People v. Blackorby, 77-289
| Decision Date | 10 August 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 77-289,77-289 |
| Citation | 41 Colo.App. 251,583 P.2d 949 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel L. BLACKORBY, Defendant-Appellant. . I |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., David W. Robbins, Deputy Atty. Gen., Edward G. Donovan, Sol. Gen., Mary J. Mullarkey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.
John A. Purvis, Acting Colorado State Public Defender, Alex J. Martinez, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for defendant-appellant.
The defendant pled guilty to a charge of second degree burglary, his judgment and sentencing were deferred for a period of one year, and he was placed under the supervision of the probation department. Prior to the expiration of the one-year period, pursuant to a summons issued by the probation department, the defendant appeared in court pro se and requested that judgment and sentencing be deferred for an additional year in order to enable him to comply with a condition of his deferred judgment that he make restitution to the victim of the offense. Pursuant to such request the trial court ordered that "the defendant is hereby granted a one-year extension of the time under supervision in order he may pay the outstanding balance of his restitution . . . ." During the one-year extension of the deferred judgment and sentence the defendant was charged with several criminal offenses, and after notice and a hearing his deferred judgment was revoked, and he was sentenced to the Colorado State Reformatory. He brings this appeal from the denial of his motion to vacate the judgment of conviction and sentence. We affirm.
The defendant challenges here the authority of the trial court to defer judgment and sentencing beyond the initial one-year period. He argues that the trial court had no statutory authority to order such an extension and that even if the trial court had such authority, it could only be exercised after a notice and hearing and for good cause.
Section 16-7-403, C.R.S.1973 (1976 Cum.Supp.) expressly authorizes a court to defer judgment and sentencing for a period of two years from the time a guilty plea is entered, and the extension granted here did not defer judgment and sentencing beyond this two-year period. And, while there is no express statutory authority which permits the court to extend the period of a deferred judgment and sentence beyond that initially imposed, in our view such authority is encompassed in the broad discretionary power of the court. See People v. Ray, Colo., 560 P.2d 74 (1977).
Further, although § 16-11-204(4), C.R.S.1973, requires notice, a hearing, and a showing of good cause before a supervisory period is increased, we...
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People v. Conner, 03CA2476.
...notice, a hearing, and a showing of good cause are not applicable if the defendant consents to the extension. See People v. Blackorby, 41 Colo.App. 251, 583 P.2d 949 (1978). In contrast, a parole revocation hearing must meet the following minimum due process (a) written notice of the claime......
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People v. Hotle
...is making a knowing and voluntary decision. People v. Conner, 148 P.3d 235, 238-39 (Colo.App. 2006); People v. Blackorby, 41 Colo.App. 251, 252-53, 583 P.2d 949, 951 (1978). Similarly, there is no statutory requirement that a defendant be advised of a right to counsel before signing a conse......
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People v. Romero
...part of the criminal prosecution"), overruled on other grounds by People v. Abdul, 935 P.2d 4 (Colo.1997); People v. Blackorby, 41 Colo.App. 251, 252-53, 583 P.2d 949, 951 (1978)("since the defendant requested the extension [of his deferred judgment], we reject his suggestion that the grant......
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People v. Carbajal
...not been fulfilled. . . . Id. (emphasis added). See also People v. Zabala, 706 P.2d 807, 808 (Colo.App.1985); People v. Blackorby, 41 Colo.App. 251, 583 P.2d 949, 951 (1978). Upon receiving a defendant's guilty plea, a trial court must enter judgment and sentence unless it imposes a deferre......