People v. Brownell
| Decision Date | 21 March 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 51646,51646 |
| Citation | 404 N.E.2d 181,79 Ill.2d 508,38 Ill.Dec. 757 |
| Parties | , 38 Ill.Dec. 757 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Curtis J. BROWNELL, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Mary Robinson, Deputy State Appellate Defender, Mark Schuster, Asst. State Appellate Defender, Elgin, and Robert Davison, First Asst. Appellate Defender, Springfield (Martin Carlson, Asst. State Appellate Defender, Chicago, Richard Cunningham, Asst. State Appellate Defender, Elgin, Verlin Meinz, Asst. State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, and Charles M. Schiedel, Asst. State Appellate Defender, Springfield, of counsel), for appellant.
William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and John H. Maville, State's Atty. of Boone County, Belvidere , for the People.
In a five-count indictment the defendant, Curtis J. Brownell, was charged with the murder, aggravated kidnapping and rape of Louise M. Betts. Count I charged that the defendant "committed the offense of murder, in that he, without lawful justification and with the intent to kill Louise M. Betts, strangled" her and thereby caused her death. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a)(1).) Count II charged that the defendant committed murder by strangling Louise M. Betts, knowing that "such act( ) creat(ed) a strong probability of death or great bodily harm." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a)(2).) Count III charged the defendant with felony murder in that he killed the decedent while attempting or committing the forcible felony rape (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a)(3)). Count IV charged the defendant with committing the offense "of Aggravated Kidnaping, in that he, in committing the offense of kidnaping, in violation of Illinois Revised Statutes, chapter thirty-eight, section 10-1(a)(2), knowingly and secretly confined Louise M. Betts against her will and inflicted another felony, to wit: Rape, upon her." Count V charged that the defendant "committed the offense of Rape, in that he, a male person of the age of 14 years and upwards, had sexual intercourse with Louise M. Betts, a female not his wife, by force and against her will." Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 11-1(a).
On September 13, 1978, after a bench trial, the defendant was found guilty of counts I, III, IV, and V by the circuit court of Boone County. Count II was dismissed on the motion of the State. The judgment of conviction under count III was subsequently vacated. A final judgment of conviction was entered as to counts I, IV and V.
The State requested a sentencing hearing for the purpose of imposing the death penalty pursuant to section 9-1(d) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 9-1(d)). The defendant waived a jury proceeding and elected to be sentenced by the court. The court sentenced the defendant to two concurrent terms of 30 to 90 years in the penitentiary for the offenses of aggravated kidnapping and rape. The court found that based on the evidence adduced at trial two aggravating factors had been established that the murdered individual was killed in the course of two other felonies, aggravated kidnapping and rape (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)), and that the murdered individual was an eyewitness against the defendant (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(7)). After hearing evidence in aggravation and mitigation, the court found that the State had proved the two aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt but that the defendant had not established any mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence. The court then sentenced the defendant to death for the offense of murder. The court set November 5, 1979, as the date for the execution of the sentence of death. The sentence was stayed (73 Ill.2d R. 609(a)) pending direct appeal to this court pursuant to Rule 603 (73 Ill.2d R. 603; Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 9-1(i)).
Through a written statement made by the defendant and admitted at trial, it was revealed that on September 27, 1977, the defendant picked up the victim, Louise M. Betts, while she was hitchhiking on a road in Boone County. The defendant held a jack knife to the victim's throat and drove to a road with cornfields on either side. The defendant stopped the car and told the victim to get out and take off her clothes. He then engaged in sexual intercourse with her. The defendant thereafter attempted to strangle the victim, but she was able to get up and run an undetermined distance. The defendant caught her, strangled her again, and then stood or jumped on her stomach and neck. The defendant dragged the victim farther into the cornfield and left her. He said he felt her pulse before he left her but he did not know whether she was dead or not.
The defendant was arrested on another charge on February 2, 1978, by Winnebago County police. On March 31, 1978, Boone County detectives requested an interview with the defendant while he was still in custody in Winnebago County on charges, unrelated to the instant case, of attempted murder and rape. The defendant was interviewed on March 31, 1978, and again on April 1, 1978. Defendant requested counsel after the first interview on March 31, 1978, and was afforded the opportunity to consult with counsel several times beginning at 6:15 p. m. on March 31, 1978. On April 2, 1978, at approximately 2 a. m. the defendant requested to see the detectives. One of the detectives advised the defendant that he had the right to have counsel present and offered to call counsel. The defendant refused the offer, stating that his lawyer would not let him say everything he wished to say.
The defendant signed a rights waiver form and then gave a three-page statement inculpating himself with regard to the aggravated kidnapping, rape and murder of Louise M. Betts.
The defense made a motion to suppress the statement on the basis, inter alia, that he had been denied his right to counsel and his right to remain silent. The motion to suppress was denied. The defense also made motions to bar the imposition of the death sentence, to acquire funds for expert witnesses, to exclude questions on voir dire regarding the veniremen's convictions concerning the death penalty, and to hold the death penalty act unconstitutional. These and several other motions were denied, and are properly preserved for review.
The defendant attacks the written statement on two grounds: first, that its admission against him violated his right against self-incrimination under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and under article I, section 10, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. The defendant argues that the written statement was taken from him in disregard of his right to counsel guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8, of the Illinois Constitution.
The State rejoins that the defendant made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel.
The State has a heavy burden to show that a defendant has waived his constitutional rights in a knowing, intelligent and voluntary manner. (Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 724.) We think that burden has been sufficiently borne here. A detailed review of testimony at trial concerning events leading up to the statement shows that the defendant was in the custody of the Winnebago County police on charges of attempted murder and rape on March 31, 1978. At approximately 2:15 p. m. on that day, Winnebago County detective Robert Ferger, accompanied by Boone County detective Joe Rollins, interviewed the defendant. The defendant interrupted Rollins during the reading of the Miranda rights to ask for his attorney to be present. Rollins did not call the defendant's attorney; instead he ceased questioning the defendant. Before he walked out of the interview room, Rollins placed a picture of Louise Betts, the murder victim, in front of the defendant and asked the defendant if he recognized the person in the picture. According to the testimony of the two detectives received during the hearing on a second motion to suppress, the defendant "jerked back slightly" and responded he did not know the person. The motion to suppress was granted so that the incident with the photograph and testimony of the two officers concerning it were kept from the jury during the trial.
By 6:15 p. m. on March 31, 1978, the defendant was represented by counsel. At that time the defendant appeared in a lineup, concerning the Winnebago County offense. The defendant met with counsel before and after the lineup. After the lineup, Gary Arbisi, a Winnebago County detective investigating the previously referred to offenses informed the defendant that he could speak to the police whether his attorney was present or not. The defendant stated he would follow counsel's advice. Arbisi started to say something else but counsel prevented him from doing so.
The next day, April 1, 1978, at approximately 6 p. m., Arbisi and another detective went to the defendant's home to speak with the defendant's wife concerning information they had received that the defendant had told Mrs. Brownell he was guilty of murder. Mrs. Brownell asked to speak with her lawyer. When counsel arrived he advised Mrs. Brownell not to speak to the detectives. Mrs. Brownell eventually agreed to talk to the detectives, but only if she could first speak with the defendant. The detectives then arranged a visit at the jail between the defendant and his wife. The defendant met separately with counsel, then with his wife and, later, again with counsel. Mrs. Brownell agreed to tell the police "everything" but, after a phone call with the defendant's stepfather, an attorney,...
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