People v. Bruce

• Decision Date: 30 June 1975
• Docket Number: Cr. 26203
• Citation: 122 Cal.Rptr. 648,49 Cal.App.3d 580
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Kenneth Robert BRUCE, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 648

122 Cal.Rptr. 648

49 Cal.App.3d 580

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Kenneth Robert BRUCE, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 26203.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

June 30, 1975.

[49 Cal.App.3d 582] Richard S. Buckley, Public Defender, Los Angeles County, Harold E. Shabo,

John P. Torelli and Richard A. Curtis, Deputy Public Defenders, for defendant and appellant

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen. and Edward T. Fogel, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

COBEY, Acting Presiding Justice.

Kenneth Robert Bruce appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered upon a guilty plea following the denial of his motion to suppress certain items seized by the police at the time of his arrest and a statement he made thereafter. ¹ The appeal lies. (Pen.Code, § 1538.5, subd. (m).)

Appellant contends that the trial court should have suppressed this evidence because the arresting officers acted without probable cause and failed to comply with the knock and notice requirements of Penal Code section 844.

FACTS

About a week prior to the events at issue here, Sgt. Fred Cram of the Sheriff's Department received a tip that someone was dismantling Volkswagens in a garage located at 4422 West Compton Boulevard in Lawndale. Deputy John Martin was dispatched to that location, but he observed nothing. The following night, Martin drove by to check the garage a second time, and again observed nothing. Regularly assigned patrol crews were also notified, but they, too, saw nothing unusual that week.

On January 14, 1974, Martin received an anonymous tip that someone was using a torch inside the garage to cut up a green Volkswagen. He, Cram, and several other deputies drove to the location. From the street, Martin immediately noticed that there were two horizontal slats missing from the main garage door, apparently near its bottom, and through the gap he was able to see the bottom part of a vehicle. He also saw irregular flashes of light inside the garage and a small amount of smoke coming out the door.

Cram positioned himself in front of the main garage door along with one of the deputies, while Martin and the remaining deputies covered the side door. Cram opened the garage door, saw appellant inside, and ordered him to 'stop.' Cram also observed two Volkswagens inside the garage, one of which was still smoldering. Cram concluded that they were probably stolen vehicles in the process of being dismantled. Meanwhile, appellant's cohort had attempted to escape via the side door. He was immediately captured.

Martin then entered the garage and checked the transaxle housings of the two vehicles to obtain their identification numbers. On the first vehicle, he discovered a freshly cut hole where the stamped number would normally be. He reached inside the housing and retrieved it. It still was extremely hot. He discovered a similar hole on the second vehicle, together with the partial remains of the identification number. He found the trunk compartment identification number on the floor at the rear of the garage.

Deputy Martin subsequently verified that both vehicles had, in fact, been stolen. The record is silent as to whether either appellant or his cohort lived in the residence on the premises where they were arrested. ²

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends that the trial court should have suppressed the evidence because the arresting officers acted without probable cause and failed to comply with the knock and notice requirements of Penal Code section 844. Because we agree generally with the latter half of appellant's contention, we need not decide whether the officers acted with probable cause.

Applicability of Knock and Notice Requirements

The threshold question is whether the knock and notice requirements apply to an entry ³ into a detached garage located on a residential premises, such as the one involved here. ⁴ The only reported case on this subject assumed the requirements Are applicable to outbuildings of this type. (People v. Superior Court (Arketa), 10 Cal.App.3d 122, 125, 127, 89 Cal.Rptr. 316.) ⁵ Nevertheless, the Attorney General invites our attention to the language of this section--which refers only to houses ⁶--and he suggests that the Arketa court was, therefore, wrong in its assumption. ⁷ The Attorney General further suggests that: (a) none of the purposes and policies underlying the knock and notice requirements are applicable to garages and outbuildings; and (b) the expectation of privacy associated with structures of this type is significantly less than that associated with the main residence. (People v. Medina, 7 Cal.3d 30, 40, 101 Cal.Rptr. 521, 496 P.2d 433.)

