People v. Beeler

• Citation: 970 N.E.2d 110,361 Ill.Dec. 110,2012 IL App (4th) 110217
• Decision Date: 12 June 2012
• Docket Number: No. 4–11–0217.,4–11–0217.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Marcus E. BEELER, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2012 IL App (4th) 110217
970 N.E.2d 110
361 Ill.Dec. 110

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Marcus E. BEELER, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 4–11–0217.

Appellate Court of Illinois,
Fourth District.

June 12, 2012.

[970 N.E.2d 112]

Veronique Baker, Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, Chicago, Barbara A. Goeben, Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, Alton, for appellant.

John Milhiser, State's Attorney, Springfield (Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman, David E. Mannchen, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION
Presiding Justice TURNER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[361 Ill.Dec. 112]¶ 1 In November 2010, the trial court found defendant, Marcus E. Beeler, not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) of first degree murder following a stipulated bench trial. In March 2011, the court found defendant was in need of mental-health services on an inpatient basis in a secure setting.

¶ 2 On appeal, defendant argues (1) his due-process rights were violated at the commitment hearing and (2) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In November 2009, the State charged defendant by information with one count of attempt (first degree murder) (count I) (720 ILCS 5/8–4(a), 9–1(a)(1) (West 2008)), one count of aggravated battery (count II) (720 ILCS 5/12–4(a) (West 2008)), and three counts of first degree murder (counts III, IV, and V) (720 ILCS 5/9–1(a)(1) (West 2008)). In March 2010, the trial court found defendant fit to stand trial.

¶ 5 In November 2010, the cause came before the trial court in a stipulated bench trial. Both parties stipulated to the psychiatric reports of Dr. Terry Killian. Upon questioning from the court, defendant stated he was 43 years old, had attended 3 1/2 years of college, and could read, write, and understand English. Defendant also stated he was taking medications but they did not affect his ability to understand the proceedings. After the State indicated it would only proceed on count V, defendant indicated he understood the charge and the possible penalties. He also indicated he understood the rights he would be waiving by utilizing the stipulated bench trial.

¶ 6 The State indicated its evidence would show Albert Green was found lying outside in a yard on November 13, 2009, “with his head in a large amount or pool of blood.” An eyewitness would testify defendant beat Green with a table leg. Green died the next day due to massive head trauma. Defense counsel stipulated the psychiatric evidence would show defendant was not guilty by reason of insanity.

¶ 7 The trial court entered an NGRI finding as to the offense of first degree murder. The court noted Dr. Killian's opinion that, at the time of Green's death, defendant was suffering from a severe psychotic episode with marked paranoia and manic features that rendered him incapable of appreciating the criminality of his conduct. The court remanded defendant to the Department of Human Services (DHS) for an evaluation to determine whether defendant was in need of mental-health services.

¶ 8 In March 2011, the trial court held a hearing pursuant to section 5–2–4(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/5–2–4(a) (West 2008)). Therein, the State and defense counsel stipulated to a DHS report that found defendant was in need of inpatient mental-health services. The court agreed with the stipulation, finding defendant was in need of mental-health services on an inpatient[361 Ill.Dec. 113]

[970 N.E.2d 113]

basis in a secure setting. The court remanded defendant to DHS. This appeal followed.

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS ¶ 10 A. Jurisdiction

¶ 11 Initially, defendant contends this court has jurisdiction to consider his appeal even though he was found not guilty by reason of insanity. We agree.

¶ 12 Our supreme court has held an NGRI finding is equivalent to an acquittal. People v. Harrison, 226 Ill.2d 427, 439, 315 Ill.Dec. 680, 877 N.E.2d 432, 438 (2007). As such, it is not subject to appellate review. Harrison, 226 Ill.2d at 441, 315 Ill.Dec. 680, 877 N.E.2d at 440. However, an NGRI defendant may still challenge the finding that he is in need of inpatient mental-health services. Harrison, 226 Ill.2d at 439, 315 Ill.Dec. 680, 877 N.E.2d at 438. Here, defendant is not appealing the NGRI finding. Instead, he is challenging the March 2011 commitment order. Thus, we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

¶ 13 B. Commitment Hearing for an NGRI Defendant

¶ 14 Defendant argues the trial court failed to conduct a hearing in this case or erred in waiving the hearing. We find defendant's claim without merit.

¶ 15 If a trial court finds a defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, DHS is required to evaluate the defendant to determine if he is in need of mental-health services. 730 ILCS 5/5–2–4(a) (West 2008). The court is then required to hold a hearing “pursuant to the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code [ (Mental Health Code) ] to determine whether the defendant is subject to involuntary admission.” 725 ILCS 5/115–3(b) (West 2008); see also 730 ILCS 5/5–2–4(a) (West 2008) (stating the court is to determine whether the defendant is in need of mental-health services on an inpatient or outpatient basis or none at all). The court is required to enter its findings. 730 ILCS 5/5–2–4(a) (West 2008).

¶ 16 Defendant's claim that no admission hearing was held in this case or that the trial court waived the hearing is without merit. On March 9, 2011, the court held “a further hearing after a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity.” An assistant State's Attorney appeared as did defendant and his counsel. No one “waived” the hearing. The court did not prevent anyone from proceeding in a manner of his or her choosing. Instead, a hearing took place in which a stipulation was entered as to the evidence the court was to consider in making its decision. Based on the February 15, 2011, report and the stipulation of the parties, the court entered its written order and found defendant to be a person in need of mental-health services on an inpatient basis in a secure setting. Accordingly, we find the court held the hearing and entered the requisite findings.

¶ 17 C. Stipulation

¶ 18 Defendant also argues the State's case cannot be based solely on a stipulation. We disagree.

¶ 19 “A stipulation is an agreement between litigants or their attorneys with respect to an issue before the court.” People v. Carodine, 374 Ill.App.3d 16, 27, 311 Ill.Dec. 856, 869 N.E.2d 869, 880 (2007). Courts look favorably upon stipulations “because ‘ “they tend to promote disposition of cases, simplification of issues[,] and the saving of expense to litigants.” ’ [Citation.]” People v. Woods, 214 Ill.2d 455, 468, 293 Ill.Dec. 277, 828 N.E.2d 247, 256 (2005).

¶ 20 Defendant argues neither the Mental Health Code nor the Unified Code contains provisions for the stipulation of all [361 Ill.Dec. 114]

[970 N.E.2d 114]

the evidence. We note section 3–807 of the Mental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/3–807 (West 2008)) provides as follows:

“No respondent may be found subject to involuntary admission unless at least one psychiatrist, clinical social worker, or clinical psychologist who has examined him testifies in person at the hearing. The respondent may waive the requirement of the testimony subject to the approval of the court.”

The language of the statute can be read as permitting the use of a stipulation to present the expert's opinion in lieu of live testimony. The use of stipulations does not “waive” the hearing, and it does nothing to encourage parties to waive their right to a hearing, as defendant argues. See People v. Johnson, 2012 IL App (5th) 070573, ¶ 24, 358 Ill.Dec. 531, 965 N.E.2d 602 (stating a stipulation to the doctor's report in lieu of live testimony did not constitute “a waiver of the entire hearing”).

¶ 21 D. Due–Process Admonitions

¶ 22 Defendant argues the stipulation entered into in this case was tantamount to a guilty plea and the trial court erred in failing to admonish him about the right to confront witnesses against him. We disagree.

¶ 23 In support of his contention, defendant relies on Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402 (eff. July 1, 1997) as well as several criminal decisions by the supreme...