People v. Briggs

• Citation: 24 Cal.Rptr. 417,374 P.2d 257,58 Cal.2d 385
• Decision Date: 30 August 1962
• Docket Number: Cr. 7127
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: , 374 P.2d 257 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John Robert BRIGGS, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 417

24 Cal.Rptr. 417

58 Cal.2d 385, 374 P.2d 257

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John Robert BRIGGS, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 7127.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Aug. 30, 1962.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Sept. 26, 1962.

Russell E. Parsons, Los Angeles, for defendant and appellant.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Gorden Ringer, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

PETERS, Justice.

Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction on two counts of attempted murder. That judgment included a denial of the motion for new trial. He was charged in count I with attempting to kill his wife (Norma Briggs), and in count II with attempting to kill his wife's mother (Mary D. Nilson). The theory of the prosecution (based almost entirely on the testimony of Mrs. Nilson) was that defendant, with intent to kill the two women, deliberately caused the automobile in which they were seated to run over a cliff. The defense relied on the testimony of defendant and his wife that the occurrence was an unfortunate accident.

On and prior to July 20, 1959, defendant and his wife lived in the Pacific Palisades area of Los Angeles. They had been married for over ten years, and had three children, aged five, eight and nine. Mrs. Nilson, who lived alone in the Wilshire area of the same community, was an overnight guest in the Briggs home on the night of July 19, 1959. On the morning of the 20th Mr. and Mrs. Briggs undertook to drive her home. Defendant drove the car, his wife sitting alongside of him, with Mrs. Nilson on the extreme right of the same seat. The car was a 1958 Mercury which belonged to Mrs. Nilson, but which she had left with the Briggs for the past several months because she did not care to drive it any longer. Mrs. Briggs was familiar with its operation, she having driven a duplicate of it for some time. It was equipped with automatic transmission, operated by push buttons situate on the dash in front of the driver, and was also equipped with power brakes. After leaving the house, Briggs drove to a service station where he had both the gas tank and a spare five-gallon can filled with gasoline. He then drove into the Santa Monica hills, which were not on the direct route to Mrs. Nilson's home. At a point where the road ran along a canyon wall, he parked the car on the right-hand side of the road (closest to the downgrade side of the canyon), on the pavement, and parallel to the road; that is, in a normal parking position. He had stopped the car by simply removing his right foot from the accelerator pedal and depressing the emergency, or 'parking' brake, with his left foot. (That brake remains engaged when the pedal has been depressed, and is released by means of a push button.) The motor was running, and the transmission was in 'driving' position. With the car in such position and condition, Briggs said something about the motor overheating, pressed the button which released the hood, and got out. ¹ He went to the front of the car and stood for a moment by the engine. While there he conversed with his wife regarding the heat gauge, and she advised him that it showed slightly above normal. There was some conversation between all three persons regarding the advisability of allowing the motor to cool with the engine running. After such conversation, Briggs returned to the door by the driver's seat. At this moment, and while Briggs was still outside, the car moved forward, turned to the right and went over the cliff. It came to a stop for some moments on a small ledge some 50 or 60 feet from the road, still in an upright position but with its front much lower than its rear. Then it tumbled the rest of the way to the bottom of the canyon.

The foregoing facts are uncontroverted. The rest of the testimony, regarding the movements of the three principal actors both before and after the occurrence, their relationship to one another, and motive or the lack thereof, was highly conflicting. As stated in respondent's brief: 'In this extraordinary and fascinating case the crucial question * * * was the conflict between mother and daughter.' The great discrepancy between the stories told by Mrs. Briggs and Mrs. Nilson, and the manner in which impeachment and rehabilitation of each was attempted, require a careful analysis of the testimony of each, not only as to the facts surrounding the alleged crime, but as to motive and opportunity for its commission.

