People v. Bridgeforth
| Decision Date | 22 December 2016 |
| Citation | 28 N.Y.3d 567,69 N.E.3d 611 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Joseph BRIDGEFORTH, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Lynn W.L. Fahey, Appellate Advocates, New York City (Tammy E. Linn of counsel), for appellant.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens (Danielle S. Finn, Merri Turk Lasky, Robert J. Masters, John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill and Joseph N. Ferdenzi of counsel), for respondent.
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, New York City (Alice Hsu, Joseph L. Sorkin, Stan Chiueh and Sofie Syed of counsel), and Vinay Harpalani, Savannah Law School, for Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality and others, amici curiae.
This appeal requires us to consider whether skin color of a prospective juror is a cognizable classification upon which a challenge to a prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes under Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) may be based. We recognize the existence of discrimination on the basis of one's skin color, and acknowledge that under this State's Constitution and Civil Rights Law, color is a classification upon which a Batson challenge may be lodged. The courts below held that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of discrimination when he challenged the prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes to exclude dark-colored women. We find this was error, and therefore reverse.
Batson provides the framework under which courts analyze challenges to peremptory strikes of potential jurors based on alleged discrimination. The Supreme Court of the United States held that "the Equal Protection Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment] forbids [a] prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race" (476 U.S. at 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ). Batson's application has been extended to discrimination on the basis of sex (see J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 [1994] ) and ethnicity (see Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 [1991] ). Batson outlines a three-step protocol to be applied when a defendant challenges the use of peremptory strikes during voir dire to exclude potential jurors for pretextual reasons. At step one, the movant must make a prima facie showing that the peremptory strike was used to discriminate; at step two, if that showing is made, the burden shifts to the opposing party to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for striking the juror; and finally, at step three, the trial court must determine, based on the arguments presented by the parties, whether the proffered reason for the peremptory strike was pretextual and whether the movant has shown purposeful discrimination (see id. at 96–98, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ).
We have adopted Batson under the State Constitution and prohibit discrimination against prospective jurors by either the People or the defense "on the basis of race, gender or any other status that implicates equal protection concerns" (People v. Luciano, 10 N.Y.3d 499, 502–503, 860 N.Y.S.2d 452, 890 N.E.2d 214 [2008] ; see People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, 554 N.E.2d 1235 [1990] ). In this appeal, we are asked to decide whether skin color is a "status that implicates equal protection concerns" (id. ).
The Equal Protection Clause of the State Constitution provides:
(N.Y. Const. Art. I, § 11 [emphasis added] ).
The separation of "race" and "color" in the Clause indicates that "color" is a distinct classification from "race." Similarly, section 13 of the Civil Rights Law, which prohibits disqualification of a state citizen from jury service on the basis of certain personal characteristics, lists "race" and "color" as distinct classes. Specifically, this provision states that "[n]o citizen of the state possessing all other qualifications which are or may be required or prescribed by law, shall be disqualified to serve as a grand or petit juror in any court of this state on account of race, creed, color, national origin or sex" (Civil Rights Law § 13 [emphasis added] ). These provisions indicate that "color" is a separate and distinct classification from "race." It follows, then, that color has been recognized as a category upon which discriminatory practices have been based, including exclusion from jury service.
Our State Constitution and Civil Rights Law plainly acknowledge that color is a "status that implicates equal protection concerns" (Luciano, 10 N.Y.3d at 503, 860 N.Y.S.2d 452, 890 N.E.2d 214 ), and therefore a Batson challenge may be based on color. Discrimination on the basis of one's skin color—or colorism—has been well researched and analyzed, demonstrating that "not all colors (or tones) are equal" . Persons with similar skin tones are often perceived to be of a certain race and discriminated against as a result, even if they are of a different race or ethnicity. That is why color must be distinguished from race. Today, we acknowledge color as a classification separate from race for Batson purposes, as it has already been acknowledged by our State Constitution and Civil Rights Law. Making this distinction is necessary to serve the purpose of Batson, which recognized that discrimination in the selection of jurors violates "a defend-ant's right to equal protection because it denies him [or her] the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure" (476 U.S. at 86, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ). Where individuals are excluded from jury service on the basis of their skin color, the defendant is denied the right to a trial by a jury of his or her peers, which is meant to reflect the community in which the defendant lives. As we stated in People v. Kern, jury service is a principal means of participation in government, and has been used as an instrument of public justice, requiring that " ‘the jury be a body truly representative of the community’ " (75 N.Y.2d at 652, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, 554 N.E.2d 1235, quoting Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130, 61 S.Ct. 164, 85 L.Ed. 84 [1940] ). " ‘For ... discrimination to result in the exclusion from jury service of otherwise qualified groups not only violates our Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government’ " (id. ). We therefore extend the application of Batson to challenges based on color to ensure that the jury is not used as a tool to accomplish such discrimination.
Recognizing that a Batson challenge may be premised on skin color does not conflict with our holding in People v. Smith , 81 N.Y.2d 875, 597 N.Y.S.2d 633, 613 N.E.2d 539 (1993). There, we rejected the defendant's contention that a Batson challenge may be based on the exclusion of "minorities" in general, regardless of race (id. at 876, 597 N.Y.S.2d 633, 613 N.E.2d 539 ). Using peremptory strikes to exclude " minorities"—a category that includes a vast and varied group of individuals that is subject to change based on census and other demographic data based on population—is quite different from excluding potential jurors because they share a similar skin color. Skin color is generally an immutable characteristic.
When a movant seeks to meet his or her prima facie burden of demonstrating that a peremptory strike was used to discriminate by showing that multiple members of a cognizable group were excluded, the movant may meet the prima facie burden by demonstrating that the perempted potential jurors have a similar skin color, for example, dark-colored as was alleged here.1 That is a much narrower showing than for an overall classification as a "minority," and does not rest on racial identity, but on color, which, as stated, is separate and distinct from race under the State Constitution and the Civil Rights Law. Indeed, there is no indication that members of minority groups generally were excluded from the jury in this case, as the record demonstrates that four of the seven seated jurors prior to the Batson challenge belonged to minority groups. Rather, defendant's challenge was specific to the People's use of peremptory strikes to exclude dark-skinned women—a color classification.
In cases where the People or a defendant makes a Batson challenge on the basis of color, it is for the trial court, using the existing Batson protocol, to decide whether the individuals identified as part of that group share a similar skin color, in the same way the trial court makes determinations about race, gender, and ethnicity classifications. It is within this framework that we analyze the Batson challenge in the case before us.
Defendant, a dark-complexioned African–American male, along with several other individuals, was involved in a robbery in Queens. As a result, defendant was charged with one count of robbery in the first degree and two counts of robbery in the second degree. During voir dire, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude a number of potential jurors. One of those jurors, the subject of this appeal, was a dark-complexioned Indian–American woman. Defense counsel lodged a Batson challenge as to five of the prosecutor's peremptory strikes, stating: "The district attorney has now perempted all the female...
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