People v. Briskin
| Decision Date | 19 February 2015 |
| Citation | 125 A.D.3d 1113,3 N.Y.S.3d 200,2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 01493 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Traci L. BRISKIN, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
125 A.D.3d 1113
3 N.Y.S.3d 200
2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 01493
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent
v.
Traci L. BRISKIN, Appellant.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.
Feb. 19, 2015.
Paul J. Connolly, Delmar, for appellant.
G. Scott Walling, Special Prosecutor, Schenectady, for respondent.
Before: GARRY, J.P., EGAN JR., LYNCH and CLARK, JJ.
Opinion
EGAN JR., J.
Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Saratoga County (Scarano, J.), rendered December 2, 2013, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of manslaughter in the second degree and the traffic infraction of driving while ability impaired.
Defendant was charged in a five-count indictment with manslaughter
in the second degree, vehicular manslaughter in the second degree (two counts) and driving while intoxicated (two counts). The charges stemmed from a collision that occurred between two motor vehicles—one operated by defendant and one operated by the victim—at approximately 7:30 p.m. on November 30, 2012 at the intersection of Jockey Street and State Route 67 in the Town of Charlton, Saratoga County. Although defendant provided more than one version of the events leading up to the collision, she testified at trial that, at approximately 6:15 p.m. on the evening in question, she poured herself a “regular” glass of wine—defined by defendant as containing four to six ounces of wine—and began making herself some macaroni and cheese. When defendant sat down to eat, she poured herself a second glass of wine, which she finished at approximately 7:00 p.m.1 Within 10 minutes of finishing her second glass of wine, defendant got into her white sport utility vehicle (hereinafter SUV)—intending to drive to a friend's house. According to defendant, her purse was on the front passenger seat, her global positioning system (hereinafter GPS) was plugged into the SUV's cigarette lighter and was resting in one of the vehicle's cup holders and a quantity of beer was lodged under the front passenger seat.
At some point after defendant turned onto Jockey Street, which ran in a generally north/south direction, defendant extinguished the cigarette she was smoking and reached into her purse to retrieve a bottle of body spray. In so doing, defendant knocked the GPS unit out of the cup holder and onto the floor at her feet. Although the GPS unit remained on and continued to give audible directions, defendant deemed it advisable to try and retrieve the unit, which she initially attempted to do by pulling on the attached cord. When the cord became dislodged, defendant tried to maneuver the unit with her feet to the point where she would be able to reach down with her hand and pick it up. By her own admission, this process entailed defendant looking down at the floor of her vehicle which, in turn, resulted in only “[s]poradically” keeping her eyes on the road ahead of her. While searching for the errant GPS unit, defendant missed a traffic sign warning of an
impending stop sign,2 failed—despite an unobstructed view of traffic on State Route 67, which ran in a generally east/west direction—to see the victim's vehicle approaching the intersection, passed through the stop sign facing her (and controlling the intersection) and struck the driver's side of the victim's vehicle.3 According to various members of
the Saratoga County Sheriff's Department, defendant—who was observed to have “glassy” eyes, a bit of “ trouble” in walking/negotiating the steps into the ambulance and a detectable odor of alcohol on her breath—failed the field sobriety tests administered at the scene, and her blood alcohol content as of 9:28 p.m. measured .11%.4
The accident was witnessed by two motorists—Glen Tevendale Jr. and Denise Feulner. Tevendale testified that shortly after turning north onto Jockey Street on the evening in question, he observed a white SUV—later determined to be operated by defendant—approximately 100 feet in front of him. As he continued along Jockey Street, Tevendale saw defendant's SUV cross over the double yellow line dividing the northbound and southbound lanes; defendant's vehicle then swerved to the right—crossing over the white fog line on the eastern shoulder of the road—before swerving back to the left and again crossing over the double yellow line.5 At this point, Tevendale saw the brake lights flash, and the SUV thereafter returned to its lane of travel. Tevendale continued behind defendant's SUV as the vehicles crested and started to descend a small hill, at which point Tevendale could see the headlights of two vehicles—one (it would be determined) operated by the
victim and the other operated by Feulner—traveling west on State Route 67 as they approached the intersection with Jockey Street.6 As Tevendale continued north on Jockey Street, he saw defendant's SUV first pass the warning sign advising motorists of the stop sign ahead and then pass the stop sign itself—entering the intersection and broadsiding the victim's sedan. Tevendale testified that he never saw defendant hit her brakes before passing through the intersection.
