People v. Buckley

• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: WACHTLER; ALEXANDER
• Citation: People v. Buckley, 75 N.Y.2d 843, 552 N.Y.S.2d 912, 552 N.E.2d 160 (N.Y. 1990)
• Decision Date: 15 February 1990
• Parties: , 552 N.E.2d 160 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Robert BUCKLEY, Appellant.

Page 912

552 N.Y.S.2d 912

75 N.Y.2d 843, 552 N.E.2d 160

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Robert BUCKLEY, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 15, 1990.

[75 N.Y.2d 844] Edward J. Nowak, Public Defender (Jeffrey Wicks, of counsel), for appellant.

Howard R. Relin, Dist. Atty. (Robert Mastrocola, Rochester, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT MEMORANDUM.

The order of the Appellate Division, 147 A.D.2d 898, 537 N.Y.S.2d 356, should be affirmed.

Defendant has been convicted, after a jury trial, of criminal possession of stolen property in the second degree (Penal Law § 165.45[1]. On this appeal he challenges the first count of the indictment which charges that he and the codefendants knowingly possessed stolen radar detectors belonging to four separate owners which, considered in the aggregate, exceeded $250 in value. ^* Defendant contends that the count is duplicitous because possession of stolen property belonging to separate owners constitutes discrete offenses committed against each property owner individually and, similar to multiple larcenies, may be charged as a single offense only if the property is possessed in furtherance of a common scheme or plan or received at the same time and place. He contends that because the People do not allege in the indictment or bill of particulars that the four instruments were had as part of a common plan, it was error to aggregate the value of the separately stolen property to charge one count of criminal possession of stolen property in the second degree rather than four separate counts of criminal possession of stolen property in a lesser degree. Supreme Court rejected defendant's contention and denied his pretrial motion to dismiss the first count and the Appellate Division affirmed relying on its decision inPeople v. Loret, 136 A.D.2d 316, 526 N.Y.S.2d 872. We agree with those courts.

As defendant acknowledges, the indictment does not allege that any one of the stolen instruments is valued in excess of $250 or as such that possession of any single instrument would by itself constitute the offense. Rather it charges that simultaneous possession of all the stolen instruments constitutes the offense because when aggregated their value exceeds $250. Thus, he does not claim, nor could he, that the first count is duplicitous because it subjects him to multiple convictions for criminal possession of stolen property in the second degree for each stolen instrument he possessed, or that he could be convicted for possession of any one instrument should the District Attorney waive prosecution for possession of another (see, People v. Klipfel, 160 N.Y. 371, 54 N.E. 788; People v. James, 98 A.D.2d 863, 471 N.Y.S.2d 158; see, CPL 200.30[1]. He claims instead that the offense, by definition, entails possession of stolen property belonging to a single owner and that the People may not aggregate the value of stolen property belonging to four separate individuals in the absence of a common scheme or plan.

Defendant's argument rests principally upon a narrow interpretation of the statutory phrase "an owner". Penal Law § 165.45 provides that one is guilty of the offense when he knowingly possesses stolen property "with intent to benefit himself or a person other than an owner thereof or to impede the recovery by an owner thereof" (Penal Law § 165.45 [emphasis added]. The General Construction Law provides, however, that "[w]ords in the singular number include the plural, and in the plural number include the singular" (General Construction Law § 35). This rule of construction "is applicable to every statute unless its general object, or the context of the language construed, or other provisions of law indicate that a different meaning or application was intended" (General Construction Law § 110). The legislative history and context of the language used in Penal Law § 165.45 demonstrate that the gravamen of the...