People v. Bing

• Decision Date: 02 July 1990
• Citation: 559 N.Y.S.2d 474,558 N.E.2d 1011,76 N.Y.2d 331
• Parties: , 558 N.E.2d 1011, 59 USLW 2086 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Bruce BING, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Thomas CAWLEY, Respondent. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Luis MEDINA, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 474

559 N.Y.S.2d 474

76 N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 59 USLW 2086

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Bruce BING, Appellant.

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Thomas CAWLEY, Respondent.

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Luis MEDINA, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 2, 1990.

Jeremy L. Goldberg, Matthew Muraskin and Kent V. Moston, for appellant in the first above-entitled action.

Denis Dillon, Dist. Atty., Nassau County (Peter Shapiro and Bruce E. Whitney, of counsel), for respondent in the first above-entitled action

Robert M. Morgenthau, Dist. Atty. (Phyllis A. Monroe, Norman Barclay and David I. Futter, of counsel), for appellant in the second above-entitled action.

Richard Sweren and Lawrence Levner, for respondent in the second above-entitled action.

Richard N. Allman and Philip L. Weinstein, for appellant in the third above-entitled action.

Robert M. Morgenthau, Dist. Atty. (Robert M. Pitler, Mark Dwyer and Atea Martin, of counsel), for respondent in the third above-entitled action.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SIMONS, Judge.

In People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225, 440 N.Y.S.2d 894, 423 N.E.2d 371, we held that a suspect, represented by counsel on a prior pending charge, may not waive his rights in the absence of counsel and answer questions on new unrelated charges. If the police are chargeable with knowledge of the prior representation, any statements the suspect makes, not only about the prior charges but also about the new charges, must be suppressed. Since the rule was announced nine years ago, scarcely a term of court has passed without a Bartolomeo issue being presented to us in one form or another. The three appeals before us, all presenting factual settings encompassed within the Bartolomeo paradigm, call upon us to reexamine the rule once more and to determine whether it continues to be a workable predicate for the exclusionary rule.

In People v. Bing, defendant, suspected of a New York burglary, was arrested in Nassau County on an Ohio warrant after a police teletype confirmed that he was wanted for burglary in that State. He had counsel on the pending Ohio charge but the police, though alerted by the outstanding bench warrant, made no inquiry about the representation when they called Ohio to confirm the warrant or when questioning defendant. After receiving Miranda warnings defendant waived his right to counsel on the New York charges and admitted his involvement in the Nassau County burglary.

Defendant moved to suppress his statements claiming that because of his representation on the prior pending charge in Ohio his rights had attached indelibly under Bartolomeo and he could not waive them in the absence of counsel. The People urged that a geographical limit should be recognized and that out-of-State charges should not trigger the Bartolomeo right to counsel on New York charges. The courts below agreed and denied suppression. 131 Misc.2d 62, 499 N.Y.S.2d 313, 146 A.D.2d 178, 540 N.Y.S.2d 247.

In People v. Cawley, defendant was charged in New York with robbery, second degree. Following his arraignment, with counsel present, he was admitted to bail. He absconded and remained a fugitive until returned to this State on a bench warrant six months later. Upon interrogation by a police officer unaware of the prior representation, defendant waived his Miranda rights and gave inculpatory statements about new, unrelated criminal conduct, confessing not only to a suspected murder and robbery, but also to his involvement in a second murder. Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to petit larceny in satisfaction of the original robbery charge and received a sentence of 30 days' imprisonment. Some days after being released, he was arrested on the new charges, waived his rights and again confessed to murder and robbery.

The trial court, relying on Bartolomeo, granted a pretrial motion to suppress the first confession. It also suppressed the confession obtained after disposition of the pending charge, holding it not sufficiently attenuated from the prior unlawful conduct. On appeal, the People contended that defendant relinquished his attorney-client relationship on the pending charge by absconding and failing to maintain contact with his lawyer while gone. The Appellate Division rejected that argument and affirmed, without opinion. 150 A.D.2d 994, 542 N.Y.S.2d 1003.

