People v. Brown

• Decision Date: 06 March 1969
• Citation: 299 N.Y.S.2d 190,24 N.Y.2d 168,247 N.E.2d 153
• Parties: , 247 N.E.2d 153 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. James E. BROWN, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 190

299 N.Y.S.2d 190

24 N.Y.2d 168, 247 N.E.2d 153

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. James E. BROWN, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 6, 1969.

Nathan Z. Dershowitz and Anthony F. Marra, New York City, for appellant.

Frank S. Hogan, Dist. Atty. (Herman Kaufman, Asst. Dist. Atty., Alan Scribner, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

SCILEPPI, Judge.

On February 20, 1963 defendant was indicted for the crime of manslaughter in the second degree. Following a Nonjury trial before Mr. Justice Marks, he was found guilty and on January 31, 1964, was sentenced from 2 1/2 to 5 years in State prison. No appeal was taken from the judgment of conviction. On March 12, 1965, however, defendant filed an application for a writ of error Coram nobis alleging that a contested coerced confession had been introduced at his trial and that pursuant to the authority of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 and People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838, 204 N.E.2d 179, he was entitled to a postconviction 'Huntley' hearing. The application was denied without a hearing on the ground that Jackson and Huntley are not applicable to nonjury trials. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed without opinion, 29 A.D.2d 919, 289 N.Y.S.2d 150.

In Jackson the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the old New York procedure for determining voluntariness of confessions in criminal cases tried before a Judge and Jury. Under that procedure, if the defendant objected to the introduction of the confession in evidence, a Voir dire was held, generally in the presence of the jury, to test its voluntariness. If no issue of fact was raised by conflicting testimony on the Voir dire, the question of the admission of the confession was for the court; but, if there was a conflict in the evidence, the question of voluntariness ultimately was for the jury (People v. Cefaro, 23 N.Y.2d 283, 296 N.Y.S.2d 345, 244 N.E.2d 42, and cases cited therein).

The Supreme Court held that this procedure violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it did not afford a defendant an opportunity 'to have a fair hearing and a reliable determination on the issue of voluntariness, a determination uninfluenced by the truth or falsity of the confession' (Jackson v. Denno, Supra, 378 U.S., p. 377, 84 S.Ct., p. 1781). Thus, the court noted that, 'Under the New York procedure, the evidence given the jury inevitably injects irrelevant and impermissible considerations of truthfulness of the confession into the assessment of voluntariness' (Jackson v. Denno, Supra, p. 386, 84 S.Ct., p. 1786). The heart of the opinion however, is found in the following language:

'But we do not rest on this ground alone, for the other alternative hypothesized in Stein (Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 73 S.Ct. 1077, 97 L.Ed. 1522)--that the jury found the confession involuntary and disregarded it--is equally unacceptable. Under the New York procedure, the fact of a defendant's confession is solidly implanted in the jury's mind, for it has not only heard the confession, but it has been instructed to consider and judge its voluntariness and is in position to assess whether it is true or false. If it finds the confession involuntary does the jury--indeed, can it--then disregard the confession in accordance with its instructions? If there are lingering doubts about the sufficiency of the other evidence, does the jury unconsciously lay them to rest by resort to the confession? Will uncertainty about the sufficiency of the other evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt actually result in acquittal when the jury knows the defendant has given a truthful confession?

'It is difficult, if not impossible, to prove that a confession which a jury has found to be involuntary has nevertheless influenced the verdict or that its finding of voluntariness, if this is the course it took, was affected by the other evidence showing the confession was true.' (Jackson v. Denno, Supra, pp. 388--389, 84 S.Ct., pp. 1786, 1787.)

Instinct in the opinion is a fundamental distrust of juries as triers of the fact on the issue of voluntariness. In other words, the court assumes that juries are incapable of understanding and following the Judge's instructions. Even if the jury found the confession involuntary, the court observed, it may nevertheless have been unable to disregard it in deciding the defendant's guilt or innocence.

The defendant argues that the only difference between the instant case and Jackson is that here he was tried without a jury. This difference he contends is not critical and urges that under the rationale of Jackson a defendant in a nonjury case is entitled to a fair and reliable hearing on the issue of voluntariness, uninfluenced by the other evidence of guilty in the case. In short, defendant contends that a Judge is also incapable of reaching an objective determination on voluntariness where he had heard evidence bearing on guilt or innocence. Therefore, as defendant asserted on oral argument, although the same Judge who tries the case can determine the issue of voluntariness, that determination should be made in a separate hearing before the commencement of the trial proper. This contention is not unsupported by authority. In the only two cases which seem to have squarely dealt with the problem of whether Jackson applies to nonjury cases, the Federal District Courts held that it did (see United States ex rel. Spears v. Rundle, 268 F.Supp. 691, and United States ex rel. Owens v. Cavell, 254 F.Supp. 154).

In holding that Jackson requires a separate hearing on the issue of voluntariness where the fact-finder is a Judge rather than a jury, the court in the Spears case said: 'The function of a judge trying a case without a jury is twofold: he is a finder of fact, as well as an arbiter of the law. The responsibility is burdensome. But the task becomes too great when we require a judge who has heard evidence of guilt, to objectively and coldly assess a distinct issue as to the voluntariness of the confession. Objectivity cannot be guaranteed, and reliability must be questioned. Jackson properly construed, prohibits the finder of fact from passing on the voluntariness of a confession since its decision as to voluntariness could be colored by evidence as to guilt.' (268 F.Supp., p. 695.)

In our opinion, this represents far too broad a reading of Jackson.

As noted earlier, the entire thrust of the Jackson opinion is concerned with the inability of juries to separate factors relating to the voluntariness of a confession from those bearing on guilt or innocence. It seems to us, however, that...