We disagree. To begin with, we recognize, as our Supreme Court did in Medina, that an intrusion into a garage located upon residential premises is less significant an intrusion than one into the main residence. (Id.) But our Supreme Court also recognized in Medina that garages so located are protected by the Fourth Amendment. (Id.) We, therefore, see no reason to retreat from our basic position in People v. Hobbs, 274 Cal.App.2d 402, 406, 79 Cal.Rptr. 281, that a householder generally has a substantial expectation of privacy associated with his garage. ⁸

Second, we believe the purposes and policies underlying the knock and notice requirements are fully applicable to the entry now before us. Those purposes and policies are: (a) to protect individual privacy; (b) to protect innocent persons who may also be present on the premises; (c) to avoid situations conducive to violent confrontations between householders and individuals who enter without proper notice; and (d) to protect peace-officers who otherwise might be injured during such confrontations. (Duke v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.3d 314, 321, 82 Cal.Rptr. 348, 461 P.2d 628.) True, the householder, or his invitee, startled inside a garage may be somewhat less inclined to react violently than he would be if startled inside the living quarters. Nevertheless, the potential for needless violent confrontation is not confined to the residence, and the burden of complying with the knock and notice requirements is slight. For this reason, we believe that the purposes and policies identified in Duke would, on balance, be better served by extending those requirements to the situation before us.

Third, we believe the Attorney General's argument places entirely too much emphasis on the Legislature's use of the word 'house' in section 844. ⁹ Our Supreme Court has deemed the rights protected by this section 'fundamental rights,' ¹⁰ has described the requirement of prior notice of authority and purpose as a requirement "deeply rooted in our heritage," and has further admonished us that it "should not be given grudging application." (People v. Rosales, 68 Cal.2d 299, 304, 66 Cal.Rptr. 1, 5, 437 P.2d 489, 493.) ¹¹ This section, moreover, was intended by the Legislature to codify the common law. (People v. Maddox, 46 Cal.2d 301, 306, 294 P.2d 6.) Its scope must, therefore, be determined with reference to that law, ¹² as well as to the specific words of the enactment. (Id.; Baker v. Baker, 13 Cal. 87, 95.)

Finally, we note that federal courts interpreting a similar statute (18 U.S.C., § 3109) have held that the term 'house' includes outbuildings located within the curtilage. (United States v. Mullin (4th Cir. 1064) 329 F.2d 295, 298--299 (small smokehouse Admittedly, there would appear to be some doubt as to whether this territorial concept of the curtilage, which originally referred to the land and buildings within the shelter of a baron's stone walls, has substantial relevance to the housing conditions of modern life. (People v. Ramsey, supra, 272 Cal.App.2d at 308, 77 Cal.Rptr. 249.) We also recognize that 'the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.' (Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 582.) Nevertheless, the rationale for extending the knock and notice requirements beyond the residence does not involve a mechanical application of the curtilage concept. Instead, the following rationale, stated in Mullin, has been relied on: 'We are not unmindful of the fact that § 3109 speaks of 'house' and we are here concerned with an unannounced entry into an outbuilding, separate and distinct from Perry's residence. However, we are unwilling to construe narrowly a statute which embodies a traditional right which is deeply imbedded in Anglo-American Law.' (329 F.2d at 299.)

located 75 feet from main residence; knock had notice statute applicable); Fields v. United States (5th Cir. 1966) 355 F.2d 543, cert. dismissed 384 U.S. 935, 86 S.Ct. 1452, 16 L.Ed.2d 536 (commercial chicken house outside curtilage; statute inapplicable).)

We, therefore, give an affirmative answer to the threshold question we posed, and hold that the knock and notice requirements are fully applicable to an entry by a peace-officer into a detached garage located on occupied residential property to investigate possible criminal activity occurring therein.

The Attorney General also argues that section 844 is inapplicable because the officers had reason to believe the premises were abandoned and were being used by trespassers for illegal purposes. (People v. Medina, 265 Cal.App.2d 703, 708, 71 Cal.Rptr. 586.) There is no merit in this argument. In Medina, the indicia of abandonment were plentiful. Most of the neighborhood had been abandoned to make way for a freeway project; the residence in question had a 'For Sale' sign and the front lawn was 8 inches high. (Id. at 705, 71 Cal.Rptr. 586.) There were no such indicia present here. ¹³

Compliance Not Excused

The Attorney General next contends that compliance with the knock and notice requirements was, in any event, excused. We find no merit in this contention.

The Attorney General first points to the...