People v. Bell

• Decision Date: 11 February 1953
• Parties: The People of the State of New York, Respondent,<BR>v.<BR>Hayward Bell, Charles Henry, Willie Young and George Gill, Appellants.
• Court: New York District Court

204 Misc. 71

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Hayward Bell, Charles Henry, Willie Young and George Gill, Appellants.

LENT, J.

February 11, 1953.

Jawn A. Sandifer for Hayward Bell and others, appellants.

Emanuel Redfield for Charles Henry, appellant.

Frank A. Gulotta, District Attorney (Henry Meyer of counsel), for respondent.

LENT, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the City Court of the City of Long Beach convicting the defendants of violating subdivision 2 of section 1990-a of the Penal Law.

Upon their conviction each defendant was sentenced to pay a fine of $5 or to serve two days in the county jail. The fines were paid.

Subdivision 2 of section 1990-a of the Penal Law, reads as follows: "Any person who loiters about any toilet, station or station platform of a subway or elevated railway or of a railroad, or who is found sleeping therein or thereon and who is unable to give satisfactory explanation of his presence is guilty of an offense."

The briefs submitted by the appellants in support of this appeal raise constitutional questions by challenging the validity of the quoted statute as violative on its face of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions and the right of freedom of assembly guaranteed by both (U. S. Const., Amdt. XIV, § 1; N. Y. Const., art. I, § 6, U. S. Const., art. I; N. Y. Const., art. I, § 11).

While the supporting arguments squarely raise the constitutional issue of claimed repugnance to the due process and freedom of assembly provisions as allegedly apparent on the face of the statute, whatever arguments are addressed to the contention that the defendants were denied equal protection flow from accusations that the defendants were selected for prosecution "for the reason of the color of their skin" and that the case has "racial discrimination overtones".

There is nothing in the record of the trial below which remotely points to a justification for these serious and startling charges. On the contrary, it is apparent that the defendants received a fair and impartial trial. So consumed have counsel become with indignation over this fancied issue, that even in their proper presentation of the constitutional questions by which they seek a declaration of the statute's invalidity, they have overlooked the basic, relatively simple and primary question ever present in the review of any record of the determination of a lower court, i.e., "Did the People prove a prima facie case?"

If that question should be answered in the affirmative the law's constitutionality will be explored, but should it be answered in the negative, necessity no longer exists for a determination of the statute's validity. This is not by way of begging a possibly complex question but from a natural reluctance to take any action which may result in striking down a solemn legislative enactment and a desire to preserve to a salutary statute its presumption of constitutionality. (McKinney's Cons. Laws of N. Y., Book 1, Statutes [1942 ed.], § 150; Thompson v. Wallin, 276 App. Div. 463, affd. 301 N.Y. 476, affd. 342 U. S. 485.)

What then is the evidence against these defendants by which the People contend that they have established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants "loitered about" the Long Beach station of the Long Island Rail Road? In substance it discloses that the...