People v. Bennett

• Decision Date: 10 February 1972
• Citation: 280 N.E.2d 637,329 N.Y.S.2d 801,29 N.Y.2d 462
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 280 N.E.2d 637 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Arthur BENNETT, Appellant.

Page 801

329 N.Y.S.2d 801

29 N.Y.2d 462, 280 N.E.2d 637

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Arthur BENNETT, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 10, 1972.

Diane A. Lebedeff, and Robert Kasanof, New York City, for appellant.

Frank S. Hogan, Dist. Atty. (Andrew E. Abraham, Michael R. Juviler and Lewis R. Friedman, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

FULD, Chief Judge.

This is another of those rare cases (see, e.g., People v. Jones, 25 N.Y.2d 637, 306 N.Y.S.2d 17, 254 N.E.2d 232, affg. 31 A.D.2d 780) in which the representation of a defendant by his assigned lawyer was so inadequate and ineffective as to deprive him of a fair trial.

The appellant, now 69 years old, was indicted, along with a codefendant (Henry Murray), for first degree robbery in September of 1951. In less than two months before the crime, he had tried to commit suicide by jumping off a roof and, while in the Tombs following his arrest, several times slashed his wrists. In February of 1952, he was found 'incompetent' by psychiatrists at Bellevue Hospital to stand trial and was committed to Matteawan State Hospital, where he remained for about a year. A couple of months after being returned to the Tombs, he was transferred to Bellevue for further psychiatric observation.

An attorney, who had been practicing for some 11 years, was assigned to represent him in June, 1953 and he was brought to trial in January, 1954 in the Court of General Sessions. He was found guilty by a jury which recommended 'leniency.' The court thereafter, in February, 1954, sentenced him as a fourth felony offender to a term of from 30 years to life.

A notice of appeal had been timely filed on the appellant's behalf but in November, 1954 the Appellate Division dismissed the appeal for failure to prosecute. However, it reinstated the appeal--initially in 1965 and again in 1969--when it appeared that the appellant had been confined to Dannemora State Hospital for virtually all of the intervening years. At any rate, a divided Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction in December, 1970 (35 A.D.2d 944, 316 N.Y.S.2d 566). The majority rejected all the contentions urged upon it by the appellant, including, in particular, his claims (1) that the trial judge should have, on his own motion, ordered a hearing to determine his competency to stand trial and (2) that he was prejudiced by the statement, made by a Bellevue psychiatrist during cross-examination by the District Attorney, suggesting that he had a criminal record. We thoroughly agree with the Appellate Division's treatment and rejection of those two claims--reasserted in our court--and turn to the appellant's additional argument that, by reason of his lawyer's manifest failure to prepare the defense that he was 'insane' at the time the crime was committed, he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel and, by that token, denied a fair trial.

The appellant's guilt was proved almost beyond all doubt. The evidence established that he was arrested, along with his accomplice, as he fled from the scene of the robbery. In addition, three eyewitnesses to the robbery identified him, and his codefendant Murray--who had pleaded guilty and been sentenced to 15 years to life--actually testified for the People, fully implicating the appellant. In the light of such evidence, the appellant's only possible defense was that of 'insanity' when the crime was committed, and there was ample basis for such a defense. The appellant had tried to kill himself a month and a half before the robbery; he had slashed his wrists while in jail; he had required psychiatric treatment two weeks after the robbery; and, found incompetent to stand trial, he was committed to Matteawan where he remained for almost a year. ¹ Unquestionably, such a history justified full and careful preparation of the case for the defense. Yet, and despite all this, counsel was, as the record persuasively demonstrates, so completely unfamiliar with either the facts or the law bearing on his client's case as to doom the defense to failure.

Thus, although he had been assigned to represent the appellant some seven months before, he told the judge on the first day of the trial that he was 'not ready'. In point of fact, (1) he had not read a single one of the numerous hospital records dealing with his client's mental condition; (2) he had not, prior to the trial, spoken to any of the doctors at Bellevue or Matteawan; (3) he was so woefully unprepared on the law via-a -vis the insanity defense that the court requested the prosecutor and the psychiatrist attached to the District Attorney's staff to 'assist' defense counsel so as to avoid 'wast(ing) more time'; (4) he was unable, even after being given additional time by the judge, to phrase the essential hypothetical question for the psychiatrists he had called to the stand and, in fact, finally had to adopt the prosecutor's own hypothetical question which, quite obviously, was designed to elicit the response that the appellant was sane; (5) both of the psychiatrists placed on the stand by counsel testified that the appellant was sane; (6) and, as the trial court observed, counsel's 'blanket offer' to put into evidence all of the hospital records would have called to the jurors' attention inadmissible and highly prejudicial matter. Indeed, his lack of preparation was so patent as to move the court to remark, at various times during the trial, that (1) '(y)ou can't try an insanity defense like you try disorderly conduct'; (2) '(a)n insanity defense * * * has got to be carefully prepared. You can't go in cold'; and (3) '(t)his case has been on trial for five days. It has been horribly prepared by counsel.'...