People v. C. Klinck Packing Co.

• Decision Date: 05 February 1915
• Citation: 108 N.E. 278,214 N.Y. 121
• Parties: PEOPLE v. C. KLINCK PACKING CO.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

214 N.Y. 121

108 N.E. 278

PEOPLE

v.C. KLINCK PACKING CO.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 5, 1915.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

The C. Klinck Packing Company was convicted in the County Court of violating section 8a of the Labor Law, and, the conviction having been affirmed by the Appellate Division (164 App. Div. 97,149 N. Y. Supp. 504), it appeals by permission. Affirmed.

See, also, 150 N. Y. Supp. 1101.

During the month of December, 1913, the defendant was engaged in operating within the city of Buffalo a plant and factory for the killing of hogs and the preparation of meats in various forms for consumption. During that time it caused or permitted some of its employés specified in section 8a of the Labor Law (Laws 1913, c. 740) to work for seven days or more consecutively without any day of rest, in violation of the provisions of said section, which at the time in question provided as follows:

‘Sec. 8a. One day of rest in seven.-(1) Every employer of labor engaged in carrying on any factory or mercantile establishment in this state shall allow every person, except those specified in subdivision two, employed in such factory or mercantile establishment at least twenty-four consecutive hours of rest in every seven consecutive days. No employer shall operate any such factory or mercantile establishment on Sunday unless he shall have complied with section shall not authorize any work on Sunday section sahll not authorized any work on Sunday not now or hereafter authorized by law.

‘(2) This section shall not apply to

‘(a) Janitors;

‘(b) Watchmen;

‘(c) Employés whose duties include not more than three hours' work on Sunday in (1) setting sponges in bakeries; (2) caring for live animals; (3) maintaining fires; (4) necessary repairs to boilers or machinery.

‘(d) superintendents or foremen in charge.

‘3. Before operating on Sunday, every employer shall post in a conspicuous place on the premises a schedule containing a list of his employés who are required or allowed to work on Sunday and designating the day of rest for each, and shall file a copy of such schedule with the commissioner of labor. The employer shall promptly file with the said commissioner a copy of every change in such schedule. No employé shall be required or allowed to work on the day of rest so designated for him.

‘4. Every employer shall keep a time-book showing the names and addresses of all employés and the hours worked by each of them in each day, and such time-book shall be open to inspection by the commissioner of labor.

‘5. The industrial board at any time when the preservation of property, life or health requires, may except specific cases for specified periods from the provisions of this act by written orders which shall be recorded as public records.’August Becker and J. Ralph Ulsh, both of Buffalo, for appellant.

Dist. Atty., of Buffalso (Clifford McLaughlin, Dist. Atty., of Buffalo (Clifford McLaughlin, of Buffalo, of counsel), for the People.

HISCOCK, J. (after stating the facts as above).

This appeal presents as its underlying question the important one whether the Legislature may require that in certain occupations employés shall have 24 consecutive hours of rest in every 7 days. The statute which requires this has popularly come to be known as the ‘one day of rest in seven’ law, and with certain exceptions and subject to certain qualifications it provides with appropriate penalties that every employer ‘carrying on any factory or mercantile establishment * * * shall allow every person * * * employed in such factory or mercantile establishment at least twenty-four consecutive hours of rest in every seven consecutive days.’

It is undisputed that this defendant was conducting a factory within the meaning of this law and that it caused or permitted some of its employés to labor without the prescribed rest in violation of the terms of the statute. Its defense is based solely and squarely on the contention that the law is unconstitutional and invalid. Its broad claim is that, in attempting to limit the right of a male adult to contract for his labor in the pursuits named, the Legislature violated the provisions of the Constitution both of the state and the United States which in substantially similar language provide that no person shall be deprived ‘of life, liberty or property without due process of law’ (Const. art. 1, § 6; Const. U. S. Amend. 14), and also the provisions of said Constitutions which respectively provide that ‘no member of this state shall be * * * deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers' (Const. art. 1, § 1), and ‘no state shall * * * deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws' (Const. U. S. Amend. 14).

[1] We agree with the appellant that the statute cannot be sustained as one enforcing the religious observance of any day, but that it must be sustained, if at all, as a valid exercise of the police power of the state, for the promotion and protection of the public health and welfare.

[2] It is, of course, very familiar law that the Legislature, under its so-called police power, may be enactments which really tend to accomplish such beneficial public purposes interfere in many and substantial ways with individual rights, without being considered as in conflict with the constitutional safeguards which surround such individual. The doctrine that personal liberty must yield to what is supposed to be the public welfare has not waned any during recent years, and if the statute now before us comes within the principles which sancton and regulate such legislation, it is not subject to the attack made upon its constitutionality. For the purpose of determining whether it is thus immune we shall first briefly considerits important features and purposes and the effects which it can be seen will naturally flow from its operation.

‘The purpose of [such] a statute must be determined from the natural and legal effect of the language employed; and whether it is or is not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States must be determined from the natural effect of such statutes when put into operation, and not from their proclaimed purpose.’ Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 64, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 546 (49 L. Ed. 937, 3 Ann. Cas. 1133).

We see at the outset that it is applicable only to certain classes of employés. But these are they who work in factories and mercantile establishments. We know as a matter of common observation that such labor is generally indoors and imposes that greater burden on health which comes from confinement many times accompanied by crowded conditions and impure air. Thus special conditions are presented which become a reasonable basis for special consideration.

[3][4] Can we say that the provision for a full day of rest in seven for such employés is so extravagant and unreasonable, so disconnected with the probable promotion of health and welfare that its enactment is beyond the jurisdiction of the Legislature? Or does the very reverse seem to be its character? We have no power of decision of the question whether it is the wisest and best way to offset these conditions and give to employés the protection which they need, even if we had any doubt on that subject. That question, as we have many times said in other similar cases, is for the Legislature. Our only inquiry must be whether the provision on its face seems reasonable, fair, and appropriate, and whether it can fairly be believed that its natural consequences will be in the direction of betterment of public health and welfare, and, therefore, that it is one which the state for its protection and advantage may enact and enforce. It seems to me very clear that we may answer that it is such an one.

The thought of one day of rest in seven has come down to us fortified by centuries of recognition. It is true that often it has been coupled with and perhaps subordinate to the desire for religious observance. But the idea of rest and relaxation from the pursuits of other days has also been present, and whether we like it or not we are compelled to see that in more recent times the feature of rest and recreation has been developing at the expense of the one of religious observance.

I suppose that no one would contend that continued and uninterrupted indoor labor would be good even for an adult man. The laws which have been passed and sustained with general approval in almost every jurisdiction limiting the hours of labor for woman and children and for those engaged in especially trying employments, such as mining and the operation of railroads, amply testify to the widespread belief that in certain fields the public health and welfare are subserved by generous opportunities for relaxation and recuperation. A constantly increasing study of industrial conditions I believe leads to the conviction that the health, happiness, intelligence, and efficiency even of an adult man laboring in such employments as those mentioned in this statute will be increased by a reasonable opportunity for rest, for outdoor life and recreation, for attention to his own affairs, and, if he will, study and education.

[5] Then we come to the question what is a reasonable opportunity, and within wide limits that problem is for the Legislature. Anybody would probably say that one day in thirty or sixty would be too little and one day in each two days extravagant. Between these extremes none can safely assert that the mean adopted by the Legislature of one day in seven is unreasonable. In fact, historical and worldwide customs seem to make it a natural one, and we should not interfere with it.

In our opinion the views we thus entertain are supported both by authorities prescribing general rules for the exercise of the police power and by those dealing with this specific subject of health legislation for...