People v. Bontrager
| Decision Date | 20 April 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case Number: 16PDJ038 |
| Citation | 407 P.3d 1235 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Complainant, v. William D BONTRAGER, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
William D. Bontrager ("Respondent") engaged in misconduct while litigating the oil and gas leases of five separate clients. He failed to act competently during the representations, and he advanced frivolous claims during four of the litigations and four appeals. He caused his clients considerable financial harm and wasted judicial resources. His misconduct warrants a nine month suspension, with the requirement that he pay restitution to his clients before petitioning for reinstatement under C.R.C.P. 251.29(c), if he wishes to resume the practice of law.
On April 29, 2016, Erin R. Kristofco, Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel ("the People"),1 filed a complaint with Presiding Disciplinary Judge William R. Lucero ("the PDJ"), alleging that Respondent incompetently represented five individual clients and advanced meritless claims on their behalves. The People also claimed that he lodged a frivolous suit in one pro se matter. These actions, the People claimed, resulted in prejudice to the administration of justice.
On May 31, 2016, Respondent filed a combined motion to dismiss along with his answer and affirmative defenses, asking the PDJ either to dismiss the People's complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, to order the People to replead their complaint with more particularity. On August 15, 2016, the PDJ denied that motion in part as to Respondent's representation of his five clients. But the PDJ ordered the People to make a prima facie showing under Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia PicturesIndustries, Inc. ("POME")2 that Respondent's pro se litigation conduct should not be protected by his First Amendment right to petition. Respondent asked for reconsideration of this ruling, but the PDJ denied his request. The People then moved to dismiss the allegations in their complaint concerning Respondent's pro se litigation, found in paragraphs 122-127 and Claims III and IV of the complaint. The PDJ granted the People's request on August 31, 2016. On that same day, the PDJ issued a scheduling order and set the hearing for January 17-20, 2017.
During the prehearing phase of this matter, the parties filed numerous motions. The Hearing Board briefly limns these motions as follows:
On January 10, 2017, the PDJ held a prehearing conference. Kristofco and Ikeler appeared for the People, and Respondent appeared by telephone. The PDJ also ordered the parties to submit a stipulated timeline of events in the underlying litigations, which they did on January 13, 2017.
At the January 17-20 hearing, the PDJ presided, along with Hearing Board members Lucy Hojo Denson, Esq., and Robert A. Munson, M.D. Kristofco and Ikeler represented the People, and Respondent appeared pro se. During the hearing, the PDJ admitted stipulated exhibits S1-S1009, the People's exhibit 1010, Respondent's stipulated exhibits A-H, L, HH, and II, and his nonstipulated exhibits J, K, OO, and PP. The Hearing Board considered the testimony of the People's expert witnesses Thomas P. Dugan and Thomas H. Shipps, Respondent, Judge Jeffrey R. Wilson, Judge David L. Dickinson, Judge David A. Cole, Judge David R. Lass, and Respondent's expert witnesses G. Robert Miller and H.J. Ledbetter.
Respondent took the oath of admission and was admitted to the bar of the Colorado Supreme Court on March 17, 2004, under attorney registration number 35359. He is thus subject to the jurisdiction of the Colorado Supreme Court and the Hearing Board in this disciplinary proceeding.3
Respondent received his J.D. from the University of Indiana in 1966. That same year he was admitted to practice law in Indiana. He opened his own general litigation firm, and his practice included civil litigation, business law, juvenile law, and criminal law. He did not practice in the areas of oil and gas, class actions, or Indian law, though he did settle tort claims. In 1977, Respondent was appointed as an Indiana Superior Court judge. He served until 1982, when he was held in criminal contempt by the Indiana Supreme Court. While a judge, Respondent heard civil, criminal, juvenile, and probate cases, although he never approved settlement agreements submitted by parties. After leaving the Indiana bench, Respondent spent one year as a solo practitioner, primarily in criminal defense.
In 1983, Respondent put his Indiana law license on inactive status. He and his wife moved to Minnesota, where he became the director of a Christian conciliation ministry service. There, he mediated disputes using secular and biblical principles. He testified that at that time, he was very troubled by the quality of justice rendered by secular litigation. The couple moved in 1988 from Minnesota to Durango, Colorado, where they "freelanced" their ministry services, while helping people to resolve conflicts.
The couple moved to Moscow in 1994 to teach law and English at two universities, where Respondent compared biblical conflict resolution principles and the laws and legal processes of modern society. He also developed and taught courses in criminal law, contracts, civil procedure, constitutional law, property, and equity. After leaving Moscow, Respondent and his wife lived in various other places abroad before returning to the United States in 2002 for health reasons.
In 2002, Respondent's wife's back "collapsed." They spent a great deal of time trying to finance medical care, and Respondent decided to return to the practice of law. In 2004, he was admitted as a Colorado lawyer and opened a solo practice in Durango, initially planning to draft wills or practice civil and criminal litigation. But he became intrigued with oil and gas litigation after speaking with three mineral rights owners whom, he believed, were owed royalties from various oil companies. According to Respondent, he successfully settled their cases by attacking the constitutionality of Colorado's forced pooling statute. Thereafter, he testified, he began to see "a pattern" in which the oil companies failed to develop leaseholds as they were required to do, and he was motivated to assist lessees with these issues.
The People charge Respondent with misconduct in five separate client cases. We address each of the cases below.
In 1931, Wallace Mollette acquired an undivided 1/40th mineral interest (or four mineral acres) in a 160-acre tract of land in La Plata County.5 On May 15, 1931, Mollette deeded this interest to Charles Werner.6 The terms of the warranty deed provided that Mollette, Werner, and their successors would share payments under an oil and gas lease.7 Werner did not immediately record his warranty deed; instead, he waited to do so until September 26, 1952.8
In the interim, on August 22, 1950, Mollette and...
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