Feulner testified that she was approximately 10 car lengths behind what would prove to be the victim's vehicle—proceeding westbound on State Route 67—when she observed two sets of headlights on Jockey Street approaching the intersection with State Route 67. As she watched these vehicles, it appeared to Feulner that the first vehicle—defendant's SUV—was “traveling too quickly” and was not “slowing down at all or going to stop for the stop sign” at the intersection. In fact, Feulner was so concerned that she pulled her vehicle to the side of the road and stopped. As she did so, defendant's SUV “came right through the intersection” and struck the victim's vehicle. Feulner testified
that defendant's vehicle neither slowed nor stopped as it approached the intersection. By all accounts, although it was very cold with slight snow flurries on the night of the collision, the roads were clear, dry and free of ice.
The victim ultimately died from the traumatic injuries sustained in the crash. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the second degree, acquitted of vehicular manslaughter (two counts) and driving while intoxicated (two counts) and convicted of the lesser included offense of driving while ability impaired. Defendant thereafter was sentenced to, among other things, a prison term of 2 ½ to 7 ½ years with respect to the manslaughter conviction. Defendant's subsequent motion to set aside the manslaughter conviction was denied, and this appeal ensued.7
Defendant initially contends that County Court erred in denying—without a hearing—her motion to suppress the results of her breath test. We disagree. “A motion seeking suppression of evidence ‘must state the ground or grounds of the
motion and must contain sworn allegations of fact ... supporting such grounds' ” (People v. Desmond, 118 A.D.3d 1131, 1133, 988 N.Y.S.2d 703 [2014], lv. denied 24 N.Y.3d 1002, 997 N.Y.S.2d 120, 21 N.E.3d 572 [2014], quoting CPL 710.60[1] ). A hearing in this regard is neither “automatic [n]or generally available [simply] for the asking” (People v. Desmond, 118 A.D.3d at 1133, 988 N.Y.S.2d 703 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted] ) and, except in circumstances not present here (see CPL 710.60[3][b] ; 710.20[3], [6] ), the trial court “may summarily deny the motion if the papers do not allege a legal basis for suppression or if the factual allegations do not as a matter of law support any alleged ground” (People v. Vanness, 106 A.D.3d 1265, 1266, 965 N.Y.S.2d 227 [2013], lv. denied 22 N.Y.3d 1044, 981 N.Y.S.2d 378, 4 N.E.3d 390 [2013] ; see CPL 710.60[3][a], [b] ). Here, in support of her suppression motion, defendant tendered the affidavit of her attorney, who merely asserted—upon information and belief—that the deputies in question lacked probable cause to arrest defendant. This “bare allegation of a lack of probable cause, without any factual support, was insufficient to require a hearing” (People v. Vanness, 106 A.D.3d at 1266, 965 N.Y.S.2d 227 ; see People v. Armstrong, 94 A.D.3d 1552, 1553, 942 N.Y.S.2d 917 [2012], lv. denied 19 N.Y.3d 957, 950 N.Y.S.2d 108, 973 N.E.2d 206 [2012] ).
Nor are we persuaded that County Court erred in granting the People's challenge for cause as to prospective juror No. 9. Pursuant to CPL 270.20(1)(b), a party may challenge a prospective juror for cause if such juror “has a state of mind that is likely to preclude him [or her] from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced at the trial” (accord People v. Harris 19 N.Y.3d 679, 685, 954 N.Y.S.2d 777, 978 N.E.2d 1246 [2012] ; People...
To continue reading
Request your trial