People v. Callicott
| Decision Date | 28 October 1926 |
| Docket Number | No. 17292.,17292. |
| Citation | 153 N.E. 688,322 Ill. 390 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. CALLICOTT. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to Circuit Court, Fayette County; William B. Wright, Judge.
Wade Callicott was convicted of escaping from the Illinois State Farm, a felony, and he brings error.
Affirmed.Brown & Burnside, of Vandalia, for plaintiff in error.
Oscar E. Carlstrom, Atty. Gen., Will P. Welker, State's Atty., of Vandalia, and Virgil L. Blanding, of Springfield, for the People.
The record in this case, which is before this court for review upon writ of error, shows that at the September, 1924, probate term of the county court of Gallatin county plaintiff in error waived a jury trial and entered his plea of guilty to an information charging him with the crime of carrying a deadly weapon concealed upon his person, and was sentenced as a part of his punishment for one year at the state farm at Vandalia. He was received there as a prisoner on September 9, 1924, and escaped therefrom about one month later. He was recaptured, and at the August, 1925, term of the Fayette circuit court was tried, convicted, and sentenced to an indeterminate term in the penitentiary upon an indictment charging him with a violation of section 5 of chapter 118 (Smith's Stat. 1925, p. 2096), which provides:
‘Whoever being a prisoner at the Illinois State Farm escapes therefrom is guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than one year nor more than ten years.’
[1][4] It is contended by plaintiff in error that this statute is in contravention of the constitution of the state in that it constitutes special legislation, and that it violates section 22 of article 4 of the Constitution in granting to prisoners confined at another prison a special privilege and immunity. While the placing of any special burden upon any individual differing from the burden placed upon other individuals in a like situation constitutes a special privilege or immunity, laws will not be regarded as special or class legislation merely because they affect one class and not another, provided they affect all members of the same class alike, People v. Sisk, 297 Ill. 314, 130 N. E. 696. Classification of the objects of legislation is not required to be scientific, logical, or consistent if it is reasonably adapted to secure the purpose for which it is intended and is not purely arbitrary. The Legislature has authority to determine upon what differences a distinction may be made for the purpose of statutory classification between objects otherwise having resemblance, though such power cannot be arbitrarily exercised and the distinction must have a reasonable basis. A legislative classification must be palpably arbitrary to authorize a judicial review of it, and it cannot be disturbed by the courts unless they can see clearly that there is no fair reason for the application of the law to the particular individuals while others of the same class are excluded. Stewart v. Brady, 300 Ill. 425, 133 N. E. 310. That all prisoners are not considered as belonging to one class is evidenced by the fact that they are classified by law and by the courts. One class of prisoners is sentenced to county jails, another to hard labor in a house of correction, another to the penitentiary, and still another to the state farm, and each class of prisoners is subject to different rules and regulations. They bear different burdens and have different immunities. The state farm was created for a particular purpose and for a particular class of offenders. While it is a penal institution, it is the only one of its particular kind in the state. The persons committed to it are all placed on the same footing, and no discrimination is made by this statute among its inmates. Differing from other penal institutions, no walls of brick or stone have been built to retain its inmates, and for that reason the Legislature may have enacted this statute to take their place and to act as a deterrent for the prevention of escapes. The contention of plaintiff in error that this statute is class or special legislation is not tenable.
[5][6] It is next contended that the statute is void because of section 11 of article 2 of the Constitution, which requires that ‘all penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense.’ Originally, at common law a breach of prison was a felony although with benefit of clergy. 21...
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People v. Close
... ... ( People v. Saltis, 328 Ill. 494 [160 N.E. 86]; People v. Callicott, 322 id. [Ill.] 390 [153 N.E. 688]; People v. Talbot, 322 id. [Ill.] 416 [153 N.E. 693]; People v. Butler, 268 id. [Ill.] 635 [109 N.E. 677]; Sokel v. People, 212 id. [Ill.] 238 [72 N.E. 382].) Exceptions are generally mere matters of defense. ( Sokel v. People, supra; Beasley v. People, ... ...
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People v. Sharpe
...its constitution" or was "so wholly disproportioned to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community." People v. Callicott, 322 Ill. 390, 393, 153 N.E. 688 (1926). For years, this restrictive test would remain the sole standard under which this court evaluated proportionate penal......
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Griffin v. Cook Cnty.
...or consistent if it is reasonably adapted to secure the purpose for which it was intended and is not purely arbitrary. People v. Callicott, 322 Ill. 390, 153 N.E. 688. But an act which places upon one citizen a burden or confers on him a privilege not placed or conferred on all others in hi......
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