People v. Blouin
| Decision Date | 24 April 1978 |
| Docket Number | Cr. 31330 |
| Citation | 80 Cal.App.3d 269,145 Cal.Rptr. 701 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Christopher Henri BLOUIN, Defendant and Appellant. |
Paul Halvonik, State Public Defender, Charles M. Sevilla, Chief Asst. State Public Defender, Jonathan B. Steiner, Russell I. Lynn, Deputy State Public Defenders, for defendant and appellant.
Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frederick R. Millar, Jr., Sharlene A. Honnaka, Deputy Attys. Gen., Los Angeles, for plaintiff and respondent.
By information in case number A329292, Christopher Blouin and Lawrence Gray were charged, in count I, with grand theft of Joseph Gates' automobile in violation of Penal Code section 487 subdivision 3 and, in count II, with receiving stolen property, a 1948 Chevrolet automobile, in violation of Penal Code section 496. 1
In a second information in case number A333439, Blouin was charged with robbery of Mikizo Suzuki in violation of Penal Code section 211. It was further alleged in this information that Blouin used a pistol in commission of the crime within the meaning of Penal Code sections 12022.5 and 1203.06 subdivision (a)(1).
Blouin plead not guilty and filed written motions to compel disclosure of the identity and address of the untested police informant and to suppress evidence of his statements to the police in accordance with Evidence Code section 402. Both motions were heard and denied. Following a court trial Blouin was found not guilty of grand theft but guilty of receiving stolen property in case number A329292 and thereafter withdrew his plea of not guilty, plead guilty to robbery and admitted the use allegations in case number 333439. The two cases were consolidated for all further proceedings, the use allegations found to be true and the robbery to be in the first degree. Defendant was sentenced to state prison with sentences to run concurrently with time in custody fixed at 60 days. He appeals from the judgment.
It is contended on appeal that (1) the denial of the suppression motion was error, 2 (2) the denial of the disclosure motion was error, and (3) that sentencing irregularities be corrected by this court or the cause remanded for resentencing.
Since no claim is made of insufficiency of the evidence no plenary statement of the facts is necessary in this opinion. We shall refer only to those portions of the record deemed necessary to a resolution of these issues.
With respect to the suppression and disclosure motions, apparently prompted by the preliminary hearing testimony of investigating police officer Gilbert Hetrick, a pretrial hearing under Penal Code section 1538.5 and Evidence Code section 402 was held to determine the admissibility of statements made by defendant to Hetrick in the course of the latter's investigation of the crimes. At the hearing Officer Hetrick, assigned to investigate auto thefts, testified that in the course of his duties he obtained information about the theft of a motor vehicle belonging to Joseph Gates from a fellow officer. Contact with Gates disclosed a number of identifying characteristics of this antique vehicle. Hetrick then had a conversation with a person described only as a "confidential informant" who told him: "that on 52nd Street between Budlong and Normandie there was a '48 Chevrolet four door, it was black primer, had a suspense receipt, a red cigarette in the front window, that it was stolen and that a person by the name of Chris owned it.
Q Do you recall whether the informant said it was owned by Christopher Blouin or just by Chris.
A Chris.
Q Did you speak with the informant personally?
A Yes.
Q Did the informant tell you anything else about the defendant?
A No.
Q Did he tell you anything else about the automobile?
A No.
Q Did he tell you that he had seen the automobile at that location?
A No."
With respect to the informant Hetrick also testified:
"Q (By Mr. Turner for Defendant) Did the informant tell you the color of the suspense sticker?
A I think he said it was red.
Q And was there in fact a red suspense sticker on the front of the car?
A Yes.
Q Did the informant tell you where Mr. Blouin lived?
A No, other than on 52nd Street between Budlong and Normandie.
Q At the time the informant gave you the information, was he under arrest?
A No.
Q Was he being detained in connection with the investigation of a crime?
A No.
Q Did he voluntarily come forward and give you this information?
A Yes.
Q To your knowledge did this informant have any motive for misrepresenting to you what the factual situation was concerning that automobile?
A Not that I know of.
