People v. Caballero

• Decision Date: 18 January 1989
• Docket Number: No. 64252,64252
• Citation: 126 Ill.2d 248,128 Ill.Dec. 1,533 N.E.2d 1089
• Parties: , 128 Ill.Dec. 1, 57 USLW 2466 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Juan CABALLERO, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 1089

533 N.E.2d 1089 126 Ill.2d 248, 128 Ill.Dec. 1, 57 USLW 2466 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,
v.
Juan CABALLERO, Appellant. No. 64252. Supreme Court of Illinois. Jan. 18, 1989.

Page 1090

[126 Ill.2d 257] [128 Ill.Dec. 2] Alan Raphael, with Pat Barnett and Leslie Khoshaba, law students, Chicago, for appellant.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Richard M. Daley, State's Atty., (Terence M. Madsen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, and Kenneth T. McCurry, Kevin Sweeny, Michael J. Kelly and Paula Carstensen, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the people.

Justice CLARK delivered the opinion of the court:

This case involves the petition of the defendant, Juan Caballero, under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985,[126 Ill.2d 258] ch. 38, par. 122-1 et seq.), challenging his convictions and sentences. Together with a codefendant, Luis Ruiz, the defendant was charged by an information filed in the circuit court of Cook County with the murders of three teenage males, Michael Salcido, Arthur Salcido, and Frank Mussa. Charges of armed violence (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 33A-2) and unlawful restraint (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 10-3(a)) regarding each victim were also filed against the defendants. The two cases were then severed, and the two defendants tried before a single judge supervising two separate juries. Both defendants were convicted on all counts. Separate sentencing hearings were then held for the two defendants. The jury found that there existed one or more of the statutory aggravating factors (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, pars. 9-1(d), (g)) and that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of death. Thereafter the defendant was sentenced to death, as was Ruiz. On direct appeal we affirmed the defendant's convictions and death sentence. (People v. Caballero (1984), 102 Ill.2d 23,

Page 1091

[128 Ill.Dec. 3] 79 Ill.Dec. 625, 464 N.E.2d 223). In a separate appeal, Ruiz' convictions and sentence were also affirmed. (People v. Ruiz (1982), 94 Ill.2d 245, 68 Ill.Dec. 890, 447 N.E.2d 148.) The defendant's subsequent petition for post-conviction relief was dismissed without an evidentiary hearing in the circuit court of Cook County, and this appeal followed (107 Ill.2d R. 651).

The facts of this case are adequately set forth in our opinion on the defendant's direct appeal and will be repeated here only where necessary. The defendant raises a number of claims concerning the fairness of his conviction and his sentence. The standard for the evaluation of these claims is clear. A Post-Conviction Hearing Act proceeding is not an appeal per se, but a collateral attack on a judgment. (People v. James (1986), 111 Ill.2d 283, 290, 95 Ill.Dec. 486, 489 N.E.2d 1350.) In order to prevail under the Act, the defendant [126 Ill.2d 259] must establish a substantial deprivation of his rights under the United States Constitution or the Constitution of Illinois. (People v. Griffin (1985), 109 Ill.2d 293, 303, 93 Ill.Dec. 774, 487 N.E.2d 599.) The defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless the allegations of his petition, supported where appropriate by the trial record or by accompanying affidavits, make a substantial showing that the defendant's rights have been so violated. (People v. Gaines (1984), 105 Ill.2d 79, 91-92, 85 Ill.Dec. 269, 473 N.E.2d 868.) For the purpose of determining whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, all well-pleaded facts in the petition and in any accompanying affidavits are to be taken as true. (People v. Cihlar (1984), 125 Ill.App.3d 204, 208, 80 Ill.Dec. 513, 465 N.E.2d 625, aff'd (1986), 111 Ill.2d 212, 95 Ill.Dec. 297, 489 N.E.2d 859; see also People v. Reeves (1952), 412 Ill. 555, 559, 107 N.E.2d 861.) For the sake of clarity, we consider the defendant's challenges to his convictions and his sentence under separate headings.

