People v. Brassfield

Decision Date12 October 1982
Docket NumberNo. 81SA388,81SA388
Citation652 P.2d 588
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James Dowell BRASSFIELD, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Robert R. Gallagher, Jr., Dist. Atty., Catherine P. Richardson, Deputy Dist. Atty., Littleton, for plaintiff-appellant.

Miller & Leher, Martin P. Miller, Geraldine L. Allan, Littleton, for defendant-appellee.

QUINN, Justice.

The People appeal from a judgment of acquittal entered by the District Court of Arapahoe County after a jury had found the defendant, James Dowell Brassfield, guilty of two counts of felony menacing, section 18-3-206, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). 1 The trial court concluded that conflicts and contradictions within the prosecution's case rendered the evidence insufficient to support the jury verdicts and entered a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdicts. Because we believe that the trial court applied an improper standard in entering the judgment of acquittal, we reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

I.

The defendant was charged in a two-count information with knowingly placing or attempting to place Thomas Biniasz and John Paglione in fear of serious bodily injury by the use of a deadly weapon, a pellet rifle, on March 8, 1980. 2 A summary of the trial evidence provides the objective context for our resolution of the issue before us.

At about 11:00 p.m. on March 8, 1980, Biniasz and Paglione, two teenage high school students, went to a pizza parlor located in a shopping center in Arapahoe County, Colorado. Biniasz was driving his 1969 blue GTO automobile and Paglione was riding as a passenger. As they entered the parking lot of the shopping center they encountered a blue Gremlin AMC automobile with out-of-state license plates. According to the teenagers' testimony, the driver of the Gremlin tried to "box them in" and, after derogatory gestures were exchanged between the occupants of both vehicles, the Gremlin was driven to another area of the parking lot. Thinking that he might know the occupants of the vehicle, Biniasz drove to approximately within 15 feet of it and parked. At this point one of the occupants of the Gremlin pointed a rifle out of the driver's window in the direction of Biniasz and Paglione. The teenagers immediately left the area and went to the pizza parlor where they called the police and gave them a description of the Gremlin vehicle and its license number.

At approximately 11:20 p.m. Officer Gerald Marques of the Cherry Hills Village Police Department stopped the Gremlin automobile. The defendant, who was wearing an orange coat, was driving the vehicle at this time and riding with him were two other passengers, Thomas Thorp and Carrie Tyra. Officer Marques made a visual examination of the inside of the vehicle and observed a "rifle type weapon" protruding from the left front or driver's seat.

After the teenagers had telephoned the police about the incident at the shopping center, Deputy Sheriff Dan Davis of the Arapahoe County Sheriff's Department picked up the young men and took them to the location where Officer Marques had stopped the Gremlin and its three occupants. Both teenagers made an on-the-scene identification of the defendant as the person who had been driving the Gremlin and who had pointed the weapon at them in the parking lot. Officer Davis seized the weapon from underneath the driver's seat of the vehicle. In the course of his investigation he observed that the defendant was wearing an orange coat.

During the trial Thomas Biniasz described the scene where the menacing took place and drew a diagram of the approximate location of the vehicles when the offense occurred. He also recounted how at the scene of the arrest he had identified the driver of the Gremlin as the man who had pointed the gun at him. Biniasz, however, was unable to make an in-court identification of the defendant as that person. The other teenager, John Paglione, did make an in-trial identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the offense. His testimony on the issue of identification was as follows:

"Q When the rifle was pointing at you what were the lighting conditions in that parking lot?

A There was a light just--let's see, there was one here, there is also another light here. There are lights all over the parking lot and all of them were on.

Q It was fairly light?

A Yes, well lit.

Q Could you describe the driver of that vehicle?

A At the time he had a red--not red, an orange-ish down jacket on, and he had jeans on, with some sort of plaid flannel shirt.

Q Could you describe his hair?

A It was black and kind of frizzed out a little bit, and he had glasses on.

Q Is the person who was in that car and pointed the rifle at you that night in the courtroom?

A Yes.

