People v. Boulter
| Citation | 199 Cal.App.4th 761,131 Cal.Rptr.3d 185 |
| Decision Date | 29 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | B230788. |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Brian BOULTER, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
Richard L. Fitzer, Los Angeles, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and Idan Ivri, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Brian Boulter (defendant) pleaded no contest to possession for sale of a controlled substance ( Health & Saf.Code, § 11378 ).
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. We hold that a search of the jail lockers into which defendant, a jail visitor, put belongings was, under the circumstances, an appropriate and valid administrative search. Thus, we affirm the judgment.
At the time of defendant's arrest, the lockers at the Men's Central Jail in Los Angeles were outdoors on jail property, and made available for use by jail visitors to secure property prohibited inside the jail's visitors center, which was indoors. The lockers were approximately 41 feet from the entrance to the visitors center, at which entrance there was a sign stating that no cameras, cellular telephones, recording devices, or purses were allowed inside the visitors center, and another sign stating, A sign was posted near the lockers also stating that no cameras, cellular telephones, recording devices, or purses were allowed inside the visitors center. Visitors did not pass through metal detectors and were not searched before they had access to the lockers. Visitors did not need permission from a jail representative to use an available locker.
Because a Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department deputy observed defendant inside the visitors center with a camera, the deputy arrested defendant, believing defendant to be in violation of Penal Code section 4575.2 Another deputy sheriff searched defendant "incident to the arrest" and recovered two keys for lockers for jail visitors. That deputy sheriff used the keys to search the two lockers. Inside the lockers were bags with a substance that resembled methamphetamine, 12 pills, and a scale. A deputy sheriff testified that the lockers would not have been searched had they not found the keys to the lockers in defendant's possession.
The District Attorney of Los Angeles County filed an information charging defendant with three counts of possession of a controlled substance in a jail ( Pen.Code, § 4573.6 ), one count of possession for sale of a controlled substance ( Health & Saf.Code, § 11378 ), and three counts of bringing drugs into a jail ( Pen.Code, § 4573 ). Defendant pleaded not guilty, and filed a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. The trial court denied defendant's motion. Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant changed his plea to the count charging him with possession for sale of a controlled substance to no contest, and the remaining counts were dismissed. The trial court suspended the imposition of a sentence and placed defendant on three years' probation.
Defendant by his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, sought to suppress evidence of "all items found inside the locker(s)" contending they were seized without probable cause or a warrant. At the hearing, the prosecutor argued that the search constituted an administrative search—a valid warrantless search. In addition to arguing that the search was a valid administrative search, the prosecutor contended that the search also was valid because it was conducted in conjunction with defendant being arrested.
The trial court denied defendant's motion, stating, On appeal, the Attorney General contends only that the search was a valid warrantless administrative search, and does not argue the search was valid because it was conducted incident to defendant's arrest.
Defendant does not challenge the validity of the warrantless search of his person and the deputy's removal of the locker keys from his pocket, but rather contends that the subsequent warrantless search of the lockers violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution because the lockers were not subject to an administrative search. Defendant "notes" that the trial court did not validate the search of the lockers as an administrative search. But even if the trial court did not, (People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1119, fn. 4, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 277, 929 P.2d 596.)
(People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425, 902 P.2d 729; see People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 969, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) In determining whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings, "[i]f there is conflicting testimony, we must accept ... the version of events most favorable to the People, to the extent the record supports them." (People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 342, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289, 181 P.3d 105.)
Defendant contends that because he was unlawfully arrested any search conducted incident to the arrest was improper and, in any event, a search of the lockers incident to arrest was improper because they were not located within defendant's immediate control. The Attorney General does not address these contentions but contends the search of the lockers was a valid administrative search.
Defendant argues that typically an administrative search may be conducted without a warrant only when there is a legitimate emergency or consent to the search has been given (Michigan v. Tyler (1978) 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486; See v. Seattle (1967) 387 U.S. 541, 545, 87 S.Ct. 1741, 18 L.Ed.2d 930; Ingersoll v. Palmer (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1332–1333, 1333–1334, 241 Cal.Rptr. 42, 743 P.2d 1299), which conditions did not exist here. He contends that the search of the lockers was improper because he did not have notice that they were subject to being searched. Defendant asserts that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in using the lockers because the signs outside the entrance to the visitors center did not state that the lockers located outdoors were subject to being searched, he did not need permission from a jail representative to use the lockers, and the lockers were locked. Defendant also argues that the search of the lockers was intended to find evidence of a crime, and therefore was improper without a warrant.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees freedom from unreasonable search and seizure. ( U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; People v. Rogers (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, 1156, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 652, 209 P.3d 977; see also Calif. Const., art. I. §§ 13, 15.) Evidence obtained in violation of this right is inadmissible in a criminal trial. (Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643, 654–655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081.) A defendant may make a motion to suppress such evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5. (People v. Rogers, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1156, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 652, 209 P.3d 977.)
(Ingersoll v. Palmer, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1329, 241 Cal.Rptr. 42, 743 P.2d 1299.) "The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application." (Bell v. Wolfish (1979) 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447.) ...
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