People v. Bruno

• Decision Date: 12 December 2002
• Citation: 752 N.Y.S.2d 34,300 A.D.2d 93
• Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Appellant,<BR>v.<BR>DOMENICK BRUNO, Respondent.<BR>THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Appellant,<BR>v.<BR>VINCENT RENDINO, Respondent.<BR>THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Appellant,<BR>v.<BR>DOMENICK BRUNO, Respondent.<BR>THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Appellant,<BR>v.<BR>VINCENT VIGNOLA, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

300 A.D.2d 93

752 N.Y.S.2d 34

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Appellant,

v.DOMENICK BRUNO, Respondent.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Appellant,

v.VINCENT RENDINO, Respondent.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Appellant,

v.DOMENICK BRUNO, Respondent.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Appellant,

v.VINCENT VIGNOLA, Respondent.

Decided December 12, 2002.

Concur — Nardelli, J.P., Buckley, Rosenberger, Ellerin and Rubin, JJ.

CPL 30.30 (1) (a) requires the People to be ready for trial within six months of the commencement of a criminal action in which a felony is charged (People v McKenna, 76 NY2d 59, 62; People v Myers, 171 AD2d 148, 150, lv denied 79 NY2d 922). The Court of Appeals, in considering the requirements of CPL 30.30, "has consistently construed it in light of its language and its legislative history, both of which conclusively demonstrate that this so-called `speedy trial' statute was intended only to address delays occasioned by prosecutorial inaction" (People v McKenna, supra at 63; People v Anderson, 66 NY2d 529, 535 ["the history of its adoption makes evident that it addresses only the problem of prosecutorial readiness, and is not a speedy trial statute in the constitutional sense"]; People v Myers, supra at 150 ["CPL 30.30 * * * `requires only that the People announce their readiness for the trial of a felony within that (six-month) time period'"]; see also People v Daniels, 217 AD2d 448, appeal dismissed 88 NY2d 917).

The indictments herein arise out of two separate brawls which occurred in the Bronx in 1997 and 1999. Indictment 80/98 accuses defendant Domenick Bruno of attempted assault in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, assault in the second degree, and of acting in concert with defendant Vincent Rendino to commit assault in the first degree, gang assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree, and four counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, and accuses Rendino of two counts of attempted assault in the second degree and two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. Indictment 2090/99 accuses defendants Bruno and Vincent Vignola of acting in concert to commit the crimes of assault in the first degree, attempted assault in the first degree, four counts of assault in the second degree, assault in the third degree, two counts of menacing in the second degree, and two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree.

The statutory six-month period is computed in calendar months and, as a result, it is not necessarily 180 days (see People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201). In the matter at bar, the parties agree that the statutory period is 182 days under Indictment 80/98 and 184 days under Indictment 2090/99. The motion court, in rendering its decision, noted that the latter indictment (2090/99) joined the earlier indictment in April 1999 and all adjournments are treated the same thereafter. The court charged 205 days as to Bruno and 191 days as to Rendino under Indictment 80/98, and 251 days as to both Bruno and Vignola under Indictment 2090/99, and dismissed both indictments. We disagree as to Indictment 80/98 and, accordingly, reinstate that indictment.

Initially, the People dispute the charge of five days for the interval of July 7, 1999 to September 7, 1999. The record indicates that the People requested a five-day adjournment and accepted Bruno's concession that no more than five days should be charged. In motion papers, however, Bruno's counsel conceded that no time should be charged under Indictment 2090/99 and, as a result, five days is now excluded as to that indictment only.

The People also contend that the delay from September 7, 1999 to September 29, 1999 was caused by defendants' motion practice and should be excluded. The focus of the proceedings on September 7 indicates that the People were unable to produce police witnesses and that they were concerned that the complainant may...