People v. Brown

• Decision Date: 24 November 1969
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 68--173
• Citation: 253 N.E.2d 140,117 Ill.App.2d 97
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard G. BROWN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 140

253 N.E.2d 140

117 Ill.App.2d 97

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard G. BROWN, Defendant-Appellant.

Gen. No. 68--173.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

Nov. 24, 1969.

Ronald E. Griesheimer, Waukegan, for defendant-appellant.

Jack Hoogasian, State's Atty., Waukegan, for plaintiff-appellee.

DAVIS, Justice.

The defendant, Richard G. Brown, was tried by a jury and found guilty of reckless homicide. He has appealed to this Court contending that he was denied his constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial.

The charge arose out of a motor vehicle accident, which occurred on May 28, 1967. The driver of the other car was fatally injured. At the time of the accident, Joseph Tenuth was a passenger in the defendant's car. The State's Attorney filed a complaint against the defendant on May 29, 1967, charging him with the criem of reckless homicide. The defendant appeared before the court on June 16, 1967, waived preliminary hearing and was bound over to the Grand Jury. At this time, the court set, and the defendant posted, bond. Several other charges against the defendant, which arose out of the same accident, were nolle prossed. The defendant was not then represented by counsel.

Apparently, the State's Attorney took no further action on the case until January 2, 1968, when he presented it to the Grand Jury, which, on that date, returned an indictment against the defendant for reckless homicide. The arraignment was continued until January 26, 1968, so that the public defender could appear on behalf of the defendant. On the letter date the defendant was represented by counsel for the first time. The defendant's counsel entered a plea of not guilty and demanded an immediate trial. On motion of the State's Attorney, the trial was set for March 25, 1968.

When the case was called for trial, the defendant moved for the dismissal of the indictment against him on the ground that the delay, between the time of the filing of the criminal complaint against him and the presentation of the case to the Grand Jury was prejudicial to him and constituted a denial of his right to a speedy trial. Specifically, he stated that during the delay, Joseph Tenuth, the passenger in his car, had changed his residenceAnd that thereafter he could not be located to testify on behalf of the defendant. The trial court held that the delay of six to seven months between the filing of the complaint and return of the indictment did not establish a sufficient basis for the quashing of the indictment.

The defendant contends that the delay in this case denied him the right to a speedy trial guaranteed by Section 9, Article II of the Illinois Constitution, and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and cites The People v. Love, 39 Ill.2d 436, 441, 235 N.E.2d 819 (1968), in support of this contention.

The purpose of the constitutional guarantee to a speedy trial is threefold: (1), to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration before trial; (2), to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation; and (3), to limit the possibility that long delay will impair the ability of the accused to defend himself. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607, 611 (1969); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120, 86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L.Ed.2d 627, 630 (1966); The People v. Tetter, 42 Ill.2d 569, 572, 250 N.E.2d 433 (1969).

Consonant with this purpose, our Supreme Court has recognized that in determining whether one has been denied a speedy trial, the period commences from the time the complaint or other form of accusation is filed, and not from the time of arrest or incarceration. The People v. Love, supra 39 Ill.2d 442, 235 N.E.2d 811. Likewise, the court has rejected the contention that the constitutional guarantee to a speedy trial has no application until after a formal prosecution has commenced, and that prior thereto, any delay is governed exclusively by the statute of limitation. The People v. Hryciuk, 36 Ill.2d 500, 503, 224 N.E.2d 250 (1967).

The delay occasioned between the filing of the original complaint, the presentation of the case to the Grand Jury, and the resulting indictment, could constitute a denial of the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial. Whether it did, in fact, depends upon the circumstances of this particular case, and the application of the governing legal principles.

The United States Supreme Court in Ewell, supra, noted that because of the many procedural safeguards given an accused, the criminal proceeding is designed to move at a deliberate pace. A requirement of unreasonable speed could seriously affect both the rights of an accused and the ability of society to protect itself. The right to a speedy trial is necessarily relative; it is consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances of the case. (383 U.S. p. 120, 86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L.Ed.2d p. 631.)

In Ewell, the defendants originally were indicted in 1962 and pleaded guilty in connection with a narcotics charge. Subsequently, it was held in another case that the type of indictment, to which the defendants had plead, was defective. Their convictions were then vacated, and the defendants were immediately indicted in connection with the same narcotics sales but under a different statutory provision. The court held that under these circumstances, the delay of some 19 months, between the time of the arrest and the subsequent indictments, did not constitute a denial of their constitutional rights. The court observed that the subsequent indictments were brought well within the applicable statute of limitations, and that by the first indictments the defendants had been put on early notice that the government intended to prosecute them with respect to these particular sales of narcotics. It also noted that no witnesses were known to have disappeared and no evidence appeared to have been lost. Our Supreme Court has...