In People v. Medina, defendant was convicted of murdering two neighbors. A detective investigating the homicides learned that defendant had recently been released from jail after being held on an assault charge. While questioning him at the scene, the detective asked defendant about the prior case. Defendant told the detective that he had been "let go". When the detective asked "why?", Medina replied that he had been "let go" because the complaining witness had failed to appear in court on four separate occasions. The detective concluded that defendant's case had been dismissed and later, after defendant waived his Miranda rights at the police station, obtained inculpatory statements from him. Defendant moved to suppress the statements claiming that under Bartolomeo he could not waive his rights on the new unrelated crimes because of his representation on the prior charge.

The trial court denied his motion to suppress, finding that although the police knew of the unrelated charge, they reasonably believed it had been dismissed. It also denied defendant's trial motion to submit the issue of the voluntariness of his statements to the jury pursuant to CPL 60.45(2)(b)(ii) and 710.70 and our ruling in People v. Graham, 55 N.Y.2d 144, 447 N.Y.S.2d 918, 432 N.E.2d 790. On appeal the Appellate Division affirmed, with two Justices dissenting. The dissenters believed the statements should have been suppressed under Bartolomeo because the police had failed to make a sufficient effort to determine whether the prior charge had been dismissed but that even if they had, defendant was entitled to have the voluntariness of his statements submitted to the jury (see, People v. Medina, 146 A.D.2d 344, 541 N.Y.S.2d 355). The District Attorney, noting the recurring problems in applying the Bartolomeo rule and its weak jurisprudential foundation, urges that we overrule it.

The rulings sought by the People in these appeals require us to do more than modify the scope of the Bartolomeo rule, as we have done in the past. The exceptions advanced in Bing and Cawley, as compelling as they are under the facts presented, would undercut the basis of the rule by limiting its application solely because of the situs of the attorney-client relationship in Bing and because of the quality of the relationship in Cawley. Presumably, the exception urged in Cawley would require the trial court to inquire into the substantiality of the attorney-client relationship, a matter which has not concerned us in Bartolomeo cases previously, to determine if the suspect could waive a right which we have held indelible once it attaches. Defendant's proposal in Medina would require us to submit to the jury the question of whether the Bartolomeo right attached to determine whether defendant's confession was "involuntary" under CPL 710.70(3). The voluntariness of defendant's statement, however, is irrelevant to the application of the Bartolomeo rule. Concededly, his waiver and statements were voluntary. The question is whether defendant's derivative right had indelibly attached so that he could not waive it in the absence of counsel.

The appeals demonstrate graphically the recurring problems we have had with the Bartolomeo rule. When it is applied to the circumstances in each case, the result is not only unworkable but it imposes an unacceptable burden on law enforcement. Nor can the results be avoided by modifying or creating exceptions to the rule without undermining its rationale. We conclude, therefore, that a fundamental change is required and, notwithstanding compelling concerns of stare decisis, we hold that People v. Bartolomeo should be overruled.

I

The doctrine of state decisis provides that once a court has decided a legal issue, subsequent appeals presenting similar facts should be decided in conformity with the earlier decision. Its purpose is to promote efficiency and provide guidance and consistency in future cases by recognizing that legal questions, once settled, should not be reexamined every time they are presented. The doctrine also rests upon the principle that a court is an institution, not merely a collection of individuals, and that governing rules of law do not change merely because the personnel of the court changes.

Precedents remain precedents, however, not because they are established but because they serve the underlying " 'nature and object of the law itself' ", reason and the power to advance justice (see, Von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 Harv.L.Rev. 409, 414). As Justice Frankfurter observed, "stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and questionable" (Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119, 60 S.Ct. 444, 451, 84 L.Ed. 604). Although a court should be slow to overrule its precedents, there is little reason to avoid doing so when persuaded by the "lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning" (Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407-408, 52 S.Ct. 443, 447-448, 76 L.Ed. 815 [Brandeis, J., dissenting]; see also, People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 488-489, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 348 N.E.2d 894; see generally, Wachtler, Stare Decisis and a Changing New York Court of Appeals, 59 St John's L.Rev. 445, 453). This is especially so in constitutional interpretation where legislative change is practically impossible.

An examination of People v. Bartolomeo, its antecedents and the experience of the courts in applying it, demonstrates that overruling it is consistent...