People v. Beck
| Decision Date | 13 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 5-20-0252 |
| Citation | 2021 IL App (5th) 200252,192 N.E.3d 842,455 Ill.Dec. 1013 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jamel BECK, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Stephen C. Williams, of Kuehn, Beasley & Young, P.C., of Belleville, for appellant.
James A. Gomric, State's Attorney, of Belleville (Patrick Delfino, Patrick D. Daly, and Sharon Shanahan, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.
¶ 1 Defendant appeals from the trial court's imposition of 80 years’ imprisonment, provided on remand from this court. He contends a new parole statute (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115 (West 2020)), which affords defendant an opportunity to obtain parole, and the day-for-day good conduct credit statute ( Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, ¶ 1003-6-3(a)(2) ), should not be considered when determining whether his sentence constitutes a de facto life sentence that violates the eighth amendment ( U.S. Const., amend. VIII ). Defendant further argues the application of section 5-4.5-115 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115 (West 2020)) to him violates the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., art. I, § 10) and the Statute on Statutes ( 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2020) ).
¶ 3 The facts of this case are more fully set forth in this court's previous decisions, People v. Beck , 190 Ill. App. 3d 748, 138 Ill.Dec. 72, 546 N.E.2d 1127 (1989) ; People v. Beck , 259 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 221 Ill.Dec. 178, 674 N.E.2d 1283 (1993) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 ); People v. Beck , 339 Ill. App. 3d 413, 274 Ill.Dec. 53, 790 N.E.2d 429 (2003) ; and People v. Beck , 348 Ill. App. 3d 1111, 311 Ill.Dec. 448, 868 N.E.2d 1109 (2004) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 ). Because defendant's appeal asserts a question of law in challenging his sentence imposed on remand, we provide only the facts necessary to this appeal.
¶ 4 On June 10, 1987, defendant pled guilty to six counts of aggravated battery and six counts of armed violence for the stabbing or shooting of six children at their family home. Before defendant pled, the court admonished defendant that armed violence is a Class X felony with a possible penalty of not less than 6 years’ nor more than 30 years’ imprisonment plus 3 years’ mandatory supervised release, and the possible penalties for each aggravated battery charge was not less than 2 years’ nor more than 5 years’ imprisonment plus 1 year mandatory supervised release. The court also averred that defendant would not be eligible for probation, periodic imprisonment, or conditional discharge, with respect to the armed violence charges. After a sentencing hearing, the court sentenced defendant to six consecutive terms of 20 years for the armed violence counts, or a total of 120 years’ imprisonment.1
¶ 5 Subsequently, defendant filed a successive postconviction petition, alleging his sentence violated Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), and People v. Buffer , 2019 IL 122327, 434 Ill.Dec. 691, 137 N.E.3d 763. The State agreed that Buffer ’s holding—that a prison sentence of more than 40 years is a de facto life sentence—read in conjunction with Graham ’s holding—that the United States Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole—means a juvenile convicted of a nonhomicide offense cannot be sentenced to more than 40 years without the possibility of parole. Consequently, the State conceded that "under the current case law, the 120-year sentence appears to be unconstitutional" and that defendant was entitled to resentencing. The State noted, however, that defendant may still be sentenced to a term of 120 years at resentencing because section 5-4.5-115 of the Unified Code of Corrections ("new parole statute") (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115 (West 2020)) provides defendant an opportunity for parole before a term of life imprisonment. The circuit court granted defendant's petition, vacated his sentence, and set the case for resentencing.
¶ 6 Before the resentencing hearing, the parties filed memoranda addressing the maximum possible sentence for defendant. Defendant contended—under Graham and Buffer —the maximum sentence the court could impose was 40 years’ imprisonment. He explained that Graham barred imposing a life sentence without parole for nonhomicide juvenile offenders. The Illinois Supreme Court in Buffer determined that more than 40 years constituted a de facto life sentence. Defendant argued that under both the new parole statute and the day-for-day good conduct credit statute, any chance of obtaining release from prison is speculative. As such, those statutes should not be considered when determining whether his 80-year sentence constituted an unconstitutional de facto life sentence. Defendant further claimed the application of the new parole statute violated the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., art. I, § 10) and the Statute on Statutes ( 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2020) ).
