was in error in ruling that either the informant's identity be disclosed or the testimony relating to the information given by the informer be stricken. Here as in the Durr case, and People v. Mack, 12 Ill.2d 151, 145 N.E.2d 609, the informer neither participated in the crime, helped set up its commission nor was present at the time of the arrest. Under these circumstances the trial court was not compelled to choose between disclosure of the informant's identity or the striking of the testimony relating to the informer.
Reasonable grounds for believing that a person has committed a criminal offense may be found in information furnished by an informer if the reliability of the informer has been previously established or independently corroborated. (People v. Durr, 28 Ill.2d 308, 192 N.E.2d 379; People v....
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