THE CONVICTIONS

The vast majority of the defendant's challenges to his convictions concern his counsel's performance at trial. The defendant claims that defense counsel erred by: (1) assuming a "belligerent and argumentative attitude" toward the court, (2) antagonizing the jury in his opening statement, (3) failing to present his strongest witnesses or evidence first, (4) inadequately cross-examining prosecution witnesses, (5) presenting a weak and incoherent closing argument, (6) failing to move for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case, and (7) failing to "life-qualify" the jury during voir dire. None of these contentions, in our opinion, serves to establish that the defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial.

The general standard for determining whether a defendant has received effective assistance of counsel at trial or at a death penalty hearing has two components: deficiency and prejudice. The defendant must prove: (1) [126 Ill.2d 260] that his counsel made errors so serious, and his performance was so deficient, that he was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution, and (2) that these deficiencies so prejudiced the defendant as to deprive him of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. (Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693.) The standard for assessing claimed deficiencies in an attorney's performance is that of "reasonably effective assistance" which is within the range of "competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." The standard is one of objective reasonableness, under "prevailing professional norms." (466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693-94.) To establish a deficiency, the defendant must overcome the strong presumption that the challenged action or lack of action might be the product of " 'sound trial strategy.' " 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694-95.

Even assuming a deficiency, the defendant must still demonstrate prejudice. Under Strickland, a defendant who demonstrates that his counsel's trial performance fell below prevailing professional norms must also show that there is a "reasonable

Page 1092

[128 Ill.Dec. 4] probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt." (466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698.) As the Supreme Court noted in Strickland, claims of ineffectiveness can often be disposed of on the ground that the defendant suffered no prejudice from the claimed errors, without deciding whether the errors were serious enough to constitute less than reasonably effective assistance. (466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 699.) As is the case with many other defendants who make similar claims, the defendant, in his argument, has attempted to reverse this procedure. He dwells heavily on the alleged [126 Ill.2d 261] deficiencies in trial counsel's performance but makes little attempt to demonstrate to a reasonable probability that, absent these deficiencies, the jury would have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. Since most of the claimed errors concerned relatively trivial matters, and since the evidence of the defendant's guilt was substantial if not overwhelming, the defendant was not prejudiced by any of the errors alleged.

It must be remembered that the defendant gave a detailed confession of his guilt, which was admitted at trial. In this confession he told how he, together with three companions, abducted the three victims, who had claimed to know members of a rival street gang. In the confession he admitted that he personally stabbed and cut the throat of one of the victims. Extensive physical and forensic evidence corroborated many of the details of the confession. The prosecution also introduced evidence that the defendant had made a less specific admission of guilt to a cell mate.

The defendant testified in his own behalf, repudiating his confession and asserting that it was extracted from him by force. He also presented the testimony of his mother and of two other, less important witnesses. Throughout the trial his counsel attempted to show that the confession was involuntary.

It is against this factual background that most of the defendant's claims of ineffective assistance must be judged. In most cases the defendant has not even argued, much less demonstrated, a reasonable probability that the jury would have found the defendant not guilty had his counsel acted as the defendant now wishes that he had. For example, the defendant maintains that trial counsel's "belligerent and argumentative" attitude towards the trial judge may have alienated the jury. Since all but one of the incidents of "belligerence" occurred outside the presence of the jury, it is difficult to understand[126 Ill.2d 262] how they could have affected, let alone changed, the jury's verdict. But in any event the allegation that the jury would have found the defendant not guilty if the relationship between defense counsel and the trial judge had been more amicable does not ring true.

It is undeniable that matters of presentation and style may have some subliminal effect on a jury. But we must normally presume that a jury has been persuaded by the strength of the evidence and not by the eloquence of counsel. Unless counsel's demeanor falls vastly below professional standards, and unless we can say to a reasonable probability that this deficiency caused a jury which would have acquitted to convict, we cannot and should not reverse. Besides, it is difficult to determine prevailing professional norms on matters which are so inherently subjective. One man's belligerent argumentativeness is another man's vigorous advocacy.

These same considerations apply to most of the remainder of the defendant's claims. We cannot say, to a reasonable probability, that the jury would have acquitted the defendant if defense counsel had not...