People v. Briggs

• Decision Date: 26 October 1967
• Citation: 28 A.D.2d 157,284 N.Y.S.2d 782
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. William BRIGGS, Jr., Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 782

284 N.Y.S.2d 782

28 A.D.2d 157

PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. William BRIGGS, Jr., Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Oct. 26, 1967.

Raymond L. Sciarrino, Mount Morris, for appellant.

Scott W. Crane, Dist. Atty., Geneseo, for respondent (J. Robert Houston, Geneseo, of counsel).

Before BASTOW, J.P., and HENRY, DEL VECCHIO and MARSH, JJ.

OPINION

BASTOW, Justice Presiding.

On January 12, 1964 a burglary and fire occurred at the central school building in the village of Mt. Morris in Livingston County. The following day appellant--then 17 years old--was taken into custody and made an inculpatory written statement to one Gilbride, the Under-Sheriff of the county. On January 14 an indictment was returned charging him and a co-defendant with arson, third degree, burglary, third degree, and petit larceny. The following day appellant was arraigned and plead guilty to all counts. On January 27 he was sentenced to a term of 7 1/2 to 15 years on the arson count and to lesser concurrent terms on the other counts.

Following a hearing in 1965 he was denied coram nobis relief by the sentencing judge (Erwin, J.) and a year later a similar application was denied by the present County Judge (Montesano, J.).

The District Attorney and present Sheriff of the county (who was Under-Sheriff in 1964 and obtained the statement from appellant) with commendable candor concede that appellant's written inculpatory statement was only made after Gilbride had told him that the sentence wouldn't exceed five years and that if defendant's conduct was good he would be released after serving a year and a half. This statement apparently was made in good faith for Gilbride testified at the hearing herein that it was his understanding in 1964 that a sentence in excess of five years could not be imposed on one between the ages of 16 and 21 (cf. Penal Law § 2184--a). What the official didn't know was that the court had power to fix a longer period of imprisonment within the limits otherwise provided by statute for a particular crime. (Correction Law, § 61, subd. 2.)

It further appears that before the guilty plea was entered appellant's lawyer talked with the District Attorney about having one or more of the counts in the indictment dismissed or reduced and the prosecutor stated 'that it was a waste of time to bother discussing the matter--that the most that the defendant could receive (would be) one to five years in the reformatory.' After the guilty plea had been entered and the night before the original date (January 22) fixed for sentencing defense counsel was told by the then Sheriff and Under-Sheriff 'that Judge Erwin was not going to go along with the one to five year sentence.'

Thus, while there is no direct proof of the fact, it is reasonably clear that the sentencing judge had knowledge of some--if not all--of the facts--that both confession and plea of guilty rested on representations of the police officer and prosecutor, respectively, that the sentence would not exceed five years.

On January 22 defense counsel moved for postponement of sentence for five days 'on the ground (that) at the time the plea of guilty was entered both my client and myself were under the impression the maximum sentence he could receive would be five years in Elmira.' The court granted the adjournment but significantly made no attempt to explore the facts surrounding the entry of the guilty plea. On January 27 sentence was routinely imposed and again the County Judge made no effort to ascertain the underlying facts relating to either plea of guilty or confession.

In denying coram nobis relief the County Court sustained the position of the District Attorney that the guilty plea had been validly entered and that appellant was attacking the validity of the confession and this he could not do after entry of such a plea (People v. Nicholson, 11 N.Y.2d 1067, 230 N.Y.S.2d 220, 184 N.E.2d 190; People v. Dash, 16 N.Y.2d 493, 260 N.Y.S.2d 437, 208 N.E.2d 171; People v. Griffin, 16 N.Y.2d 508, 260 N.Y.S.2d 447, 208 N.E.2d 179). This, we conclude, took a much too narrow view of the issue presented. (Cf. People v. Freeman, 7 A.D.2d 960, 182 N.Y.S.2d 146; People v. Sullivan, 276 App.Div. 1087, 96 N.Y.S.2d 266.)

Upon the hearing herein there was proof of these facts and also that during the preliminary questioning of appellant by the officers he asked for an attorney but the request was ignored. As soon as he was taken into custody defendant's mother telephoned an attorney who went to the county jail and asked to see Briggs. He was told that the youth was being questioned. The lawyer waited and some time later was told by the Under-Sheriff that an inculpatory written statement had been made by appellant.

This is the typical case where the confession was the 'fundamental element in the construction of the People's case.' Faced with knowledge that the confession had been made, appellant and his counsel had small choice and the guilty plea was entered the day following indictment and three days after the burglary and fire. The mistaken and untrue representations that induced the confession and plea of guilty could have been honored by the sentencing judge. It appears, however, that this was no routine crime, but one that had attracted considerable public attention. The judge apparently decided that...