People v. Blackwell

• Decision Date: 10 June 1985
• Citation: 128 Misc.2d 599,490 N.Y.S.2d 457
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Eric BLACKWELL, Defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 457

490 N.Y.S.2d 457

128 Misc.2d 599

The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Eric BLACKWELL, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Trial Term New York County, Part 71.

June 10, 1985.

Robert M. Morgenthau, Dist. Atty., New York County by Patrick Jordon, Asst. Dist. Atty., New York City, for the people.

Caesar Cirigliano, Atty. for Legal Aid Society by Joseph McBride, New York City, for defendant.

SHELDON S. LEVY, Justice:

What is the proper scope of cross-examination when a defendant testifies at a Huntley hearing? More specifically, if a defendant seeks to suppress incriminating statements only on the ground that the right to counsel has been violated, can the prosecutor ask questions concerning the truth of those statements or with respect to guilt of the crimes charged?

Curiously, although numerous Huntley hearings are conducted daily throughout the State, no reported case has detailed the legal and practical perimeters of cross-interrogation applicable to these and similar hearings.

Defendant, Eric Blackwell, accused of stealing a wallet and possessing five stolen credit cards, was indicted for grand larceny in the third degree and possession of stolen property in the second degree. The pertinent facts elicited at the Huntley hearing are readily set forth.

On January 22, 1985, at the Times Square IRT subway station, Police Officer Joseph Schweiger arrested defendant for taking a woman's wallet out of her pocketbook. Upon having Miranda warnings read to him, defendant made an incriminating statement and was thereafter escorted to a nearby police substation. There, Officer Schweiger searched the defendant and found, secreted in various places on his person, several credit cards in different names. The officer then gave defendant his Miranda rights once more, and defendant made additional admissions.

On cross-examination of Officer Schweiger, defense counsel asked him if he had found defendant's wallet when he searched him and if he had noticed in the wallet a Legal Aid Society calling card with the notation of a court date subsequent to January 22nd, 1985. Officer Schweiger remembered the wallet, but denied seeing any Legal Aid card therein.

At the conclusion of the People's case, defense counsel stated that his client wished to testify regarding a Legal Aid card that was in his wallet at the time of his arrest. The attorney, however, requested an in limine ruling from the Court that questions by the prosecutor be strictly confined to the issue of what was in the defendant's wallet at the time of arrest and that the People be allowed no other areas of cross-examination. The assistant district attorney opposed the application, arguing that his interrogation of defendant should not be limited in any manner; should be as broad as at trial; and should include inquiry as to details of the crimes charged and the truth of the statements made.

In this Court's view, however, the fair and proper standard to be applied in these and similar circumstances lies between the asserted positions of the respective parties. The resolution of the issue also necessitates a new look at the permissible scope of cross-examination, especially at pretrial suppression hearings.

In civil matters, although it is within the trial judge's sound discretion to enlarge the allowable areas of cross-examination, such questioning is generally limited to matters testified to on direct examination (Friedel v. Board of Regents, 296 N.Y. 347, 73 N.E.2d 545; Provo v. Morehouse, 12 A.D.2d 668, 207 N.Y.S.2d 536). In criminal proceedings, however, it is well-settled, but oftentimes misunderstood, that a party may prove through cross-examination any relevant proposition, regardless of the scope of the direct testimony (People v. Kennedy, 70 A.D.2d 181, 186, 420 N.Y.S.2d 23). It is this broader criminal standard, with specified modifications, that governs cross-examination at suppression hearings preliminary to trial.

At any suppression proceeding, no matter what the substance of a testifying defendant's direct examination is, the defendant is seeking to have the trier of facts believe the proffered evidence. By such sworn testimony, the defendant is setting forth one or more affirmative propositions that, if given credence, will be of material aid to defendant's cause. Clearly, the defendant, at a minimum, is putting credibility in issue.

On this basis alone, the People are entitled to cross-examine the defendant fully as to all aspects of those factual issues raised by the direct proof.

In addition, the prosecution must also be permitted to employ those normal means of impeachment which are standard implements in the arsenal of attack upon the believability of any witness. In this regard, a defendant who testifies in support of a motion to suppress statements may be interrogated with respect to prior convictions and bad acts to the extent that such information may assist in evaluating credibility as a witness. This type of cross-examination is little different from cross-examination at trial. Indeed, it may well be even broader because, in the absence of the jury, its scope need not be restricted by Sandoval considerations (see People v. Lombardi, 76 A.D.2d 891, 428 N.Y.S.2d 709) or "compromises" (see People v. Handly, 96 A.D.2d 649, 466 N.Y.S.2d 514; People v. Bermudez, 98 Misc.2d 704, 414 N.Y.S.2d 645, aff'd 84 A.D.2d 968, 447 N.Y.S.2d 570).

Moreover, if a district attorney chooses to do so, a defendant can be cross-examined concerning alternate theories under which the evidence that is the subject of the hearing might be admissible. For example, even when the right to counsel has attached, statements that have been genuinely volunteered and have not been made as a product of police interrogation, inducement or encouragement...