People v. BRENDLIN

• Decision Date: 20 April 2009
• Docket Number: No. S123133.,S123133.
• Citation: 45 Cal.4th 262,195 P.3d 1074,85 Cal.Rptr.3d 496
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Bruce Edward BRENDLIN, Defendant and Appellant.

45 Cal.4th 262

195 P.3d 1074

85 Cal.Rptr.3d 496

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Bruce Edward BRENDLIN, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S123133.

Supreme Court of California

Nov. 24, 2008.

Certiorari Denied April 20, 2009.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

Elizabeth Campbell, Sacramento, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and James F. Johnson, San Francisco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Donald E. de Nicola, Deputy State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson and Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Mary Jo Graves and Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorneys General, John G. McLean, Janet E. Neeley, Michael A. Canzoneri and Clifford E. Zall, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

BAXTER, J.

The issue presented in this case is whether evidence seized in a search incident to a lawful arrest based upon a valid outstanding warrant nonetheless must be suppressed because the discovery of the warrant occurred during an unlawful traffic stop. Case law from other state and federal courts uniformly holds that the discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant prior to a search incident to arrest constitutes an intervening circumstance that may-and, in the absence of purposeful or flagrant police misconduct, will-attenuate the taint of the antecedent unlawful traffic stop. We join this chorus of cases and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which had ordered suppression of the evidence seized from defendant's person and from the vehicle in which he was a passenger on the sole ground that the outstanding warrant would not have been discovered “[b]ut for the unlawful vehicle stop.”

Background

Around 1:40 a.m. on November 27, 2001, Sutter County Sheriff's Deputy Robert Charles Brokenbrough effected a traffic stop of a brown 1993 Buick Regal with expired registration tabs on Franklin Avenue in Yuba City. Prior to the stop, Deputy Brokenbrough confirmed through dispatch that the car's registration had expired two months earlier but that a renewal application was “in process.” Although Deputy Brokenbrough observed prior to the stop that a temporary operating permit with the number “11” (indicating an expiration date at the end of November) had been taped to the rear window, he could not determine from his vantage point whether the permit matched the vehicle. He decided to stop the Buick to investigate further.

Deputy Brokenbrough approached the driver's side of the Buick and asked the driver, Karen Simeroth, for her driver's license. He also asked defendant, the passenger, to identify himself, since he recognized defendant as one of the Brendlin brothers, Scott or Bruce, and recalled that one of them had absconded from parole supervision. During the inquiry, Deputy Brokenbrough observed receptacles in the car containing substances used in the production of methamphetamine. In response to the deputy's inquiry, defendant identified himself. The deputy returned to his patrol vehicle and verified that defendant was a parolee at large and had an outstanding no-bail warrant for his arrest. (See Pen.Code, §§ 3000, subd. (b)(8), 3060.)

After backup arrived, Deputy Brokenbrough ordered defendant out of the car at gunpoint and placed him under arrest for the parole violation. The entire episode, from the time Deputy Brokenbrough asked Simeroth for her driver's license to his discovery that defendant had an outstanding warrant, lasted a couple of minutes.

Police found an orange syringe cap on defendant's person during a search incident to arrest. They found two hypodermic needles (one of which was missing a syringe cap), two baggies containing a total of 12.43 grams of marijuana, and a baggie containing 0.46 grams of methamphetamine on Simeroth's person during a patsearch and a subsequent search incident to her arrest. Materials used in manufacturing methamphetamine were found in the back seat of the Buick.

After a hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, the superior court held that defendant had not been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution until Deputy Brokenbrough ordered him out of the car at gunpoint and placed him under arrest and that, even if he had been seized at the inception of the traffic stop, the stop was lawful. Defendant then pleaded guilty to manufacturing methamphetamine (Health & Saf.Code, § 11379.6, subd. (a)) and admitted a prior prison term enhancement (Pen.Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). He was sentenced to four years in prison.

The Court of Appeal reversed in a published opinion. It held that a traffic stop necessarily results in a detention (and, hence, a seizure) ( People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 363, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425, 902 P.2d 729) of both the driver and any passengers. The Court of Appeal further found that the seizure was unlawful in that Deputy Brokenbrough, who knew that the vehicle's application to renew its registration was in process and who had seen the temporary permit in the rear window, had “at most a hunch” that “the temporary operating permit displayed in the window might not belong to the car and, thus, it was being unlawfully operated as an unregistered vehicle.” The court ruled that the evidence seized from defendant as well as from the Buick should have been suppressed on the ground that the evidence would not have been discovered “[b]ut for the unlawful vehicle stop.”

This court, in a four-to-three decision, reversed the Court of Appeal and held that a passenger in a vehicle subject to a traffic stop is not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment in the absence of additional circumstances that would indicate to a reasonable person that he or she was the subject of the peace officer's investigation or show of authority.

( People v. Brendlin (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1107, 1111, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 50, 136 P.3d 845.) The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Corrigan, argued that a traffic stop entails the seizure of a passenger even when the driver is the sole target of police investigation. ( Id. at p. 1125, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 50, 136 P.3d 845.)

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed in a unanimous opinion, holding that a traffic stop subjects a passenger, as well as a driver, to a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. ( Brendlin v. California (2007) 551 U.S. 249, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132.) The high court remanded the matter to enable “the state courts to consider in the first instance whether suppression turns on any other issue.” ( Id. at p. 251, 127 S.Ct. at p. 2410.)

[1] [2] On remand, we granted the Attorney General's request that the parties be directed to file supplemental briefing as to whether the existence of defendant's outstanding arrest warrant-which was discovered after the unlawful traffic stop but before the search of his person or the vehicle-dissipated the taint of the illegal seizure and rendered suppression of the evidence seized unnecessary. ¹

Discussion

[3] [4] “In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court must find the historical facts, select the rule of law, and apply it to the facts in order to determine whether the law as applied has been violated. ( People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 279 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 532, 6 P.3d 193].) We review the court's resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential substantial evidence standard. The ruling on whether the applicable law applies to the facts is a mixed question of law and fact that is subject to independent review. ( Ibid.)” ( People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 505, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 575, 101 P.3d 478.) In evaluating whether the fruits of a search or seizure should have been suppressed, we consider only the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures.

( People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1141, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 759, 117 P.3d 476.)

[5] The People concede that the traffic stop of the vehicle in which defendant was traveling was not supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and it is clear from the high court's opinion that the stop effected a seizure of defendant. It is thus undisputed that defendant was unlawfully seized at the time of the traffic stop. Further, the Court of Appeal was correct in finding that but for the unlawful traffic stop, Deputy Brokenbrough would not have discovered the outstanding warrant for defendant's arrest and would not then have conducted the search incident to arrest that revealed the contraband. This does not mean, however, that the fruits of the search incident to that arrest must be suppressed. “[E]xclusion may not be premised on the mere fact that a constitutional violation was a ‘but-for’ cause of obtaining evidence.” ( Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 547 U.S. 586, 592, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 165 L.Ed.2d 56.) “ ‘[N]ot ... all evidence is “fruit of the poisonous tree” simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is “whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” ’ ” ( People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 445, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537, 853 P.2d 992, quoting Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 487-488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441.) “[B]ut-for cause, or ‘causation in the logical sense alone,’ [citation] can be too attenuated to justify exclusion....” ( Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. at p. 592, 126 S.Ct. 2159; see also Brown v. Illinois (1975) 422 U.S. 590, 603, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 ( Brown ).)

[6] [7] Although the significance of an arrest warrant in attenuating the taint of an antecedent unlawful traffic stop is an issue of first impression...