Q Would you please describe where that person is seated and what they are wearing?

A Right over there.

Q At the table marked defendant?

A Yes.

Q And what is that person wearing?

A Blue jacket, just a suit.

Q A plaid jacket?

A Yes.

MR. MOODY [Deputy District Attorney]: Let the record reflect he has identified the defendant Mr. Brassfield."

* * *

* * *

"Q ... Did you see the same party that pointed the gun at you later that night?

A Yes.

Q Where was that?

A That was like University down by Greenwood Village.

Q And how did you get down to that location?

A We were escorted in a police car. We were in the back seat of it."

* * *

* * *

"Q Did you point out any person at that location as being the person who pointed the gun at you?

A Yes, we did.

Q Is that the same person you have identified in the courtroom?

A Yes, it was."

At the conclusion of the prosecution's case the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal. The trial court denied the motion primarily on the basis of Paglione's testimony which, according to the trial judge, positively identified the defendant as the person who had pointed the gun on the evening in question.

The defendant called as his only witness Carrie Tyra. She testified that she had been living with the defendant for over a year and that it was Tom Thorp, rather than the defendant, who pointed the gun at Biniasz and Paglione. Tyra also stated that Thorp was wearing the orange jacket on the evening in question and that, when the menacing occurred, he "picked up the gun which was under the passenger seat" and "put it across both me and Jim [Brassfield] and stuck it out Jim's window."

To rebut this testimony the prosecution called Tom Thorp. He testified that he and the defendant had been drinking the entire day of the incident, having consumed at least two cases of beer. He identified the pellet gun as belonging to the defendant and positively identified the defendant as the person who had pointed the gun at Biniasz and Paglione. Although Thorp acknowledged that he signed a written statement on December 19, 1980, at the Arapahoe County Sheriff's Office, in which he admitted to having pointed the pellet gun at the teenagers, he testified that the statement was untrue and was signed to assist the defendant. Thorp also admitted that he later signed an affidavit at the defense attorney's office, in which he confessed that he, rather than the defendant, pointed the gun on the evening in question. While on the witness stand, however, Thorp repudiated this statement as false and described how the defendant's father had promised to forgive him a debt in exchange for the statement exculpating the defendant. He also testified that the defendant told him that "he [the defendant] had already been charged with it, so if I said I did it it would just mess them up and they would drop it."

The jury returned guilty verdicts on each count. The defendant, who retained new counsel after the trial, filed motions for a judgment of acquittal and for a new trial. The motion for a new trial was primarily based upon two grounds: (1) newly discovered evidence, according to the defendant, pointed to Thorp as the person who pointed the weapon at the teenagers; 3 and (2) a new trial was required in the interest of justice. See Crim.P. 33(b). The court did not rule on the motion for a new trial, but, instead, granted the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal, ruling, in pertinent part, as follows:

"I think this is a case in which there has been a miscarriage of justice. I think that primarily because of the fact that the prosecution's witnesses contradicted each other, the evidence was highly conflicting and contradictory, and I can not feel comfortable with the conviction. I do not feel that the guilty verdict has been fully supported by competent and sufficient evidence in this case.

"The Court therefore finds that the evidence is insufficient and incompetent to support the verdict."

* * *

* * *

"The verdict, therefore, is not received by the Court and the case is dismissed and the defendant's bond discharged. This procedure, of course, affords the prosecution an opportunity to appeal the Court's ruling and if the appellate court should determine that this Court is in error in setting aside the verdict this Court could be instructed by the appellate court to reinstate the jury verdict or to then consider the motion for new trial."

This appeal followed.

II.

The People argue that the court misapprehended the appropriate standard for granting a judgment of acquittal and, in effect, invaded the province of the jury by assessing the credibility and weight to be accorded to the prosecution's evidence. We agree with the People's claim.

A.

To withstand a motion for a judgment of acquittal the prosecution has the burden of presenting evidence which, when viewed as a whole and in a light most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable person that the defendant is guilty of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Gomez, 632 P.2d 586 (Colo.1981), cert. denied, ...

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