People v. Bradford
| Decision Date | 12 December 1974 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Irone BRADFORD, Defendant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
Richard H. Kuh, Dist. Atty. of New York County, Leonard Rienzi, New York City, of counsel, for the People.
Diamond & Dreifuss, New York City, Walter Dreifuss, New York City, of counsel, for defendant.
The defendant herein pleaded guilty, on July 9, 1974, to the crime of robbery in the second degree, a Class C felony, in violation of section 160.10 of the Penal Law. The defendant, who is currently awaiting sentence, now makes a two-pronged attack on the constitutionality of section 60.05(3) of the Penal Law which mandates incarceration for certain enumerated Class C felonies, among them second-degree robbery. He contends that section 60.05(3), which precludes the exercise of judicial discretion in specified cases, is unconstitutional because it contravenes (1) the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and (2) the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
The defendant asserts that section 60.05(3) of the Penal Law, by providing, in effect, that certain C felonies be treated with greater severity than other types of C felonies, constitutes an infringement of his Fourteenth Amendment right to the equal protection of the law. Thus, according to the defendant, all those convicted of a Class C felony make up a class entitled to be sentenced within the same range of punishment.
First, it must be noted a strong presumption of validity attaches to legislative enactments, and a party who is attacking the constitutionality of a statute bears the heavy burden of establishing unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Nettleton Co. v. Diamond, 27 N.Y.2d 182, 315 N.Y.S.2d 625, 264 N.E.2d 118 (1970); Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739, 229 N.E.2d 426 (1967); People v. Pagnotta, 25 N.Y.2d 333, 305 N.Y.S.2d 484, 253 N.E.2d 202 (1969); Wasmuth v. Allen, 14 N.Y.2d 391, 252 N.Y.S.2d 65, 200 N.E.2d 756 (1964); and Matter of Van Berkel v. Power, 16 N.Y.2d 37, 261 N.Y.S.2d 876, 209 N.E.2d 539 (1965).
Further, there is also a presumption that the Legislature has investigated for and found facts necessary to support the legislation at issue. I.L.F.Y. Co. v. Temporary State Housing Rent Comm., 10 N.Y.2d 263, 219 N.Y.S.2d 249, 176 N.E.2d 822 (1961); and Lincoln Building Associates v. Barr, 1 N.Y.2d 413, 153 N.Y.S.2d 633, 135 N.E.2d 801 (1956).
When there has been an allegation of discriminatory treatment, as is the situation here, the person making that claim must meet a heavy burden of demonstrating conscious, intentional discrimination. People v. Goodman, 31 N.Y.2d 262, 338 N.Y.S.2d 97, 200 N.E.2d 139 (1972); Matter of DiMaggio v. Brown, 19 N.Y.2d 283, 279 N.Y.S.2d 161, 225 N.E.2d 871 (1967); and People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 A.D.2d 12, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128 (4th Dept., 1962). If there is some reasonable and possible basis for a legislative classification, it cannot be held to be special and unconstitutional, but must be given effect by the courts. Farrington v. Pinckney, 1 N.Y.2d 74, 150 N.Y.S.2d 585, 133 N.E.2d 817 (1956).
The United States Supreme Court, when confronted with this issue, has stated that a 'statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.' McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961), and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970). According to the court in McGowan v. Maryland, supra, the Fourteenth Amendment allows the states a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently from others, and the constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification is based on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the state's objective.
In Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 69 S.Ct. 198, 93 L.Ed. 163 (1948), the court declared that while the Constitution precludes irrational discrimination between persons or groups of persons in the incidence of a law, it does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same. The court, in Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 64 S.Ct. 397, 88 L.Ed. 497 (1944), stated that a discriminatory purpose is not to be presumed; there must be a showing of clear and intentional discrimination. In Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 77 S.Ct. 1344, 1 L.Ed.2d 1485 (1957), the court asserted that the prohibition of the equal protection clause goes no further than invidious discrimination and that this clause does not remove from the state the power to classify, but permits the exercise of a wide scope of discretion except when what is done is without any reasonable basis and is purely arbitrary. Further, the court held, a classification does not offend against the equal protection clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality if any state of facts can reasonably be conceived to sustain it.
As the court announced in Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 489, 75 S.Ct. 461, 465, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955), the
Thus, a legislative classification must be sustained unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. The only exception to this rule is when the classification involved is based upon race, sex, alienage, national origin, or status of birth, in which case it is inherently suspect and subject to careful judicial scrutiny. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971); and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886).
The category of Class C felonies is clearly not such an inherently sustpect classification. Consequently, the legislative action in enacting section 60.05(3) of the Penal Law must be upheld unless the defendant has met his heavy burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the discrimination was patently arbitrary, unreasonable, and wholly unrelated to any legitimate governmental interest. This he has failed to do. 'The comparative gravity of criminal offenses and whether their consequences are more or less injurious are matters for its (the state's) determination.' Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55, 58 S.Ct. 59, 60, 82 L.Ed. 43 (1937). Moreover, the fact that a particular criminal action constitutes a Class C felony, or any other class of felony or misdemeanor, is purely a legislative determination, and there is nothing sacrosanct about these classifications, which were established solely for sentencing purposes.
The defendant also argues that section 60.05(3) of the Penal Law violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, since it singles out for special punitive treatment the offense committed by the defendant, among those other Class C felonies specified therein and, further, that, despite his being a first offender, he is excluded from the sentencing procedure authorized by section 65.00 of the Penal Law, which deals with probation.
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