People v. Byrd
| Decision Date | 06 December 1990 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 1-87-0949,s. 1-87-0949 |
| Citation | 151 Ill.Dec. 905,565 N.E.2d 176,206 Ill.App.3d 996 |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
| Parties | , 151 Ill.Dec. 905 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles BYRD and Larry Watts, Defendants-Appellants. & 1-87-1057. |
Randolph N. Stone, Cook County Public Defender, Chicago (Karen E. Tietz, Asst. Public Defender, of counsel), for defendant-appellant Charles Byrd.
Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, Patricia Unsinn, Asst. Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for defendant-appellant Larry Watts.
Cecil A. Partee, Cook County State's Atty., Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, David R. Butzen, Michele I. Lavin, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.
After a jury trial, defendants, Charles Byrd and Larry Watts, were found guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 12-14(a)(2).) Defendant Watts was sentenced to 10 years and defendant Byrd was sentenced to 8 years to be served in the Illinois Department of Corrections.
On appeal, defendant Watts seeks reversal of his conviction and remand for a new trial, or remand for a new sentencing hearing, or reduction of his sentence to a term of 8 years. Defendant Byrd seeks reversal of his conviction, or reversal of his conviction and remand for new trial, or remand of the cause for a new sentencing hearing.
Watts raises the following issues for review: (1) Whether the State's expert witness rendered an opinion on an ultimate issue that was outside of her expertise; (2) whether the cumulative effect of alleged prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of a fair trial; (3) whether he was denied due process when the trial judge considered statements contained in complainant's impact statement; and (4) whether his 10-year sentence was grossly disparate to the 8-year sentence imposed upon his co-defendant.
Byrd raises essentially the same issues, with the exception of the last issue raised by Watts. However, in addition, Byrd raises the following issues: (1) Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on an accountability theory.
We affirm.
At trial, complainant testified that on July 20, 1985, at approximately 2 a.m., complainant began walking home after visiting Beverly Smith, one of her friends. Beverly walked part of the way with complainant. Complainant testified that in the vicinity of 39th Street and Cottage Grove Avenue, in Chicago, she stopped to talk with two male acquaintances. Shortly thereafter Watts, who was driving a car, saw complainant and honked his car horn to attract her attention. Byrd was riding in the car with Watts as a passenger. Watts parked his car across the street from where complainant stood. He got out of the car to talk with her. He identified himself as a friend of complainant's mother.
After conversing with Watts, complainant agreed to join him in the car; she sat in the front seat and Byrd moved to the back seat. Complainant then asked for a drink. En route to Byrd's apartment, the parties stopped at a liquor store where Watts purchased a 6-pack of beer and a package of cigarettes. Upon their arrival, Byrd and Watts went to the back of the apartment to talk while complainant stayed in the front of the apartment. Watts then invited complainant to join him in the rear of the apartment. When she refused, Watts grabbed complainant and pulled her into one of the rear bedrooms. Byrd, in the meantime, situated himself in another room in the apartment.
Once inside of the bedroom, Watts told complainant to disrobe. When complainant asked Watts to repeat what he had said, he struck her in the face with his fist. Complainant screamed when he hit her. Byrd, who was in another room, asked if Watts was hitting her. Complainant responded that Watts was not hitting her. Watts then struck complainant a second time and told her to take off her clothes. Watts then proceeded to have vaginal and oral intercourse with complainant.
Shortly thereafter, Byrd entered the bedroom. He was nude when he entered the room. Watts then told complainant to tell Byrd to put his penis into her anus. Although complainant complied with this order, Watts struck her again.
After this act and at complainant's request, she was allowed to go to the bathroom. Both Watts and Byrd later joined her in the bathroom and forced her to have oral intercourse with both of them. Watts then poured beer and shampoo into complainant's hair and asked whether she liked what he had done. When complainant answered, he slapped her and stated, "When I ask you something you answer by, yes, ma'am [sic ]." Watts struck her again and she responded as she was told.