Q In other words, he didn't say something to you like, 'I want to get Blouin,' or anything like that?
A No statements like that were made.
Q At the original time that you went out to this location on 52nd, did you have any information about a person by the name of Blouin?
A No.
Q Did you have any specific information as to where this person Christopher lived at all?
A On that street between two north-south streets there's an east-west street and it's somewhere in there.
Q So you were told that Christopher lived on that street or just that the car
A Was there. We had gone by the location probably almost the whole week prior and never saw the car there.
Q But were you specifically told this person Christopher had the car and he lived on that street?
A I think maybe the informant did tell me that he did live on the street.
Q Or was your information just that the car was on that street in possession of a Christopher and that's why you went out there to check to see if you could find the car?
A I think the informant told me that Christopher lives on the street. The informant felt he lived on the street."
Thereafter the record reveals the following with respect to the obtaining of defendant's statements by Hetrick:
"Q Now on the date of the defendant's arrest did you drive to the location described by the informant?
A Yes.
Q From what street did you which street were you driving on when you first saw the automobile which is the subject of this prosecution?
A 52nd Street.
Q What direction were you driving?
A Westbound.
Q How far were you from the automobile when you first observed it?
A Approximately a block away.
Q Did you drive by the automobile?
A Yes.
Q How close did you come to the automobile when you drove by?
A Three feet.
Q Did it match the description given to you by the informant of the automobile?
A Yes.
Q What did you observe when you rode by, what did you observe concerning the automobile? Describe it, in other words.
A It was black or gray primer. It appeared to be a 1948, it was a four door, it had a red temporary sticker in the right front window, that's all.
Q I believe you indicated it was black primer; is that correct?
A Gray primer, black primer.
Q If the paint had been taken off the car would primer be on the outside of the car? Is that what you said if the paint was taken off the car?
A If somebody painted primer on it, you would see primer.
Q Before repainting the car do you always put primer on it?
A Sometimes.
Q Have you noticed in connection with cars that are stolen that often either the thief or the person that receives the stolen car will put primer on the car?
A Primer or a color change, usually.
Q Incidentally, how long have you been investigating theft of stolen automobiles?
A Eight years.
Q How long have you been a Los Angeles police officer?
A Eight years.
Q Are you assigned now to a detail that has responsibility of the investigation of reports of stolen automobiles?
A Yes.
Q How long have you been on that detail?
A A year and a half.
Q After you drove by the automobile, what did you do then?
A Placed the vehicle under surveillance.
Q Did you see the defendant near the vehicle?
A Yes.
Q Where did you see him?
A I saw the defendant under the hood, appeared to be working on the engine.
The driver's door was opened and he would walk around and open the door and sit partially in the car for a brief period of time and he would get out and go back underneath the engine.
He would go into the house, come back out, continue to be under the hood, in the car.
Q How long did you observe the defendant working on the car?
A Approximately 20 or 30 minutes.
Q What did you do then?
A Drove from the surveillance position to the vehicle itself.
Q Did you then alight from your police vehicle?
A Yes.
Q When you got out of the police car, had you seen anything that was inconsistent with what you or your partner had been told by the informant?
A No.
Q Was everything the informant had told you true?
A Yes.
Q Did you think it was reasonable to have relied upon the informant?
A I think so.
Q When you got out of the police car, what happened then?
A Approached the defendant who at that time was working on the engine.
Q Did you say anything to him?
A Displayed our police badges displayed my police badge.
Q Did your partner display his police badge also?
A Yes.
Q Did either one of you say anything to the defendant?
A I told him I was a police officer.
Q Did you do all the talking?
A I initially approached the defendant.
Q Did you ask him any questions?
A I asked him if it was his car.
Q Did you ask him his name first?
A I believe I asked him if it was his car first.
Q What did he say?
A He said, 'Yes.'
Q Did you ask any other questions?
A I asked him what his name was.
Q Was that the next question you asked him?
A I think so. Yes.
Q And I take it he gave you his name; is that right?
A Yes.
Q Did you ask any other questions?
A I asked him...
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