People v. Benzinger

• Decision Date: 20 December 1974
• Citation: 324 N.E.2d 334,36 N.Y.2d 29,364 N.Y.S.2d 855
• Parties: , 324 N.E.2d 334 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Patricia J. BENZINGER and Carl A. Miller, Appellants.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 855

364 N.Y.S.2d 855

36 N.Y.2d 29, 324 N.E.2d 334

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Patricia J. BENZINGER and Carl A. Miller, Appellants.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 20, 1974.

Vincent E. Doyle, Jr., Buffalo, for Patricia J. Benzinger, appellant.

Charles J. Scibetta and Herbert M. Siegel, Buffalo, for Carl A. Miller, appellant.

Edward C. Cosgrove, Dist. Atty. (William E. Balthasar, Buffalo, of counsel), for respondent.

SAMUEL RABIN, Judge.

The principal issue on this appeal is whether the evidence offered at trial, circumstantial in nature, was sufficient to establish the defendants' guilt of manslaughter in the first degree beyond a reasonable doubt.

John Benzinger, defendant Patricia Benzinger's husband, was found dead in his home by the police at approximately 12:30 a.m. on August 14, 1970. The deceased had been seen alive at about 7:00 p.m. on the evening of August 13, 1970. The prosecution attempted to prove that the defendants Patricia Benzinger (Benzinger) and Carl Miller (Miller) were present at the Benzinger home at the time of the homicide and that the only reasonable inference from the facts proven was that acting in concert they had killed John Benzinger by stabbing him. We conclude that the cumulative effect of the evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict of guilt.

The oft-stated rule with respect to convictions based exclusively upon circumstantial evidence is that for guilt to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt the hypothesis of guilt should flow naturally from the facts proved, and be consistent with them; and the facts proved must exclude 'to a moral certainty' every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. (E.g., People v. Borrero, 26 N.Y.2d 430, 434--435, 311 N.Y.S.2d 475, 478--479, 259 N.E.2d 902, 904--905; People v. Cleague, 22 N.Y.2d 363, 365--366, 292 N.Y.S.2d 861, 862--863, 239 N.E.2d 617--618, 619.) The reason for the current application of this rule is not that circumstantial evidence is thought to be weaker than direct evidence, since the reverse is frequently true. Rather, the rule draws attention to the fact that proof by circumstantial evidence may require careful reasoning by the trier of facts. By highlighting this aspect, the rule hopefully forecloses a danger legitimately associated with circumstantial evidence--that the trier of facts may leap logical gaps in the proof offered and draw unwarranted conclusions based on probabilities of low degree (see People v. Cleague, Supra, at p. 367, 292 N.Y.S.2d 864, 239 N.E.2d 619). In the end, the application of the test becomes 'a question whether common human experience would lead a reasonable man, putting his mind to it, to reject or accept the inferences asserted for the established facts.' (People v. Borrero, Supra, 26 N.Y.2d at p. 435, 311 N.Y.S.2d at p. 479, 259 N.E.2d at p. 905; People v. Wachowicz, 22 N.Y.2d 369, 372, 292 N.Y.S.2d 867, 868, 239 N.E.2d 620, 622.)

Since the issue is the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence, we view the facts most favorably to the People (People v. Cleague, Supra, 22 N.Y.2d at p. 366, 292 N.Y.S.2d at p. 863, 239 N.E.2d 618; see Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 296, 81 S.Ct. 1517, 1520, 6 L.Ed.2d 836, 840). We assume that the jury credited the prosecution witnesses and gave the prosecution's evidence the full weight that might reasonably be accorded it.

Viewed in this light, the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's verdict. Both Benzinger and Miller gave written statements to the police to the effect that they were together the entire day and evening of the crime. Neighbors testified that they had seen both Benzinger and Miller at her home at several different times on the night in question. Miller was seen at the house at 10:30 p.m., and his car remained there from that time up until the arrival of the police. Since the Benzinger residence was located on a dead-end courtyard, the presence of the car indicates that the defendants remained in the house during this time. The prosecution expert testified that in his opinion death occurred after 9:45 p.m. The Benzinger home was a one-floor residence, approximately 28 feet in total length, with one bath and three rooms. The bathroom, where the body was found, was only five or six feet from the kitchen and the living room, rooms in which the defendants had been that evening. The portion of the hall into which the deceased's legs protruded was visible from at least certain sections of the living room. Upon analysis this evidence establishes that the defendants were present at Benzinger's home the evening of August 13, that the decedent was killed during the time the defendants were present, and that given the physical layout of the house, and the conduct of the defendants, there was no reasonable explanation of the decedent's death other than at the hands of the defendants. The proven facts lead naturally and reasonably to the conclusion of guilt, and are inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

There is, furthermore, additional evidence which tends to exclude an hypothesis of innocence. Both defendants made false statements to the police concerning the time of their return to the Benzinger home on August 13. Miller stated he had been sleeping at his house in the early evening and that 'I worke about 9:30 p.m. and I and Patricia sat around the (Miller) house and watched television. I left my house with Patricia about 11:15 p.m. and...