People v. Brown
| Decision Date | 07 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | Supreme Court Case No. 21SA110 |
| Citation | 504 P.3d 970 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Alexander BROWN, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant: Beth McCann, District Attorney, Second Judicial District, Victoria M. Cisneros, Deputy District Attorney, Richard F. Lee, Deputy District Attorney, Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee: Megan A. Ring, Public Defender, Matthew E. Catallo, Deputy Public Defender, K. Alexis Sheek, Deputy Public Defender, Denver, Colorado
¶1 The People bring this interlocutory appeal under C.A.R. 4.1, challenging an order of the Denver District Court suppressing Alexander Brown's statements following his detention by the police. The trial court determined that the officers who detained Brown did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a crime had been committed, was being committed, or was about to be committed.
¶2 We conclude that while the trial court erred in considering the officers' subjective intent in effectuating the seizure, it was nonetheless correct that the officers lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to detain Brown. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order suppressing Brown's statements, albeit on other grounds.
¶3 On February 18, 2020, Denver police officers Jesus Galvan and Christina King were patrolling the parking lot of an apartment complex in the area of East 26th Avenue and Martin Luther King Boulevard. During their patrol, the officers discovered a vehicle that had been involved in a hit-and-run accident and, next to it, two vehicles without license plates that the officers suspected were stolen. Beside those vehicles, the officers noticed a red Ford Focus with temporary Colorado tags. Officer Galvan pulled the patrol vehicle partially behind the Ford Focus, blocking its exit. It was late in the evening and dark. The patrol car had its blue headlights on.
¶4 The officers observed two occupants seated in the vehicle and smoke emanating from the car's windows. Officer Galvan approached the driver-side door of the vehicle, while Officer King approached the passenger-side door. The officers made contact with the occupants, which Officer Galvan later testified was necessary "for officer safety" because they were going to be checking for vehicle identification numbers on the neighboring vehicles. Upon making contact with the driver, who identified himself as Alexander Brown, Officer Galvan noticed "a strong smell of burnt marijuana coming out of the vehicle."
¶5 Officer Galvan requested identification from both Brown and the passenger, along with registration and proof of insurance. After running Brown's information and clearing it through the system, Officer Galvan returned Brown's paperwork, and the following exchange took place:
¶6 Officer Galvan then returned to his patrol car to call for a K-9 unit, but, after realizing that one would not be available, he decided not to make the call. Instead, Officer Galvan returned to Brown's car, and Brown then admitted that he had marijuana in the vehicle. Officer Galvan told Brown that he was "not worried about the weed." Rather, Officer Galvan explained, he was worried about firearms and asked if Brown had any in the vehicle.
¶7 Brown then exited his vehicle, and Officer Galvan proceeded to pat him down for weapons. The passenger then stated, "Hey I want to go back into my apartment, can I leave?" Officer Galvan told her, "Yeah, you can leave if you want." The passenger then opened the door and exited the vehicle. Officer Galvan testified that Officer King patted the passenger down for officer safety and, while doing so, discovered a handgun in the passenger's waistband. Upon finding the firearm, Officer King shouted, "Gun, gun." Brown immediately shouted, Brown affirmed that the firearm belonged to him, and Officer Galvan then detained Brown with handcuffs, placed him in a patrol car, and advised him of his Miranda rights. After being read his rights, Brown again confirmed that the firearm was his and explained that he had given it to the passenger because he was scared.
¶8 Brown was charged with one count of possession of a weapon by a previous offender—juvenile offender.
¶9 Brown filed a motion to suppress the admission of the statements he made to the officers, asserting that he was subjected to an investigative detention unsupported by reasonable suspicion, which led to his formal arrest without probable cause in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. At the suppression hearing, defense counsel elaborated, arguing that "from the very beginning of [the] encounter it was an investigatory stop based on the officers' actions, based on where they parked, [and] how they approached." Brown "would [not] have believed he was [ ] free to leave" because "Officer Galvan's squad car was parked behind Mr. Brown's in such a way that Mr. Brown could not back out without hitting the squad car."
¶10 Following multiple motions hearings, the trial court ruled that (1) the initial contact was consensual; (2) the encounter turned into an investigatory stop once Officer Galvan told Brown he was calling to have a dog brought to the scene; (3) Brown did not have standing to challenge the search of the passenger, resulting in discovery of the firearm; and (4) Officers Galvan and King did not have reasonable and articulable suspicion that a crime had been committed, was being committed, or was about to be committed to justify the seizure. Specifically, the trial court found that because Officer Galvan indicated that he was not concerned with the marijuana, he lacked justification for seizing Brown. Thus, the trial court suppressed all statements obtained after Officer Galvan said he was calling for a dog, including Brown's statements that the firearm belonged to him.
¶11 The People then brought this interlocutory appeal.
¶12 We begin by addressing the basis for our jurisdiction and the appropriate standard of review. Next, we discuss the law and standards related to police-citizen encounters, the requirements for establishing reasonable and articulable suspicion for an investigatory stop, and the scope of this court's C.A.R. 4.1 review. We then apply these principles to the record before us and hold that, while the trial court erred by considering the officers' subjective intent, it was nonetheless correct that the officers lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion for the stop. Accordingly, we affirm the portion of the trial court's order suppressing Brown's statements, albeit on different grounds.
¶13 Section 16-12-102(2), C.R.S. (2021), and C.A.R. 4.1 allow the prosecution to file an interlocutory appeal with this court, seeking relief from a trial court's ruling granting a defendant's pretrial motion to suppress evidence.2 However, interlocutory relief under C.A.R. 4.1 is not available to defendants. See People v. Bland , 884 P.2d 312, 322 (Colo. 1994) ; see also People v. Barton, 673 P.2d 1005, 1006 n.1 (Colo. 1984) (). When a trial court resolves a suppression issue against a defendant, this court has no jurisdiction to address it through an interlocutory appeal. People v. Weston, 869 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Colo. 1994).
¶14 On appeal, a trial court's suppression order presents a mixed question of law and fact. People v. Chavez-Barragan, 2016 CO 16, ¶ 9, 365 P.3d 981, 983. We accept and defer to the trial court's findings of historical fact, if supported by competent evidence in the record. Id. However, we review the trial court's conclusions of law de novo. People v. Garcia, 11 P.3d 449, 453 (Colo. 2000).
¶15 The United States and Colorado Constitutions protect against "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amends. IV, XIV ; Colo. Const. art. II, § 7. However, not all encounters between police officers and citizens implicate the Fourth Amendment's protections, as a seizure only occurs when a police officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, restrains a citizen's liberty. See People v. Johnson, 865 P.2d 836, 841 (Colo. 1994) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ). Based on this understanding, "Colorado case law recognizes three general categories of police-citizen encounters: (1) arrest, (2) investigatory stop, and (3) consensual interview." People v. Marujo, 192 P.3d 1003, 1006 (Colo. 2008). Because consensual encounters are requests for "voluntary cooperation," they do not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Id. (quoting People v. Jackson , 39 P.3d 1174, 1179 (Colo. 2002) ). Only arrests and investigatory stops are considered seizures that have such an implication. Id.
¶16 A person is seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when an officer terminates or restrains the person's freedom of movement through an intentional act. See Tate v. People, 2012 CO 75, ¶ 7, 290 P.3d 1268, 1269. To determine if a person's freedom of movement was sufficiently restrained to constitute a seizure, a court must ask...
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