People v. Brown

• Decision Date: 09 May 2012
• Docket Number: No. 1–09–1940.,1–09–1940.
• Citation: 967 N.E.2d 1004,2012 IL App (1st) 091940,359 Ill.Dec. 974
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Dante BROWN, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2012 IL App (1st) 091940

967 N.E.2d 1004

359 Ill.Dec. 974

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Dante BROWN, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 1–09–1940.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division.

April 16, 2012.

Rehearing Denied May 9, 2012.

Michael J. Pelletier, Jennifer Bontrager, both of State Appellate Defender's Office, Chicago, for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez State's Attorney of Cook County, Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Marie Quinlivan Czech, Mary Beth Kinnerk, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[359 Ill.Dec. 978]¶ 1 Following a jury trial, defendant, Dante Brown, was convicted on an accountability theory of two counts of first degree murder and was sentenced to a statutorily mandated sentence of natural life in prison without the possibility of parole. On appeal, defendant asserts that: (1) in light of the evidence of his cognitive disabilities, the trial court improperly denied defendant's motion to suppress a videotaped statement he provided to police on the grounds that he did not intelligently and knowingly waive his constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); and (2) those same cognitive disabilities, and his relative youth, rendered defendant's mandatory natural life sentence unconstitutionally disproportionate. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Defendant and his codefendant, Dwight Allen, were charged by indictment with the October 6, 2003, murders of Charles Edwards III (G–Red or Red) and Charles Edwards IV (Little Rock) ¹, as well as multiple counts of home invasion, armed robbery, residential burglary, and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. The record reflects that defendant and Mr. Allen were charged with murder on the basis of their accountability for the actions of defendant's cousin, Corey Singleton, who actually committed the murders. Mr. Allen pleaded guilty to a single count of murder in exchange for a sentence of 30 years' imprisonment and his promise to testify against Mr. Singleton should he ever be charged. While defendant's brief indicates that he rejected a similar plea, there is no evidence of this in the record. In any case, the charges against defendant proceeded to a jury trial in June of 2008.

¶ 4 Prior to trial, defendant was referred to the circuit court's forensic clinical services for a evaluation as to his fitness to stand trial. It appears that this referral may have been made in response to a letter defendant's mother wrote to the trial court referencing defendant's low intelligence quotient (IQ) scores and history of special education. In March of 2007, a licensed clinical psychologist examined defendant and subsequently informed the trial court that defendant was fit to stand trial.

¶ 5 Defendant also filed a pretrial motion to suppress a videotaped statement he gave on November 15, 2003, when he was 19 years old. The record reveals that on the day before this statement was given, defendant was in police custody and being investigated for an unrelated offense along with Mr. Singleton. At that time, and after he had previously been informed of his Miranda rights, defendant asked Officer (now Detective) Carolyn Keating if he could tell her something. Defendant then told Officer Keating that Mr. Singleton had killed G–Red and Little Rock. Defendant explained that he knew this “because [he] was there.” Officer Keating, who was not then aware of the two murders, contacted the detectives working on the homicide investigation.

[359 Ill.Dec. 979]¶ 6 Defendant was thereafter interviewed by those detectives, as well as by Assistant State's Attorney (ASA) Andreana Turano. Before each interview, defendant was again informed of his Miranda rights and agreed to waive those rights. He then went on to describe his involvement in the murders. Finally, defendant agreed to memorialize his statement on videotape, and that videotaped statement was introduced as evidence at the hearing on the motion to suppress.

¶ 7 That video begins with defendant acknowledging that he had previously been provided his Miranda rights and agreed to speak with the police. Defendant is then again informed of his Miranda rights. Defendant thereafter indicated that he both understood and waived those rights, and he orally agreed to have his statement videotaped; defendant also acknowledged that he had previously consented to the videotaped statement in writing. He then began answering the ASA's questions about the events of October 6, 2003.

