People v. Blair

Decision Date03 June 2005
Docket NumberNo. 96198.,96198.
Citation831 N.E.2d 604,215 Ill.2d 427
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Leon BLAIR, Appellee.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (Lisa Hoffman, Linda D. Woloshin, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, Renee G. Goldfarb, Alan J. Spellberg, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, Jeffery A. Waldhoff, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for appellee.

Justice FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:

As defendant Leon Blair and two friends were walking toward an intersection on the south side of Chicago, they encountered a car driven by Darryl Mims. After harsh words were exchanged, defendant pulled a .357 Magnum from his waistband, said "ball game," and killed Mims. A jury convicted defendant of first degree murder and the trial court imposed a sentence of 55 years' imprisonment. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, defendant filed the instant postconviction petition, blaming his lawyers for his first degree murder conviction. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition based on res judicata or waiver. The appellate court reversed, holding that both res judicata and waiver are not permitted bases for summary dismissal under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2000)). 338 Ill.App.3d 429, 431, 272 Ill.Dec. 936, 788 N.E.2d 240. We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal. See 177 Ill.2d R. 315(a). We find the legislature intended to allow a judge to summarily dismiss petitions where facts ascertainable from the record reveal the petition's claims have already been decided, waived, or forfeited. We therefore reverse.

BACKGROUND

At trial, the following evidence was adduced. On June 25, 1995, 18-year-old defendant, Leon "Little Tray" Blair, acted as a security "lookout" at a Black Disciples gang picnic on the south side of Chicago. After leaving the picnic at either 12 p.m. or in the afternoon, he began "journeying" around the neighborhood with fellow Black Disciples John McKenzie and Marcus Wright. According to Wright's testimony on cross-examination by defendant's counsel, the trio had been drinking beer and gin, and defendant had been smoking marijuana. As daylight waned at 8:45 p.m., defendant, McKenzie, and Wright approached a three-way intersection at 73rd Street, Ellis Avenue, and South Chicago Avenue. They encountered Darryl Mims as his red Oldsmobile pulled up to a stop at the intersection. They asked Mims the price of his vehicle and Mims replied, "$3,500." Defendant was angered at the high price and said, "That's a robbery without a gun." Mims then "disrespected" defendant, so defendant told Mims, "I am a Black Disciple. My name is Little Tray, and you better show some respect for me." Mims then called the 5-foot-5-inch, 150-pound defendant a "little motherfucker," further angering defendant.

Assistant State's Attorney Anne Lorenz testified that in an interview she conducted with defendant, defendant told her that he saw Mims reach his right hand over the front passenger seat toward the glove compartment. Defendant did not see a gun on Mim's person or in the car. Lorenz testified that defendant orally told her that he "extended his arm into the car," and that "before he pulled the trigger, he said, `ball game' to the driver, which means `it's over.'" Defendant, however, crossed this statement off the written statement that Lorenz prepared. At trial, defendant admitted that he shot Mims. Defendant further testified, however, that Mims reached toward the glove compartment with his right hand, which led defendant to think that Mims was retrieving a weapon. Wright disputed this, testifying that after words were exchanged between Mims and defendant, he heard defendant say "ball game" and saw defendant lean toward the inside of the vehicle and fire a shot at Mims. Also according to Wright, Mims was sitting back comfortably in his car seat with his right hand on the steering wheel. Eyewitness Taron Cain testified that he stopped his car at the intersection when he saw two men talking to an occupant of the car which fit the description of Mims' car. He saw defendant walk or jog up to the car and shoot the occupant. After the shooting, the three men ran away as Cain exited his car to assist Mims. Mims died approximately two weeks later.

After leaving the scene, defendant threw the gun into the water by Rainbow Beach and later went to the residence of Cassandra Harris, the mother of two of defendant's children. Harris testified that she, Wright, and defendant were on her porch that night. She testified that defendant stated, "[McKenzie] told him to stick that nigger." McKenzie then arrived on the porch, and defendant said to McKenzie, "Man, you told me to stick that nigger." At trial, after first denying that he used those words, defendant admitted that he said them. Defendant also admitted at trial that he never told the group on the porch that he shot Mims because he was in fear for his life.

Defendant was charged in a two-count indictment with the first degree murder of Daryl Mims. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1992). After defendant's motion to suppress was denied, the case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury rejected defendant's second degree murder argument premised on defendant's unreasonable belief in the necessity for self-defense. Instead, the jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder.

Defendant's trial counsel filed a motion for a new trial alleging that the evidence was insufficient and that defendant was denied a fair trial. In addition, defendant filed a separate pro se motion for a new trial alleging that during the trial his attorney became physically ill and should have asked for a continuance; and his attorney's illness may have caused her to inadequately represent him.

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court offered defendant's counsel an opportunity to be heard on her motion, but counsel waived argument. The trial court then offered defendant an opportunity to be heard on his pro se motion. Defendant responded: "I waive argument." The trial court then denied both motions, stating, inter alia, "As to defendant's motion for new trial, based upon the fact his Attorney was physically ill and did not ask for a continuance in this matter, I find there is no merit whatsoever. Counsel did an excellent job in representation of this defendant. This motion will also be denied."

The trial court received evidence in mitigation and aggravation, including testimony from the mother of the victim and letters from four teachers who helped defendant obtain his GED while he was incarcerated. The trial court subsequently sentenced defendant to 55 years' imprisonment.

Defendant filed a notice of appeal and the Cook County public defender was appointed to represent him on appeal. Attorneys in the public defender's office reviewed the record and concluded that there were no issues of merit warranting argument on appeal. Accordingly, the public defender filed a motion for leave to withdraw as appellate counsel and a brief in support of the motion pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Defendant filed a pro se response to the motion to withdraw, arguing that: (1) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by neglecting his case because she was "obviously medicated" during trial due to an illness making her "often incoherent"; (2) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to evidence regarding his gang involvement, which the trial court improperly admitted at trial; (3) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview potential character witnesses to testify at the sentencing hearing; (4) his appellate counsel labored under a conflict of interest because both trial and appellate counsel were employed at the public defender's office; and (5) his 55-year sentence was excessive because the trial court did not "meaningfully" consider factors in mitigation when imposing the sentence.

On February 3, 2000, the appellate court filed a Rule 23 order granting the public defender's motion to withdraw. People v. Blair, No. 1-98-4119, 309 Ill.App.3d 1074, 261 Ill.Dec. 984, 764 N.E.2d 599 (2000) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate court rejected defendant's claim of ineffective assistance related to his posttrial motion that trial counsel neglected his case because she was "obviously medicated" due to an illness, making her "often incoherent." The court added that his argument was "unsupported by the record or based on matters that are outside the record." In a footnote, the appellate court noted that defendant had expressly declined to argue his posttrial motion on this basis and that the trial court denied the motion, stating that it was without merit. The court also rejected each of defendant's additional pro se arguments. The court concluded, "We have carefully reviewed the record in this case, the aforesaid brief and defendant's response in compliance with the mandate of the Anders decision and find no issues of arguable merit. Therefore, the motion of the public defender for leave to withdraw as counsel is allowed." This court denied defendant's petition for leave to appeal. People v. Blair, 189 Ill.2d 663, 246 Ill.Dec. 917, 731 N.E.2d 766 (2000) (order).

On January 8, 2001, defendant filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2000). In the petition, defendant set forth six arguments. Defendant first argued that his trial counsel improperly advised him to decline argument on his pro se posttrial motion, and that the trial court should have investigated his claim as to his counsel's illness. Second, defendant alleged that his trial c...

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