People v. Bohl, Court of Appeals No. 16CA0644

• Decision Date: 01 November 2018
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals No. 16CA0644
• Citation: 446 P.3d 907
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joshua Thomas BOHL, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

446 P.3d 907

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Joshua Thomas BOHL, Defendant-Appellant.

Court of Appeals No. 16CA0644

Colorado Court of Appeals, Division I.

Announced November 1, 2018

Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Elizabeth Ford Milani, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Andrea R. Gammell, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

Opinion by JUDGE FOX

¶ 1 Defendant, Joshua Thomas Bohl, appeals the trial court’s decision denying him access to juror contact information. We affirm. Because the record lacks evidence of jury misconduct, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to release juror contact information.

I. Background

¶ 2 A jury convicted Bohl of one count of first degree murder for killing his girlfriend, Jayme Hosier.

A. Bohl’s Trial

¶ 3 During a four-day trial, the prosecution presented evidence that Bohl killed Hosier in a Commerce City apartment. Bohl initially told police that Hosier died when a television accidentally fell on her head, but the forensic pathologist determined that Hosier died from asphyxiation

due to blunt force trauma to the neck. The key dispute at trial was whether Bohl had the requisite intent to commit first degree murder. The prosecution’s pathologist said that pressure to Hosier’s neck would have had to continue for three to five minutes before she died, but the defense expert testified that Hosier could have died sooner, helping to negate intent.

B. Post-Trial Hearings

¶ 4 The day after the verdict, a deputy district attorney who was not involved in prosecuting the case sent a text message to Shelley Hillesheim, the wife of jury foreman Mark Hillesheim. Mrs. Hillesheim and the deputy district attorney knew each other, and the deputy district attorney asked if Mr. Hillesheim would provide feedback on the trial and the prosecutors’ performance during the case. Mrs. Hillesheim replied as follows:

The minute Mark got selected to sit on the case, I knew he would be the foreman too. I told him I was calling it. He took it very seriously too. It kind of amused me. He would come up and look up and research various scientific items that were presented, etc. He said he even mapped out his own timeline of events so he could try to put it together in his mind. He said he’d be more than happy to share his feedback. He took lots of notes and still is frustrated by certain things.

¶ 5 Following this communication, the People filed a "Notice of Juror Contact" with the trial court. In response, Bohl’s counsel quickly filed a motion for a new trial. In addition to requesting a new trial, Bohl requested alternatively that the court hold a hearing on the incident and release the jurors’ contact information.¹

¶ 6 At a hearing on Bohl’s motion, the court directed the People to subpoena the Hillesheims to a January 7, 2016, hearing. The court declined to provide juror contact information to Bohl’s counsel at that time, explaining, "I’m not planning on doing that right now. If we need to, we will. But I think right now ... we need to summon the juror and his wife into court."

¶ 7 At the January 7 hearing, the court informed the Hillesheims that they had been subpoenaed because it appeared that Mr. Hillesheim might have violated the court’s order not to engage in outside investigation. The court proceeded to advise the Hillesheims

that if it’s shown by either side that you violated an order of this Court, technically speaking, you could be found in contempt of this Court; and this Court could impose a sentence up to six months in the Adams County Jail or a fine or require that you pay restitution if in fact a mistrial is declared.

¶ 8 While the court intimated that it was not focused on pursuing contempt proceedings, it nonetheless advised the Hillesheims that "theoretically, that may occur; and so I think you may need to consult with an attorney to see what liability you may have in this matter before I proceed to a hearing."

¶ 9 At a later hearing, on February 16, 2016, defense counsel renewed her request for contact information for the other jurors. While the court did not completely foreclose that possibility, it expressed concern that CRE 606(b) precluded inquiry into the jury’s deliberative process.

¶ 10 On February 16, Mrs. Hillesheim testified that, during trial, her husband had shown her that he was researching decomposition on the internet. Mrs. Hillesheim said the webpage displayed a picture of a pig with the title "decomposition." She testified that it was the only time she saw her husband researching decomposition or any other scientific items during the trial. Mrs. Hillesheim also testified that Mr. Hillesheim had created a timeline of events in the case, but that she had not seen it.