No evidence was offered to contradict the defense testimony that there had never been any but a happy, normal connubial relationship between defendant and his wife. As evidence of motive, the prosecution attempted to show that if both Mrs. Nilson and Mrs. Briggs had died, Briggs would have inherited the considerable fortune owned by each, and also that he would have benefited by reason or recently obtained policies of life and accident insurance (totaling $600,000). That evidence was to the effect that when Mr. Nilson died (many years before the Briggs' marriage) the mother and daughter each inherited a very sizable fortune, some of which was distributed to each heir individually, while some was distributed in joint tenancy in order that Mrs. Nilson could manage the same for their joint benefit. As a result there was, on July 20, 1959, a considerable estate to which Briggs would normally succeed. But the legal situation was not normal. In the first place, immediately prior to his marriage Briggs (at the insistence of Mrs. Nilson) had executed a disclaimer of his right to inherit, and that document was still in effect. Although that disclaimer would have no effect on property which his wife left to him by her will, it would have operated to bar him from succeeding in the absence of will. It was shown that Mrs. Nilson had often expressed the intention to so leave her property that Briggs could not obtain any interest therein. Since the prosecution failed to present any evidence that she had left anything to Briggs by will (or that if she had, that he knew the fact), it must be inferred that he had no reason to believe that he could obtain financial gain through the death of Mrs. Nilson, alone. On the other hand, it was shown that he and his wife had executed reciprocal wills, each leaving all of their respective estates to one another, and to their children if the spouse failed to survive the testator. ² Of course, such wills would have rendered ineffectual the disclaimer that Briggs had executed insofar as his wife's considerable property was concerned. However, such fact does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that he would benefit financially from the will upon his wife's death, because the two had long before placed all of their property (community and separate alike) in joint tenancy, which property Briggs had managed ever since. It would therefore appear that Briggs had no need to do away with his wife in order to enjoy the fruits of her estate. ³ Furthermore, it is doubtful that the jury would or should find motive for murder in the fact, standing alone, that husband and wife had executed reciprocal wills. This is the ordinary custom of husband and wife. However, there was one peculiar circumstance concerning these wills. The evidence showed that the wills (both of which were holographic) had been executed only a short time before the alleged attempt, but had been predated by some six months. Mr. and Mrs. Briggs' explanation of the reason for predating was based on an alleged belief that dating prior to a pending divorce, among the Briggs' in-laws, would avoid claims from or by the divorcing parties. Such explanation was hardly convincing.

When viewed in light of motive, the evidence regarding the insurance was weak. The prosecution showed that shortly prior to the date in question Mr. and Mrs. Briggs had applied for four policies, consisting of one policy of ten-year-term life insurance in the sum of $300,000 on the life of each spouse, together with one accident policy (in which the death benefit was $300,000) in which each was the insured. However, the uncontradicted evidence was: (1) that such a program of insurance had been recommended to the Briggs by the accountant who handled their financial affairs, for the purpose of providing available cash to pay death taxes on the joint estate which was estimated at $1,000,000; (2) that the original plan was to obtain only the term life insurance, including double indemnity in the case of accidental death, and that the insurance broker found it necessary to make the applications in the form finally used in order to split the risk between two companies; (3) that the applications as presented (and the policies if issued would have) named the children as the sole beneficiaries, thus avoiding any inference that Briggs could obtain a direct financial benefit; (4) that two of the policies had never been issued, and that the other two had been issued only in the sense that they had been approved by the company, but such fact was unknown at the time to either Briggs or the broker, so that there was no evidence that Briggs had any reason to believe that the insurance was effective on the date of the alleged attempt. It should also be pointed out that there was documentary evidence, the testimony of independent witnesses, and of both Mr. and Mrs. Briggs, that the Briggs frequently went on hunting trips in which minor accidents could have been fatal, and engaged in water skiing and boating, etc., which made the application for accident insurance reasonably advisable.

In order to show intent, or a plan of action consistent with intent, the prosecution relied on two facts. These were the filling of the five-gallon gasoline can, and the allegedly unexplained 'detour' into the Santa Monica hills. As to the first, Mrs. Nilson merely recited the fact that Briggs brought the empty can with him and had it filled at the service station at the time of...