People v. Buck

• Decision Date: 14 December 1950
• Docket Number: No. 161612,161612
• Citation: 101 Cal.App.2d Supp. 912,226 P.2d 87
• Parties: 101 Cal.App.2d Supp. 912 PEOPLE v. BUCK. PEOPLE v. GUERRA. PEOPLE v. YOUNGREN. Appellate Department, Superior Court, San Diego County, California
• Court: California Superior Court

Page 87

226 P.2d 87

101 Cal.App.2d Supp. 912

PEOPLE v. BUCK.

PEOPLE v. GUERRA.

PEOPLE v. YOUNGREN.

No. 161612.

Appellate Department, Superior Court, San Diego County, California.

Dec. 14, 1950.

Petition for Rehearing Denied Jan. 9, 1951.

Manuel Ruiz, Jr., Los Angeles, for appellants.

James Don Keller, Dist. Atty., by Duane J. Carnes, Deputy Dist. Atty. San Diego, for respondent.

BURCH, Judge.

The defendants were convicted of a violation of Section 9 of san Diego County Ordinance No. 464 (N.S.) as amended by Ordinance No. 609 (N.S.), which provides that 'it shall be unlawful for any person to drive or to be in actual physical control of any taxicab in the unincorporated areas of the County of San Diego without first obtaining a permit in writing so to do from the Sheriff of the County of San Diego.' It then requires the payment of a $1 fee annually; and examination by the sheriff as to the applicant's knowledge of the provisions of the ordinance; knowledge of the Vehicle Code, traffic regulations and geography of the county; and that the sheriff may grant or deny the permit or may revoke the same if he finds the person holding any such permit to be of bad moral character or convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude. Provision is made that if the permit is refused or revoked by the sheriff the applicant may appeal to the Board of Supervisors for a hearing thereon.

According to the agreed statement of facts, the defendants were arrested while driving taxicabs on the highways in unincorporated territory in San Diego County. The defendants were not stopping to pick up or discharge passengers, using the highways only as a means of transporting passengers for hire from the Republic of Mexico, on their way to a destination outside of the unincorporated areas of the County of San Diego. This was their usual course of business. When not in use the taxicabs were stationed in Tijuana, Republic of Mexico, and all passenger service originated there. The defendants are American citizens.

Each of the defendants had applied for and been denied the license required by the ordinance in question. One only of the defendants appealed from the sheriff's decision to the Board of Supervisors, but his appeal was denied. No one of the defendants has sought in the courts a review of the administrative action. Instead they contend that the ordinance, as applied to them, contravenes the commerce clause of the federal constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, and is therefore void.

Since the constitution and laws of Congress are the supreme laws of the land, we will have to decide whether the ordinance is valid as tested by the commerce clause and acts of Congress thereunder. In this connection, it has been held that neither a tax measure nor a police regulation by local authority may unduly burden nor be discriminatory as to the commerce clause. Our concern here is with a police regulation.

The defendants were engaged in foreign commerce. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28, 68 S.Ct. 358, 92 L.Ed. 455. The ordinance is an exercise of the State's police power properly delegated by the legislature of the State to the Board of Supervisors of the county. In re Martinez, 22 Cal.2d 259, 138 P.2d 10. The federal power over commerce, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, United States Constitution, is supreme, Article VI, Clause 2, United States Constitution. The distribution of power between the State and federal system in regard to commerce belongs to Congress. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Commission, etc., 332 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 190, 92 L.Ed. 128. In the event of conflict in that field the local law must give way to the supremacy of the federal law. Francis et al. v. Southern Pacific Co., 333 U.S. 445, 68 S.Ct. 611, 92 L.Ed. 798. This is true whether the local law be under the taxing power or under the police power in its more conventional sense. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 67 S.Ct. 274, 91 L.Ed. 265. Not all burdens upon commerce but only undue or discriminatory ones are forbidden. Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U.S. 252, 259, 39 S.Ct. 265, 63 L.Ed. 590; Western Live Stock et al. v. Bureau of Revenue et al., 303 U.S. 250, 254, 58 S.Ct. 546, 82 L.Ed. 823; McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 46, 60 S.Ct. 388, 84 L.Ed. 565; Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 61 S.Ct. 586, 85 L.Ed. 888; Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 425, 66 S.Ct. 586, 90 L.Ed. 760. It was recognized in People of State of California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 61 S.Ct. 930, 85 L.Ed. 1219, that positive intervention by Congress was required to displace the reserve power of the State to promote safety and honesty in the business of motor carrier transportation beyond State lines. After Congress 'enters the field' the State law and the State's power to enact law in the same field, stands or falls upon the intent of Congress to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, or to accept the aid of the State. People of State of California v. Zook et al., 336 U.S. 725, 69 S.Ct. 841, 93 L.Ed. 1005.

Congress entered the field of motor vehicle carriers for the first time by Act of August 9, 1935. 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-327. The National Transportation Policy Act was enacted September 18, 1940, c. 722, Tit. I, § 15, 54 Stat. 919. One of the declared purposes of the latter Act is 'to cooperate with the several States and the duly authorized officials thereof'. Section 1, 49 U.S.C.A. note preceding section 1. By Section 303(b) of the above motor vehicle act 'taxicabs, or other motor vehicles performing a bona fide taxicab service, having a capacity of not more than six passengers and not operated on a regular route or between fixed termini' are excluded except 'It shall be the duty of the Commission * * * To regulate * * * qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees and safety of operation and equipment.' 49 U.S.C.A. § 304(a)(2). In performance of this mandate the Interstate Commerce Commission has provided rules and regulations. Code Federal Regulations, Parts 190-197. These cover general definitions, hours of service, qualifications of drivers, driving of motor vehicles, accident reports, inspection and maintenance and carrying of explosives or other dangerous articles by motor vehicles.

Our question for the purpose of decision here is narrowed to whether the ordinance conflicts or cincides with the federal law above outlined. In this respect the ordinance exacts of the defendants at the point where they complain an annual fee of $1 which is no more than the cost of its administration. Defendants offer no evidence to the contrary. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Borough of New Hope, 187 U.S. 419, 23 S.Ct. 204, 47 L.Ed. 240; Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U.S. 252, 39 S.Ct. 265, 63 L.Ed. 590; Sprout v. City of South Bend, 277 U.S. 163, 169, 48 S.Ct. 502, 72 L.Ed. 833; Interstate Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183, 51 S.Ct. 380, 75 L.Ed. 953; South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros. Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 58 S.Ct. 510, 82 L.Ed. 734; Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of Railroad Commissioners, etc., 332 U.S. 495, 68 S.Ct. 167, 92 L.Ed. 99.

One attacking as unreasonably burdening commerce the validity of a regulatory or taxing measure enacted by State authority for the use of the highways, has the burden of showing a want of reasonable relation to the increased cost of maintenance and policing due to such traffic. Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of Railroad Commissioners, etc., supra.

The principal...