¶ 7 Regarding his ex post facto argument, defendant argued the State and the court cannot now rely on the new parole statute to "cure" the unconstitutionality of his prior sentence. He noted that the touchstone of an ex post facto analysis is "whether a given change in law presents a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Peugh v. United States , 569 U.S. 530, 539, 133 S.Ct. 2072, 186 L.Ed.2d 84 (2013) (citing California Department of Corrections v. Morales , 514 U.S. 499, 509, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995) ). Here, without the availability of the juvenile parole statute, defendant could be resentenced to no more than 40 years under United States Supreme Court and Illinois precedent. Defendant analogized this case to Weaver v. Graham , 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981), where the Supreme Court determined Florida's "gain time‘‘ credits altered the punitive consequences for prisoners and therefore violated the ex post facto clause. He claimed the new juvenile parole statute is designed to allow for the imposition of de facto life sentences that could not otherwise be imposed by affording the availability of parole, which violates the ex post facto clause.
¶ 8 With respect to the Statute on Statutes, defendant argued that he has a right to be sentenced under either the law in effect at the time the offense was committed or that was in effect at the time of sentencing, and he chose to be sentenced without regard to the new parole statute. He contended that the new parole statute effectively repealed an "accrued right," which triggers the Statute on Statutes’ application. According to defendant, when the Supreme Court decided Graham , he accrued a right to be sentenced within the bounds of the eighth amendment and Buffer set that boundary at 40 years’ imprisonment. The new parole statute is therefore designed to alter his accrued right by enacting procedures designed to circumvent the United States and Illinois precedent.
¶ 9 The State asserted that 120 years’ imprisonment was the maximum sentence. It argued that while defendant was entitled to a new sentencing hearing, he could be resentenced to the originally imposed 120 years’ imprisonment—in compliance with Graham —based on the new parole statute, which provides the possibility of parole for defendants who committed crimes before they were 21 years old and are sentenced after June 1, 2019. It further argued that the Fifth Appellate District of Illinois has held that a defendant is "not entitled to an election of sentencing laws" where the law "did not lessen or increase [the] possible or actual punishment." People v. Farmer , 176 Ill. App. 3d 436, 442, 126 Ill.Dec. 4, 531 N.E.2d 137 (1988). Therefore, the State claimed the new parole statute in no way alters the number of years defendant could statutorily be sentenced. The State also noted that the Fifth District stated, "the [Illinois] [S]upreme [C]ourt recognized ‘that the Parole Act had nothing to do with the sentence imposed by the court, that parole is a matter of clemency and grace and that it relates to prison government and discipline.’ " Harris v. Irving , 90 Ill. App. 3d 56, 61, 45 Ill.Dec. 394, 412 N.E.2d 976 (1980) (quoting People ex rel. Kubala v. Kinney , 25 Ill. 2d 491, 493-94, 185 N.E.2d 337 (1962) ). Accordingly, the State contended there was no statutory modification or repeal that would allow defendant to choose which statute applies.
¶ 10 At the sentencing hearing, the court found the new parole statute applied. Defendant was also eligible for day-for-day good conduct credit. After hearing arguments regarding the mitigating and aggravating factors, the court imposed a total of 80 years’ imprisonment on the six counts of armed violence.2
¶ 11 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, asserting the same arguments as he did at the sentencing hearing. On July 10, 2020, the court denied defendant's motion. Defendant timely appealed.
¶ 13 Defendant's contentions on appeal are the same as he alleged before the trial court. He argues that the new parole statute and day-for-day good conduct credit statute cannot be considered in determining whether defendant's sentence was a de facto life sentence. Alternatively, if this court finds that—under normal circumstances—the new parole statute can be considered in assessing whether defendant's sentence subjects him to a de facto life sentence, we should not find so in this case. Defendant further argues that application of the new parole statute to him violates the ex post facto clause and the Statute on Statutes. Because all the...
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