People v. Benton

• Decision Date: 02 February 1990
• Citation: 158 A.D.2d 987,551 N.Y.S.2d 139
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent v. William BENTON, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 139

551 N.Y.S.2d 139

158 A.D.2d 987

PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent v. William BENTON, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Fourth Department.

Feb. 2, 1990.

Linda S. Reynolds by Gillian Brown, Buffalo, for appellant.

Kevin M. Dillon by Susan Nusbaum, Buffalo, for respondent.

Before CALLAHAN, J.P., and DENMAN, GREEN, BALIO and LAWTON, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

County Court properly refused to admit into evidence a prior consistent statement of defendant after defendant's trial testimony had been attacked as a recent fabrication. A prior consistent statement of a witness whose testimony has been attacked as a recent fabrication can be admitted only when the prior statement was made at a time when there was no motive to falsify (People v. Davis, 44 N.Y.2d 269, 277, 405 N.Y.S.2d 428, 376 N.E.2d 901; People v. Sease-Bey, 111 A.D.2d 195, 196, 488 N.Y.S.2d 822, lv. denied 66 N.Y.2d 618, 494 N.Y.S.2d 1041, 485 N.E.2d 245). Here, the statement was written by defendant on March 6, 1986, two days after he was arrested on the instant charges and while he was in jail. Since the statement was made after defendant had a motive to falsify, the court properly refused to admit that self-serving statement into evidence (see, People v. Davis, supra; People v. Sease-Bey, supra ).

The record at the suppression hearing establishes that the police advised defendant of his Miranda rights prior to questioning him. Although it does not appear that defendant expressly waived his rights, such a waiver may be inferred from defendant's conduct (see, North Carolina v. Butler, 441 US 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757, 60 L.Ed.2d 286; People v. Morton, 116 A.D.2d 925, 926, 498 N.Y.S.2d 874, lv. denied 67 N.Y.2d 887, 501 N.Y.S.2d 1039, 492 N.E.2d 1246). It is apparent that defendant understood the Miranda warnings and, with such understanding, freely chose to answer the questions asked by the police (People v. Morton, supra ). The police scrupulously honored defendant's right to counsel and ceased questioning him once they learned that he was on parole and after he requested to speak with an attorney. Defendant's subsequent lengthy statement was made while the police were in the hall outside the interrogation room and did not result from any police interrogation or its "functional equivalent" (see Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 US 291, 302, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1690, 64 L.Ed.2d 297). Under such circumstances, such spontaneous statement is admissible (see, People v. Rivers, 56 N.Y.2d 476, 479, 453 N.Y.S.2d 156, 438 N.E.2d 862, rearg denied 57 N.Y.2d 775, 454 N.Y.S.2d 1033, 440 N.E.2d 1343; People v. Allnutt,...