¶ 8 Defendant stated that on that date, Mr. Singleton picked him up at his home in a blue Lumina driven by a man defendant called “Jermaine,” the name by which he knew codefendant Mr. Allen.² All three were members of the Black P–Stone street gang. They drove around some time, smoking and drinking. They then drove to Mr. Singleton's home so that Mr. Singleton could retrieve a .38–caliber handgun. Defendant asked to see that gun, and upon inspection he saw that the magazine clip was loaded with 10 rounds of ammunition. Defendant then returned the gun to Mr. Singleton, and Mr. Singleton explained that they were all going to rob G–Red at his home. G–Red was the leader of the same gang, but had recently had someone try to kill Mr. Singleton.

¶ 9 Upon arriving at G–Red's home, Mr. Singleton observed through the window that G–Red appeared to be the only person at home. Before kicking the rear door in and entering, defendant saw Mr. Singleton cock the gun. Defendant was unarmed at the time. Defendant covered his face with a mask and Jermaine had covered his face with a stocking cap. Mr. Singleton had not covered his face, and when defendant was asked why not, defendant stated that Mr. Singleton intended to kill G–Red.

¶ 10 Once inside, Mr. Singleton confronted G–Red and ordered him to give up “every * * * thing you got in this house or I'm gonna kill you.” Defendant, Mr. Singleton, and Jermaine ransacked the house, taking drugs, clothes, and jewelry. During the course of the robbery, Mr. Singleton shot both G–Red and Little Rock-who was G–Red's 16–year–old son-multiple times, killing both.

¶ 11 Thereafter, defendant was taken back to his home. Mr. Singleton kept the items defendant had stolen, giving defendant $50 in cash because they “didn't get too much of nothing” in the robbery. Mr. Singleton also told defendant not to tell anyone what had happened.

¶ 12 After the video was introduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress, defendant presented the testimony of Dr. Nancy Cowardin, who held a doctorate in special education and psychology and was accepted as an expert in educational psychology and special education, as well as a developmental learning specialist. She testified that she was hired by the public defender to assess defendant, and she completed a number of interviews and a battery of tests with him in May of 2004.

¶ 13 Dr. Cowardin testified that the results of these interviews and tests revealed that defendant's general level of intellectual functioning was quite low. His overall IQ score was within the range of those classified as mentally retarded, he read at a first-grade level, and his math skills were at a third-grade level. He had demonstrated difficulties in receiving, processing, and expressing information. She testified that some of these deficiencies were exhibited in the videotaped statement, noting single instances where defendant had difficulty remembering Jermaine's name and the name of the car Jermaine was driving, as well as making errors in syntax.

¶ 14 With regard to the Miranda warnings that defendant was provided, Dr. Cowardin testified that they were “coded” to the level of a 12– or 13–year–old child, a level above that which defendant's test results indicated he could understand. The understanding defendant displayed in the video may have been superficial only and an example of “masking” his actual misunderstanding. She further stated that defendant did very poorly on the verbal portion of the so-called “Gisso” test, which tested his ability to understand the Miranda warnings. Defendant, however, did “very, very well” when the concepts contained in those warnings were presented pictorially, earning “a hundred out of a possible hundred points” on that portion of the test.

¶ 15 Ultimately, Dr. Cowardin expressed concerns and doubts about defendant's ability to understand the Miranda warnings that were provided to him in the videotape. However, on both direct and cross-examination, Dr. Cowardin indicated that she could not be certain that he did not understand those warnings, testifying that it was indeed possible he could have understood them.

¶ 16 At the conclusion of Dr. Cowardin's testimony, defendant indicated that he had no other evidence to introduce in support of his motion to suppress. The State then made a motion for directed finding, which the trial court granted and thus also denied defendant's motion. The trial court found that Dr. Cowardin's testimony was “more relevant to teaching the defendant rather than the particular issue at hand” and “at best you would have to characterize her contribution to this [as] * * * he may have not understood. I don't know.”

¶ 17 The matter proceeded to a jury trial, where defendant's videotaped statement was introduced as evidence by the State. The State also introduced other testimony and evidence regarding the police investigation, including evidence that defendant's fingerprints were found at G–Red's home and that G–Red and Little Rock died of multiple gunshot wounds. Dr. Cowardin also testified at trial, with her trial testimony similar to the testimony she provided at the suppression hearing. Defendant was ultimately found guilty, on a theory of accountability, of two counts of first degree murder.

¶ 18 Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied. The matter proceeded to a sentencing...