¶ 11 Mr. Hillesheim testified that he had "looked up decomposition of animals, which was brought to my interest [by] terms used in the case," but stated that he did not remember what websites he accessed. He said that he was motivated to look up decomposition because "it was all new" and he was interested from a personal standpoint because he was a hunter who grew up on a farm. He said he told his wife he was researching decomposition because "it was dealing with some sciences that are involved this week in the case."

¶ 12 Regarding the timeline, Mr. Hillesheim said he believed he had made some notes before the last day of trial, like "chicken scratch," but he could not recall what he "did with [them, or] if [they were] used for anything[.]" Ultimately, Mr. Hillesheim testified that his research was "nothing specific to anything in the case" and that he did not share the timeline or his decomposition research with the other jurors.

¶ 13 At the conclusion of the hearing, the court did not address Bohl’s request for juror contact information, but said that it would not "subpoena the other 11 jurors" because "[w]e should only [subpoena other jurors] if there, in fact, is a good-faith belief that extraneous information may have been submitted to the jury[.]" The court reasoned that, based on the evidence presented, Bohl failed to show that extraneous evidence of decomposition had been presented to the jury, and even if it had been, there was no prejudice because decomposition was not an issue at trial. The court also found that because the timeline was based on "information that [Mr. Hillesheim] received at trial," the timeline was not extraneous information. Accordingly, the court denied Bohl’s motion for a new trial and later sentenced Bohl to life in prison without the possibility of parole.

II. Juror Contact Information

¶ 14 Bohl argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for juror contact information because he was deprived of the opportunity to investigate and gather evidence to support his claim of juror misconduct. We disagree.

A. Preservation and Standard of Review

¶ 15 The parties agree that this issue was preserved.

¶ 16 Although there is no established standard of review in Colorado for a trial court’s denial of a party’s request for juror contact information, we conclude that we should review a court’s denial of access to juror contact information for an abuse of discretion. Cf. People v. Pifer , 2014 COA 93, ¶ 19, 350 P.3d 936 ("We review [defendant’s Crim. P. 24(b)(1)(X) challenge based on bias] for an abuse of discretion[.]"); People v. Pena-Rodriguez , 2012 COA 193, ¶ 69, 412 P.3d 461 ("Assuming, while not deciding, that the trial court erred or abused its discretion in applying Crim. P. 24(a)(4) and Crim. P. 33(c), we find any error harmless."), aff’d , 2015 CO 31, 350 P.3d 287, rev’d on other grounds , 580 U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 855, 197 L.Ed.2d 107 (2017) ; People v. Garrison , 2012 COA 132M, ¶ 7, 303 P.3d 117 (reviewing the trial court’s decision under Crim. P. 24(g) —allowing juror questions—for an abuse of discretion). See generally King v. United States , 576 F.2d 432, 438 (2d Cir. 1978) (recognizing that although the trial judge has discretion to disclose juror contact information, "[t]here is a judicial reluctance" to allow post-verdict contact with jurors); Brewington v. State , 981 N.E.2d 585, 593-94 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (concluding that the trial court correctly balanced the needs of effective trial administration against Brewington’s constitutional rights and did not abuse its discretion in granting the State’s request for an anonymous jury), aff’d in part and vacated in part , 7 N.E.3d 946 (Ind. 2014) ; Golnick v. Callender , 290 Neb. 395, 860 N.W.2d 180, 195 (2015) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Golnick’s request for juror contact information after the jurors completed their service and applying a statutory "good cause" standard to the disclosure of juror information). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or if it misconstrues or misapplies the law. People v. Relaford , 2016 COA 99, ¶ 25, 409 P.3d 490.

B. Law and Analysis

¶ 17 Crim. P. 24(a)(4) says that although "[j]urors shall not be required to disclose personal locating information ... and such information shall not be maintained in files open to the public[,] [t]he trial judge shall assure that parties and counsel have access to appropriate and necessary locating information." While Crim. P. 24(a)(4) is more often raised in pre-evidentiary proceedings, such as voir dire, Bohl relies on the rule post-trial, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to provide the requested juror contact information.

¶ 18 The United States Constitution does not guarantee a defendant the right to question jurors post-verdict. Pena-Rodriguez , ¶ 68. And though CRE 606(b) limits the circumstances under which a juror may testify post-trial, it provides an exception for "extraneous prejudicial information ... improperly brought to the jurors’ attention."...