Both Watts and Byrd were in the bathroom with complainant while she bathed. Eventually, Watts left complainant alone in the bathroom with Byrd. Byrd proceeded to wash complainant's hair. He then took her into the bedroom and had vaginal intercourse with her. After Byrd completed this act, complainant noted that she was bleeding from the vaginal area. Byrd forced complainant to wipe the blood from his penis and offered her a sanitary napkin. Subsequently, complainant dressed and managed to escape from the apartment.
Once out on the street, about 1 block away from Byrd's apartment, complainant saw a security guard. The guard testified that when complainant approached him at approximately 4 a.m. on July 20, 1985, she asked whether he had a telephone. He noticed that she was badly shaken and crying. He also noticed swelling in the area of her forehead and blood on her mouth. The guard called the police as complainant was too distraught to make the call.
When the police arrived, they proceeded directly to Byrd's apartment. Byrd was arrested outside of his apartment. Watts was arrested inside of the apartment. After being advised of their Miranda rights, Watts told the officers that he did not rape complainant because he "did not come in her."
Complainant was taken to the hospital and received treatment for edema, bruises around both eyes and cheekbones, and abrasions on her buttocks and thighs. The treating physician also found that complainant's bleeding was due to a 4-inch V-shaped laceration on the left side of her vagina.
Byrd testified in his own behalf. He stated that complainant flagged them down while he and Watts were driving in the vicinity of 39th Street and Cottage Grove Avenue. As they drove around the area, they drank liquor and smoked an hallucinogenic drug. Watts then asked complainant to "turn him on." She agreed to do this for a fee of $45. The parties then proceeded to Byrd's apartment. Complainant was allegedly paid before entering the apartment building.
According to Byrd, the parties entered the apartment at approximately 1:50 a.m. After drinking beer and smoking marijuana, Watts and complainant went into one of the bedrooms. Byrd smoked marijuana and watched television in another room in the apartment. Subsequently, he was called into the bedroom with Watts and complainant. At that time, complainant stated, "Come on, [i]t's your time" and she then guided him in an act of anal intercourse. Thereafter, she had oral intercourse with him. After several minutes, complainant asked if she could take a bath. She went into the bathroom and began to run the water. Approximately 10 minutes later, Byrd entered the bathroom with a towel. He, at that time, noticed that complainant was bleeding. She explained that she must have begun her menstrual cycle. Byrd then gave her a sanitary napkin. He testified that he did not have vaginal intercourse with complainant after she took a bath.
Byrd further testified that complainant then went into the room occupied by Watts. After approximately 3 minutes, she left that room and went into another bedroom. Shortly thereafter, complainant left the apartment. Byrd dressed, after he heard her close the apartment door, and went in search of complainant. He stated that he went in search of her because he was concerned for her safety in a neighborhood in which she was unfamiliar. He was arrested shortly thereafter.
Watts testified that he picked up complainant while he and Byrd were en route to the liquor store. Complainant allegedly told Watts that it would cost each of them $25 to have sex with her. Watts subtracted $5 from the quoted amount to pay for the liquor complainant requested. The parties then proceeded to the liquor store. According to Watts, complainant waited in the car while he and Byrd went into the store. When Watts came out, he saw complainant expose her breasts to some men. He struck her and told her not to expose her breasts again. Watts stated that complainant then exposed her breasts again and he struck her a second time. He also stated that he struck complainant twice during the entire incident.
Watts further testified that once they were inside of Byrd's apartment complainant approached him and performed an act of fellatio. Thereafter, complainant told him to call Byrd into the room with them. She then guided Byrd in an act of anal intercourse with her. According to Watts, after this act, complainant had oral intercourse with him. She then went into the bathroom to bathe. Approximately 20 minutes later, Watts saw complainant getting dressed. After dressing, she asked for some money but then stated, "That's all right," and left the apartment. He was arrested sometime thereafter.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found defendants guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault. The court then imposed sentence. It is from this decision that defendants appeal.
Defendants first argue that reversible error was committed when the trial court allowed an expert witness to render an opinion that was outside of her area of expertise. At trial, ...
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