People v. Bonilla
| Decision Date | 03 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | E068880 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MANUEL BONILLA, Defendant and Appellant. |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINIONAPPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Christian F. Thierbach, Judge. ) Affirmed in part; reversed in part with directions.
David L. Annicchiarico, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Paige B. Hazard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 1997, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant and appellant Manuel Bonilla pled guilty to one count of robbery (Pen. Code,1 § 211, count 1) and admitted that he used a dangerous weapon in the commission of count 1 (§ 12022, subd. (b)). In exchange, the trial court dismissed a charge of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1), count 2) and its attendant firearm enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (b)). The court sentenced him to two years on count 1 and a stayed term of one year on the weapon enhancement. It then suspended execution of the sentence and placed defendant on probation for three years, under specified conditions. On January 1, 2017, section 1473.7 went into effect. (Stats 2016, ch. 739, § 1.) It permits a defendant to challenge a conviction based on a guilty plea where prejudicial error affected the defendant's ability to understand the immigration consequences of the plea. (Former § 1473.7.) Defendant filed a motion to vacate his conviction under former section 1473.7. The court denied the motion.
On appeal, defendant contends that the court erred in denying his motion under former section 1473.7. We affirm in part and reverse in part and remand the matter.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
On September 25, 1996, the victim was sitting in the driver's seat of his car at a gas station. Defendant and his cohort approached the driver's side window and asked for a cigarette. His cohort reached into the car and grabbed the victim's cell phone from thedashboard, and he and defendant ran to defendant's car. The victim and his friend pursued them, until defendant and others exited the car and started coming toward them. The victim returned to his car. Defendant approached him and stabbed him several times. Defendant and his cohort fled the scene but were later apprehended by the police. The victim identified defendant as the person who stole the cell phone and stabbed him.
On January 23, 1997, the Riverside County District Attorney filed an information alleging that defendant committed a robbery (§ 211, count 1) and committed assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1), count 2). The information also alleged that he committed both counts personally using a deadly weapon. (§§ 12022, subd. (b) & 1192.7, subd. (c)(23).)
On July 8, 1997, defendant entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to count 1 and admitting the weapon enhancement. Defendant initialed the box next to the statement: "If I am not a citizen of the United States, I understand that this conviction may have the consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States." Defendant signed his name on the plea form beneath the statement: "I declare under penalty of perjury that the initials that appear above are my own, and that I have read and understand each statement that I have initialed." Defendant's trial counsel also signed the form beneath the statement:
Pursuant to the plea agreement, the court dismissed count 2 and the attendant weapon enhancement, imposed the low term of two years on count 1 and one year on the weapon enhancement. The court ordered the time imposed on the weapon enhancement stayed, suspended execution of the sentence on count 1, and released defendant on probation, under specified conditions.
On January 22, 2016, the trial court granted defendant's motion to set aside his guilty plea, pursuant to section 1203.4. A plea of not guilty was entered, and the court ordered the case dismissed.
On January 13, 2017, the court granted defendant's motion for certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. The certificate stated that the court decreed that defendant had been rehabilitated and was fit to exercise all the civil and political rights of citizenship, except as provided in section 4852.15.
On July 7, 2017, defendant filed a motion to vacate his conviction, pursuant to former section 1473.7. He asserted that he qualified for relief because his trial counsel's representation was so constitutionally ineffective that it rendered him unable to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a guilty plea. Defendant specifically claimed that his attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness since he did not adequately investigate the immigration consequences of the guilty plea, neverdiscussed the immigration consequences of the plea, and did not attempt to obtain an immigration safe plea bargain. Defendant further argued that he was prejudiced because, if he had been properly counseled, he would not have pled guilty. He would have instead asked to seek an alternative, immigration neutral plea or gone to trial.
In support of the motion, defendant submitted a copy of the minute order from his plea hearing, a copy of his plea agreement, and a newspaper article from 2016 about the violence in El Salvador. He also submitted a declaration in which he stated that he was not advised by the court or his public defender that his felony conviction would have the effect of excluding him from admission or exposing him to deportation and denial of citizenship, that he signed his plea form but did not read it or understand its contents and thus was unaware that his conviction would have any adverse immigration consequences, that it was not until he consulted with an immigration attorney regarding his application for lawful permanent residency that he discovered he was subject to mandatory exclusion from the United States as a direct consequence of his felony conviction, and that, had he known he was bargaining away his lawful immigration status, he never would have agreed to a plea. Defendant did not submit a declaration from trial counsel.
On August 4, 2017, the court held a hearing on the motion. Defense counsel informed the court that defendant was currently working with an lawyer in immigration court, and the immigration judge said the problem was that defendant had a two-year sentence. Furthermore, even though he never served the time, and a section 1203.4motion had been granted, the conviction still disqualified him for immigration purposes.3 Counsel asserted that defendant would have insisted on a different resolution, if he had been informed. The court acknowledged that defendant had become a productive contributor to the economy and had been law-abiding since his offense. However, it stated the following: Defense counsel interjected that he was not contending the court did not comply with section 1016.5; however, section 1016.5 was not a bar for relief under section 1473.7. He then pointed out that if defendant had heard from his counsel that his plea would definitely have consequences, as opposed to potential consequences, the situation would be different. The court stated that there was a conflict in authority and proceeded to deny the motion.
ANALYSIS
to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant argues the court erred in denying the motion to vacate his conviction under former section 1473.7. He contends the court mistakenly believed he was ineligible for relief since he had been advised that his plea "may" have immigration consequences. He further claims his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to research the actual immigration consequences of his plea and inform him that he would be subject to mandatory deportation. Defendant asserts he proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that if he had known he would be deported, he would have rejected the agreement and "held out" for an immigration neutral plea or gone to trial. The People concede that defen...
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