People v. Buchanan

• Decision Date: 27 May 2021
• Docket Number: 13576-13576A,Case No. 2018-1758,24/17,2020-03319,Ind. No. 3229/16
• Citation: 147 N.Y.S.3d 53,194 A.D.3d 655
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Timothy BUCHANAN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

194 A.D.3d 655

147 N.Y.S.3d 53

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Timothy BUCHANAN, Defendant-Appellant.

13576-13576A

Ind. No. 3229/16

24/17

Case No. 2018-1758

2020-03319

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.

ENTERED May 27, 2021

Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Alexandra L. Mitter of counsel), for appellant.

Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Stephen J. Kress of counsel), for respondent.

Manzanet–Daniels, J.P., Mazzarelli, Oing, Kennedy, JJ.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Ellen N. Biben, J. at plea; Melissa C. Jackson, J. at sentencing), rendered September 15, 2017, convicting defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of three counts of burglary in the second degree, and sentencing him, as a second violent felony offender, to concurrent terms of nine years; and order, same court (Biben, J.), entered on or about March 2, 2020, which denied defendant's CPL 440.10 motion to vacate the judgment, unanimously reversed, on the law, the pleas as to all counts vacated, and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

The sentencing risk that a defendant would avoid by pleading guilty is an essential consideration in determining whether or not to accept a plea deal. We have stated that "defendants must ... be made aware of the sentencing parameters so that they may assess the propriety of entering a plea of guilty" ( People v. Johnson, 160 A.D.3d 516, 518, 76 N.Y.S.3d 18 [1st Dept. 2018] ). "To that end, a defendant's receipt of inaccurate information regarding ... possible sentencing exposure is clearly a factor which must be considered" ( id. ). Indeed, courts have frequently vacated pleas where defendants had been misinformed about their maximum sentencing exposure (see e.g. People v. Keller, 168 A.D.3d 1098, 92 N.Y.S.3d 415 [2d Dept. 2019] [vacating plea where the defendant was erroneously informed that he could receive a maximum aggregate sentence of 3 to 5 years after trial when the maximum aggregate sentence was 2 to 4 years]; Johnson, 160 A.D.3d at 518, 76 N.Y.S.3d 18 [vacating plea where court erroneously informed the defendant that she could receive up to 25 years in an adult facility and not 3 ? to 10 years in a juvenile facility]; People v. Bobo, 41 A.D.3d 129, 836 N.Y.S.2d 604 [1st Dept. 2007] [vacating plea where the court and the parties were operating on a mistaken belief as to whether sentences imposed would run concurrently], lv denied 9 N.Y.3d 873, 842 N.Y.S.2d 785, 874 N.E.2d 752 [2007] ).

Defendant was told that he faced the possibility of serving three 15–year sentences, to run consecutively, if he chose to proceed to trial, when at most he was facing 20 years because of the statutory cap (see Penal Law § 70.30[1][e][i] ). Thus, he was weighing a 9–year plea offer against what he was told was a maximum of 45 years' imprisonment. Because defendant was not told about the capping statute, he did not have a "full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequences" ( People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d 9, 19, 471 N.Y.S.2d 61, 459 N.E.2d 170 [1983] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

This 25–year disparity between the true legal sentence and the sentence defendant was told he could receive was so significant alone as to render his plea involuntary (see Johnson, 160 A.D.3d at 518, 76 N.Y.S.3d 18 ["Defendant's belief that she was avoiding a much greater risk than she actually was casts doubt on a finding that she had a clear understanding of her guilty plea"]). As defendant explained in his affidavit, submitted in support of his CPL 440.10 motion, the prospect of spending 45 years in prison—and dying there—factored into the 42–year–old's calculation of the relative pros and cons of accepting the plea (see People v. Joseph, 191 A.D.3d 148, 150, 137 N.Y.S.3d 31 [1st Dept. 2020] ).

This decision is consonant with our ruling in People v. Joseph, 191 A.D.3d 148, 137 N.Y.S.3d 31, wherein we held that a plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered where the sentencing court failed to inform the defendant that the capping statute limited the defendant's sentencing exposure to 20 years instead of 45 years as had been represented by the court ( id. ).

There is no basis for concluding that the evidence against defendant rendered the plea offer a reasonable deal. The strength of the alleged facts was never tested since defendant pleaded guilty before the suppression hearing was conducted.

People v. Murray, 175 A.D.3d 1191, 109 N.Y.S.3d 271 (1st Dept. 2019), lv denied 34 N.Y.3d 1018, 114 N.Y.S.3d 768, 138 N.E.3d 497 (2019), a case relied upon by the People and...