People v. Brown
| Decision Date | 17 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 18CA1099 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Adrian Jeremiah BROWN, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brian M. Lanni, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Robert P. Borquez, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
Opinion by JUDGE CASEBOLT*
¶ 1 When does a statement by an irate and angry respondent parent in a dependency and neglect (D& N) case rise to the level of a "credible threat" that may be punished under section 18-8-615, C.R.S. 2021, which proscribes retaliation against a judge? In this case, Adrian Jeremiah Brown appeals the judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of violating that provision when, after being told by the D& N judge that he must undergo a domestic violence evaluation or anger management therapy, he stated, We conclude that this statement, when coupled with other circumstances detailed below, was not constitutionally protected and constitutes a "true threat" under the recent Colorado Supreme Court case of People in Interest of R.D. , 2020 CO 44, 464 P.3d 717. We thus affirm Brown's conviction.
¶ 2 This case arises from a D& N case involving Brown's infant daughter (the child). After learning that the child had been born with methamphetamine in her umbilical cord, a caseworker from the Adams County Department of Social Services (the Department) obtained a judge's hold to place the child in the custody of the Department. In the hospital, Brown was verbally and physically aggressive towards the caseworker and medical staff upon learning that the Department intended to take the child from him and the child's mother. The caseworker, after obtaining a court order to take the infant into the Department's custody, wrote a report of what had occurred at the hospital, which became part of the case file.
¶ 3 Brown also acted in an accusatory and hostile manner at the initial hearing in the D& N case, which a magistrate conducted. The magistrate requested a sheriff's deputy at the hearing because Brown was "loud and kind of aggressive."
¶ 4 A district court judge, the victim in this criminal case, presided over the second hearing in the D& N case. The judge had read the case file and knew about Brown's aggression toward hospital staff and his conduct at the previous hearing before the magistrate. During that hearing, Brown raised his voice and exhibited hostility and anger. He characterized the Department personnel who had taken his child as "kidnappers" and "terrorists." His demeanor was an escalation from the previous hearing.
¶ 5 At the conclusion of that second hearing, the judge offered to make her courtroom available for Brown's supervised visits with the child because employees of the Department had expressed concern about hosting the visitations. Brown and the child's mother accepted the judge's offer.
¶ 6 During one of the supervised visits in the judge's courtroom, Brown walked up to the bench and looked at items she kept there, including a photograph of her infant child. A sheriff's deputy told Brown to move away from the bench. Brown responded that he would change his daughter's "shitty diaper" on the judge's bench because there was "enough shit up there." The judge was informed of this incident, and she testified in the criminal case against Brown that it caused her concern. She also testified that she kept personal and private items on her bench, including a photograph of one of her children.
¶ 7 Brown appeared before the judge at a third hearing to establish a treatment plan that, if successful, would allow reunification of the child with Brown and the child's mother. Brown again acted aggressively and was "[l]oud and angry." His aggressive behavior, which escalated from his conduct at the previous hearing, included clenching his jaw and his fists and shouting at the judge. He stated he would not comply with the judge's order for a drug test because it could reveal his past drug use.
¶ 8 The judge ordered a domestic violence evaluation for Brown based on a report that he had threatened to kill the child's mother, and the judge's own observations of Brown's behavior in the courtroom. In response to the order, Brown became "very angry" and told her to "look at the fucking file." The judge explained that, considering Brown's behavior in court, if she did not order a domestic violence evaluation, she would at least order "anger management."
¶ 9 The following exchange ensued:
¶ 10 The judge did not immediately respond to Brown's statement about "kidnap[ping] your daughter" (the kidnapping statement). She proceeded with the hearing and entered several orders regarding the child. The judge said that she still did not "have any problem with [Brown's supervised] visits happening" in her courtroom but cautioned that she did not "want anybody at [her] bench" and that she would no longer allow the visits if Brown walked up to her bench again.
¶ 11 After Brown reiterated his comment that he thought it was appropriate to change his daughter's diaper on the judge's bench because there was "enough shit up there," the judge found Brown in direct contempt, and he was removed from the courtroom. The contempt finding is not part of this appeal. The judge recused herself from the D& N case the next day.
¶ 12 The prosecution charged Brown with retaliation against a judge under section 18-8-615 based on the kidnapping statement, and two counts of failure to register as a sex offender. The trial court judge in that criminal case granted the prosecution's motion for entry of a protection order against Brown for the benefit of the judge.
¶ 13 The trial court severed the retaliation charge and set a trial on that charge alone. Brown filed a pretrial motion to dismiss on the grounds that the retaliation statute, which criminalizes "credible threats" against judges, is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague as applied to him because the kidnapping statement was not a true threat. He asserted that the kidnapping statement was protected speech because it was part of a "rhetorical exchange" with the judge. The trial court denied Brown's motion.
¶ 14 The judge testified at the criminal trial regarding her interactions with Brown and how the kidnapping statement affected her. She said that the day after her final hearing in the D& N case, she saw Brown "pok[e] his head into [her] courtroom," which made her "concerned" because of "his anger towards [her]." After seeing him look into her courtroom, the judge immediately contacted courthouse security.
¶ 15 The judge also testified that, several weeks after that incident, she received documents by mail at the courthouse purporting to be a "criminal presentment" from a "De Jure people's Grand Jury in Colorado." The documents demanded that the judge vacate her office and pay over fourteen billion dollars in fines. The documents further stated that a lien would be placed on the judge's home but did not provide an address or a legal description for the home. Brown's signature and fingerprint appeared on the documents.
¶ 16 The judge also described her reaction to Brown's behavior and his statement about "see[ing] if [she] [would]n't get angry" if her child were kidnapped. She said that the kidnapping statement frightened her and that she "[a]bsolutely" believed it was a credible threat. She stated that she was "concerned that [Brown] would locate [her home], or knew where [she] resided," and was concerned for her children's safety because "[h]e knew about" them from viewing the photograph on her bench.
¶ 17 She said she perceived the kidnapping statement as a credible threat because of her familiarity with the record in the D& N case. In addition to an allegation that Brown had threatened to kill the child's mother, the judge said that the petition in the D& N case reported that Brown had allegedly threatened to bring a gun to the hospital where the child's mother was recovering from childbirth. She also testified that she had taken additional safety measures after Brown made the kidnapping statement, including installing motion-activated lights around her home and requesting that a security officer escort her to her car after work.
¶ 18 The jury found Brown guilty of retaliation against a judge based on the kidnapping statement. The trial court sentenced him to five years in prison.
¶ 19 Brown first contends that the trial court erred by concluding that the kidnapping statement was a true threat, not constitutionally protected speech. He asserts that the retaliation statute is unconstitutional as applied to him. We disagree.
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